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Edited by Irving Howe

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



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Luther Carpenter

Time for Some Answers

It is clear by now that the Reagan administration is fulfilling the predictions of economic and social disaster that left-liberals made before Reagan's election. Capitalism isn't revitalized; instead, more than 25 percent of our productive capacity and almost 9 percent of our labor force are idle. Corporations and wealthy individuals have not invested the proceeds of their new tax cuts in new plants and equipment. Nor do they plan to do so. The Commerce Department's "survey of American business executives shows them planning a five-tenths of 1 percent decline in 'real,' or inflation-adjusted, spending in 1982 compared with 1981" (*New York Times,* Jan. 14, p. D2). The unemployed and those who use public services are "sacrificing" in vain.

Most Democrats are sitting back, waiting for the Reagan administration to destroy itself. Their tactic is self-defeating. First, it is hard to believe that the Administration won't get *some* Keynesian expansion out of a $100 billion deficit. While this effect couldn't possibly justify the suffering that's being inflicted, it could becloud the issues enough to keep the Reaganites in control of Congress in the 1982 elections. Second, it leaves the Democrats without a policy to apply if they regain the presidency in 1984. Just as Carter was the Democrats' Ford, someone else can become the Democrats' Reagan. By 1984, Reagan may have destroyed the federal government's capacity to manage the economy and to assist anyone not a businessman. It won't be possible simply to reverse the cuts; a new Administration will have to rebuild government.

Most liberal Democrats have fought against sections of the Reaganite program, especially cuts in social programs. That is necessary, but not enough. For every outrage that comes to public attention, such as tax exemptions to subsidize school segregation, ten more end up in the back pages. We need to start work now on a labor-left-liberal program that can tell us which outrages to publicize the most, and we must give a positive alternative to Reagan's simple-minded Social Darwinism.

We want full employment. We want to use government to fill the needs that people can't obtain through a market economy. We want everyone to have a valued place in society, instead of having a frustrated working or lower-middle class going backward and an underclass going nowhere.

Simply returning to the New Deal isn't enough either. Its conservative Keynesianism doesn't work well economically, and the Reaganites have already "out-Keynesed" us. (By "conservative Keynesianism" I mean the budgetary policy that considers the size of the federal deficit the only instrument for expanding the economy, and tax cuts the only way to increase the deficit.) Government now is the main tool we have, so we are going to have to use it to pump money into the economy; but we are going to have to direct that money into rebuilding the economy, while conservative Keynesianism and supply-side economics let money flow into unproductive uses. To rebuild the economy, we need to stop the leaks and to create new mechanisms for public investment.

THERE ARE FOUR obvious places to pump money: (1) rebuilding the country's infrastructure; (2) research and development; (3) new plants and equipment; and (4) housing. The government already provides lots of money to these areas—but in ineffective ways. Much of what we want can be obtained by converting existing "tax expenditures" into direct expenditures. (Tax expenditures include exemptions from taxes, tax credits, and lowered taxes on capital gains.) These conversions can keep our program from increasing the federal deficit. In addition, we can easily transfer money from the military budget to productive uses.

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• The United States' infrastructure is crumbling—roads, bridges, railroads, water supplies, and the postal service, all of which were built with federal money. Meanwhile, the government continues to emphasize new public works of dubious value—Westway, the Tennessee-Tombigbee waterway, the Tellico dam—over maintenance and rebuilding. Hardly anyone denies that infrastructure is a legitimate public concern and that infrastructure expenditures can reduce shipping costs and aid expansion. There have already been some raids on the Highway Trust Fund; let's convert it into an Infrastructure Fund, with rebuilding and maintenance as its primary purpose.

• Businessmen complain that the U.S. spends far less than Japan and Germany on research and development; nonetheless, they aren't doing anything about it. The government already finances much of our R & D, directly through the Defense Department and indirectly through tax expenditures. Years ago, I remember reading that half of America's scientists worked in defense and aerospace. Let's aim at freeing half of them for civilian use. If we just dumped them, the way Reagan dumps the resources embodied in his budget cuts, they wouldn't be used; let's establish instead regional laboratories to hire many of them. New York State and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute have made space available at low rents to ambitious inventors. The same thing could be done elsewhere, using surplus schools or other public property, and providing some public support services (marketing advice, links to venture capital, and bookkeeping). Leftists shouldn't let their suspicions of business get in the way of encouraging people with ideas.

• R & D is a special instance of the way our investment mechanism has become clogged. There is money floating around, but it doesn't get converted into real capital. Speculation, subsidized by tax breaks, and high-yield tax-exempt bonds mean that a new process or plant has to promise a 25 percent or 30 percent return to be attractive. We have to eliminate these breaks. One of Reagan's most loyal senators, Peter Domenici, admits that tax expenditures come to an astounding $266 billion. The *New Republic* (Feb. 10, in "Reagan's Articles of Confederation") says that we could get $16 billion in 1982 from reversing new tax breaks for oil companies and another $32 billion from "limiting capital gains deductions to productive investments, limiting nonbusiness interest deductions, and halving business entertainment allowances."

Plugging the loopholes will make real investment more competitive, and also generate funds that the federal government could devote directly to investment. Here we need a Federal Investment Fund, similar to Britain's National Enterprise Board. The Fund should be provided with a chunk of capital each year, to be used for direct investment in undercapitalized or struggling companies and to support new inventions or expansion in critical sectors such as energy. Government investment should no longer be restricted to "losers." The Fund should take equity positions, and sell them (perhaps to employee cooperatives) when the company is stable; it should recycle the proceeds for further direct investments. The Fund should have representation from labor, business, and consumer groups. It should not be dominated by Wall Street, nor deal through the stock exchanges and banks. The stranglehold of these institutions on investment is one of our biggest problems. In effect, capital markets now act in an oligopolistic manner. For example, if "normal" supply and demand theory operated, the banks would lower interest rates when the money supply increases; instead, they raise rates to anticipate inflation. Leif H. Olsen, of Citibank, says that investors are demanding more for their money, despite Reagan's recession. "He notes that real interest rates (after subtracting current inflation) have averaged about 8 percent since the end of 1980, while for a quarter of a century before that they did not run above 4 percent and usually were well below it." (In "The Growing Money Muddle," by Leonard Silk, *New York Times*, Feb. 5, p. D2.) This behavior is a new structural obstacle to real investment and can only be broken by using a Federal Investment Fund to finance investments directly.

• A similar fund could operate in housing, where high interest rates have choked off new construction and the private housing industry won't build for ordinary people. A revolving Federal Housing Fund could contract with builders, including worker cooperatives, to build for working people (*not* public housing that is restricted to the poorest). There would have to be an income limit or the wealthy would get all the benefit; but this limit should be high, perhaps one and a-half times the median family income. The Housing Fund also should finance renovation and should build for sale and for rental. Its aim should be comfortable, energy-efficient, basic housing—integrated in terms of class and race, filling in and stabilizing existing marginal and working-class neighborhoods wherever possible.

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A LOT OF WORK, obviously, must be done to quantify these ideas, make them into an alternate federal budget, and work out their econometric impact. I don't think they will create full employment by themselves, so we will have to consider general reductions in the work week. Full employment and economic reconstruction have to be given at least as much weight as rebuilding the social services; full employment is the key to everything else.

I have emphasized housing because it is one of the main problems for working-class or lower-middle-class families. And in this sector we can break out of the trap that conservatives have forced us into, by identifying social services with programs aimed exclusively at the poor. Often, of course, this identification has been dishonestly fabricated by conservatives.

Conservatives have intentionally wrecked such words as "welfare." They have cut benefits such as Food Stamps and Social Security Survivors' Benefits to those who were just getting by—forcing them into poverty or into a bitter struggle to avoid poverty. We have to fight this whole conception of the social services with an emphasis on universal social benefits.

• We need to use this perspective to evaluate all the social programs that the Reaganites intend to destroy. Clearly, the most universal program—Social Security—stands up best against conservative hatred. I do not mean to denigrate Food Stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children. They do, of course, meet real needs, and Food Stamps served a large section of the working population until the conservatives shamefully distorted eligibility requirements. But I think we have to recast our whole policy toward families, so these programs don't stand alone. If we abolished income tax exemptions for children; used an equivalent amount of money for cash family allowances to all persons with dependent children or aged family members, relative to family size; made these cash allowances taxable, to get back some of the money from the wealthiest; integrated AFDC into this family allowance system as an additional benefit for low-income families, tapering off as family income rose—we could come up with a positive family policy or a social wage.

Such a policy would help poor and working people feel part of the society. It would give us a positive answer to the Reaganites' double negative: they claim to be profamily while hurting people who aren't in traditional families, and prowork while hurting those who can't get work. We would provide genuine help to people who work and take care of children and the aged.

THESE EMPHASES—rebuilding the investment mechanism for full employment and a positive family policy—can become the centerpieces of a new social bargain. We must present them as a social contract, an agreement between the people and the government. To serve as a social contract, they must be the result of visible public bargaining.

The AFL–CIO's package, which includes credit

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STU Smith, a federal union shop steward who is attempting to organize the Senate's restaurant workers, complains that some of the same senators who loudly petitioned the Polish government on behalf of Solidarity's right to organize workers have been mysteriously silent when it comes to unionizing the people who serve the solons their meals at the Capitol.

Senate staff workers deny this, but Mr. Smith asks, "Where are all the liberals?" He contends that he has locked in a vault 133 pledge cards with the signatures of a majority of the 200 or so workers in the Senate's half-dozen restaurants and cafeterias. While various labor laws do not apply in the Capitol, Mr. Smith says the workers' constitutional right to petition Congress is being ignored as he seeks recognition for his group, the Capitol Employees Organizing Group.

His campaign is focusing on the Rules Committee and its chairman, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Republican of Maryland. "My boss doesn't intend to stand in anybody's way," said Joseph E. diGenova, director and chief counsel of the committee. "It's strictly a situation they have control over," he said of the workers, noting that Mr. Smith has approached various senators over the issue without so far enlisting active supporters.

Mr. Smith has presented his complaint to the International Labor Office, the United Nations affiliate, as a violation of basic human rights. The office says it is studying the matter. Meantime, Mr. Smith invites any senators curious to meet the workers outside their passive service roles to come to the workers' Christmas party Dec. 18 in Room G-219 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. "They'll find lots of soul," he says.

— *New York Times,* "Briefings," Dec. 13, 1981 □

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controls, a new Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and housing, has started negotiations. Labor must be a full partner—but, in return, unions may have to agree to an incomes policy. Now 80 percent of the labor force isn't in unions; how can they be integrated into the bargain?

Grass-roots coalitions can broaden the consultation. If we bring enough people into the bargain, then we can generate enough pressure to force business to negotiate. We have to close their loopholes and challenge their monopoly of powers over the economy—and get them to see that negotiation is better than the stagnation and bitterness that Reagan's policies cause. □

Murray Hausknecht

David Stockman — "How the World Works"

The beginnings of the almost palpable meanness of spirit that pervades the Reagan administration's domestic policies go back to the early Nixon years. The new element is the institutionalization of meanness; that is, meanness of spirit is now expected and approved, while generosity is defined as worthy only of derision.

Institutionalized meanness overlaps traditional capitalist orientations, but it also represents something of a departure. Take the air controllers' strike. The Administration broke not only the strike but the union as well. It was a calculated action designed to warn other federal unions as well as the entire labor movement that the power of the federal government was aligned with the interests of management. The Administration did not stop there; it refused to let the controllers return to their jobs. In this we see a characteristic meanness.

This meanness is different from the stereotypical "capitalist exploitation of the working class," because the harsh oppression associated with the "dark Satanic mills" that formed the backdrop to *Das Kapital* has now been softened. The notion of "the welfare state" creates a cultural expectation that the state has the duty to mitigate some of the effects of inequality. But the new meanness of spirit implies that this obligation is neither met nor respected, and when institutionalized there is, at best, an indifference to the consequences of inequality and, a worst, a positive antagonism to the claims of those who suffer from these inequalities.

There is a further implication: in the formulation of policies the consequences of inequalities are seen as irrelevant. When the nutritional needs of children in poor families are routinely ignored in budgetary proposals, meanness has become institutionalized. Weaving meanness into legislative and administrative action is not so easy, since it runs against the grain of the welfare state—even one so primitive as our own. We can get some idea of what is required to establish these new patterns from the recent *Atlantic* article "The Education of David Stockman," by William Greider. It helps us understand, to use one of Stockman's favorite phrases, "how the world works."

Stockman, not unlike many who later formed the New Left, came from a family in which politics was important. His Republican maternal grandfather held an elective county office for 20 years, and his mother was active in local Republican politics. When he went to college in 1964 he had read and absorbed Barry Goldwater's *The Conscience of a Conservative*, so that how the world works was not a problem for him. But college turned out to be a sort of Trojan Horse, an unexpected intellectual trauma. "My first professor was an atheist and a socialist from Brooklyn [Jewish, too, maybe?], and within three months I think he destroyed everything I believed in, from God to the flag." This is surely hyperbole. It is quite likely there was a professor from Brooklyn, perhaps even "an atheist and socialist," but he is probably emblematic of a far from unusual experience. The exposure of bright, young students to new and cosmopolitan

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perspectives is the stock-in-trade of colleges, making what is heretofore taken for granted highly problematic.

Stockman's confidence in the rightness of the world he had been raised in was further shaken by his participation in the antiwar movement, albeit as a member of the Methodist youth center on campus. Another sign of change was his switch of major from agriculture to the humanities. Just as some New Leftists questioned the ideological concerns of their left and liberal-minded parents, Stockman seems to have done the same thing rather more indirectly and quietly.

There was, in short, no radical break or complete alienation from family traditions. Upon graduation Stockman began theological studies at Harvard Divinity School, but soon drifted from theology to the social sciences, studying with James Q. Wilson, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and Nathan Glazer. These mentors were undoubtedly useful in providing a picture of how the world works that reconciled the conservatism learned at his mother's knee and the realities of a modern capitalist economy. From the classroom Stockman went to work on Representative John Anderson's staff and eventually to Congress as a representative of his home district.

IN CONGRESS, Stockman applied himself to the traditional task of using federal programs for the benefit of his constituents by using "a computerized alert system for grants and loans from the myriad of agencies to make certain that no opportunities were missed." Stockman says, "I went around and cut all the ribbons and they [the constituents] never knew I voted against the damn programs." He also voted against the Chrysler bailout, although a Chrysler supplier was located in his district. Seemingly principled action is accompanied by a streak of contempt for constituents and their needs.

The other side of the coin of contempt is a sense of moral superiority. "Too many politicians are intimidated by the squeaking wheel. . . . Regardless of their ideological viewpoint, they're able to incorporate the squeaking wheel into their general positions. . . . It is whatever serves the constituencies." Stockman believes that service to a constituency conflicts with "the national interest" and makes "idea-based agendas" (his term) impossible. Sometimes moral superiority fades into intellectual superiority. "The traditional Republicans probably sensed. even if they didn't know it, that their ideas lacked intellectual responsibility."

Stockman also believes that government assistance should go only to those with "strong claims" rather than to politically powerful groups. Morality requires a willingness "to attack strong clients with weak claims." But in leading the battle for the Administration's budget and tax bills—a struggle in which Stockman proved himself to be an adept practitioner of traditional political bargaining—he consistently bowed to those groups with the most political muscle. Yet, to the very end, Stockman sees himself as a moral actor in a crowd of immoral others. Although an important participant in the final stages of the tax bill fight he could still say, *"Do you realize the greed that came to the forefront? . . . The hogs were really feeding. The greed level, the level of opportunism, just got out of control."*

There is something reminiscent of the '60s in Stockman's sense of his own rectitude vis-à-vis both his constituents and his fellow politicians. The student activists railed against "hypocrisy," which meant anything that smacked of "compromise" or a failure to hold out for the ideal solution. Liberals and unions were disdained because their objective was an extension of the welfare state rather than "revolution." Like Stockman, the student activists were committed to "idea-based agendas" and were prepared to ignore the actual needs and wants of the people with whom they identified.

Most of these students eventually lapsed into inactivity or, if they remained active, modified their conceptions of how the world works. Similarly, Stockman's recent experiences affected his ideas of how the world works as he tried to remake it in the image of supply-side economics. "I don't believe too much in momentum theory anymore. . . . I believe in institutional inertia." Among the inertial forces are Republican conservatives as well as the dread Democratic liberals, and a note of bitterness is added to that of moral outrage: "I have a new theory . . . there are no *real* conservatives in Congress. . . ." That is, there are those, like himself, who are principled but forced by circumstances to come to terms with institutional realities and there are others whose conservatism is merely a mask for "opportunism."

Is there a contradiction between what I take to be Stockman's view of himself and his actual behavior? If he is so principled a conservative that he is outraged by the greed and hoggishness he has exposed, and if it is true, as he states, that in the Reagan administration the claims of the powerful triumph over those of the weak, how can he continue to hold office in such an Administration—especially after calling attention to its immorality?

Part of the answer lies in human weakness: high

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office and power are not easily surrendered even when the power threatens to be circumscribed. Another part of the answer lies in the way Stockman has distanced himself, intellectually and morally, from others. Although his initial conceptions of how the world works have proved to be inadequate, he is prepared to revise them in the light of experience—thus his concession that supply-side economics is nothing but the old Republican trickle-down theory. But his experiences have not altered his sense of moral and intellectual superiority or his contempt for ordinary citizens. Indeed, experience has confirmed that greed and hoggishness and "a lack of intellectual responsibility" still dominate the self-proclaimed conservatives, and, therefore, *he* is needed more than ever.

Here, then, is one possible answer to what is required for the institutionalization of meanness in America. It takes, most obviously, an old-fashioned, traditional desire on the part of those with wealth and power to reclaim the small inroads the welfare state has made on their privileged position—greed and hoggishness point the way to meanness.

Beyond that, there is the additional force of commitment from those who have distanced themselves, morally and intellectually, from the concerns of ordinary citizens. Those who separate themselves in this fashion neither recognize nor are affected by the pain they produce in others as they pursue their vision of how the world ought to work. □

Jeri Laber

Human Rights in Yugoslavia

Belgrade at first seemed very different from the other East European capitals I had visited. The crimson flag of the U.S.S.R. was nowhere to be seen, nor were there lines of grim-faced people waiting in front of the shops. Compared to stores in Prague and Warsaw, those in Belgrade seemed laden with food and appliances, many of the latter of Western make. People on the streets were cheerful and outgoing. It was sunny and warm, unseasonably balmy weather for November, giving the misleading impression that Yugoslavia is quite untouched by the gray chill that pervades the rest of Eastern Europe.

Appearances, however, are deceiving in Yugoslavia. As Milovan Djilas, the country's leading dissident, pointed out to me, "Yugoslavia is neither free nor stable, despite what people in the United States would like to believe." Djilas, like most of the Yugoslavs I met, believes that the United States government is so intent on maintaining stability in post-Tito Yugoslavia that it refuses to acknowledge the serious political and economic difficulties that exist there.

I visited the Belgrade offices of Srdja Popovic, a courageous, dedicated lawyer who since 1965 has been representing people charged with political "crimes." Like just about everyone else I met in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, Mr. Popovic knows that his office, apartment, and telephone are bugged. He knows exactly where and when the microphones were hidden in his office, but he has not tried to remove them since they will only be reinstalled. He spoke softly, but without reticence, as he described to me some of the recent political cases in which he has been involved.

Srdja Popovic was one of the defense attorneys for Dr. Marko Veselica, a 45-year-old Croatian professor of political economy at the University of Zagreb who was sentenced to 11 years in prison on September 9, 1981. Dr. Veselica was convicted of disseminating "hostile propaganda" and "participating in hostile activities." Mr. Popovic believes that one of the reasons for the excessive length of Dr. Veselica's sentence is that he had written to the European Helsinki Group asking to become a member. The Yugoslav government, like other

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East European governments, is wary of any contact between its citizens and foreign human rights groups.

Srdja Popovic himself was arrested back in 1975 and sentenced to one year in prison, a result of his legal activities. His appeals for support from international lawyers' groups resulted in vehement protest in the West, enough to convince the government to suspend his sentence and disbar him instead for a year. This experience convinced him of the efficacy of international protest, but only on a massive scale. "A little bit of protest will hurt rather than help," he observed.

POLITICAL REPRESSION in Yugoslavia has increased since Tito's death in May 1980. Many see this as a reflection of the insecurity of the collective leadership that has replaced Tito. The crackdown has been especially severe in Croatia where the government is fearful of the outspoken liberal intelligen-

El Salvador: Talk or Big Talk?

Can they really be serious? There are simpletons enough in the Administration. But can they be so simple as to think they can impose a military solution in El Salvador—whether by sending Marines to the rescue or propping a decrepit and faltering junta with extensive arms shipments?

Secretary of State Haig hasn't said that the Administration would send troops to El Salvador, not in so many words. He has merely hinted at the possibility; in an interview reported in the papers in February he let it be known that El Salvador differed from Vietnam in that our national security was immediately at stake in the Caribbean, which it was not in the earlier abomination. All that amounts to is an acknowledgment on the highest level that the U.S. engagement in Vietnam was unpardonable. It offers nothing but tremors of fear that we might be enmeshed in a "little" Vietnam.

Even if only a threat, the hints dropped by Haig and other State Department officials express the one policy that will *not* bring peace to El Salvador. Even the Pentagon is reported as finding the prospect of military engagement in that unhappy country distasteful. And Defense Secretary Weinberger has steered clear of the mess by taking himself to Ryadh and Amman (to fight the Russians there).

"Little" or "big" Vietnam, we are back to body counts. Every objective source reports massive violations of human rights in El Salvador, with junta soldiers killing civilians by the hundreds. And the various guerrilla groups in their forays kill their quota too. By the time this comment appears, the number will swell. In its 1981 Report to Congress on human rights around the world, the Administration confirms that the situation is getting worse in Central America (and other parts of the world) but offers the pretense that it is improving in El Salvador. By how much? By the standards of Chile? Afghanistan? One less person imprisoned or tortured? One less killed?

The *New York Times* (Feb. 5) observed that "Mr. Hinton [U.S. ambassador] estimates total guerrilla strength at 4,500 to 5,000. That they can frustrate a much better equipped, regular army of 18,000 surely reflects sadly on the American premise that the Duarte regime can gain favor with the population of 4.7 million *without broadening its political base toward the left.*" [Emphasis added.] Precisely; the Duarte regime is faltering, and no charade of "fair" elections in March will save it.

If the Administration's present course is continued some consequences are predictable: the extreme left will intensify its activities and possibly win new adherents. And should it actually come to sending U.S. troops, we'll offer the Administration another predictable scenario—wide protests here in the U.S.

These Latin American countries are no longer banana republics, and the time is long past when United Fruit Co. could depend on Marines landing to put down rebellious peasants. The merest suggestion will only serve to inflame Latin America and the population at home. Helicopters and bombers, even if manned by junta personnel, will do little more than multiply casualties.

What then? Negotiate! Admittedly, the word comes more easily in the saying than in doing. How? Well, the U.S. can and should play a role even if only because it has committed so much to the junta's hopeless position. It could press Duarte to sit down and talk with the opposition; that's plural. The good offices of other countries—say, of Mexico—could be employed to persuade the opposition forces to join in talks that would promise fair elections, under rigid supervision, and with a program guaranteeing the protection of human rights and land reform. Where? In San Salvador. In Mexico. In Paris. Why, even at the White House dinner table where the delegates could eat off the new dinnerware.

Easy? Oh no! Not at all. The world may see the junta crumbling but its leaders can deceive themselves so long as they receive encouragement from the U.S. And, let's face it, the guerrilla factions can deceive themselves too. But at some point the talking has to begin.

EMANUEL GELTMAN □

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tsia and of the powerful Catholic church. Several people told me that political prisoners are tortured in Zagreb, the Croatian capital. I was warned that if I tried to meet with dissidents in Zagreb I would be arrested immediately and expelled from the country.

Most of the recent trials in Zagreb have involved charges of disseminating "hostile propaganda." Dr. Franjo Tudjman, a 59-year-old historian and former army general, was sentenced to three years for giving an interview to foreign journalists. Vlado Gotovac, a 51-year-old writer, was sentenced to two years in prison, also for contact with foreign journalists. Dobroslav Paraga, a 20-year-old student, was sentenced to three years in prison for collecting signatures on a petition asking for an amnesty for political prisoners. In Belgrade the poet Gojko Djogo was sentenced to two years in prison for anti-Tito sentiments that were discerned in his work. The official "cult of Tito" is even stronger in Yugoslavia since Tito's death; no word of criticism, no matter how oblique, is tolerated.

I found great concern in Yugoslavia about deaths, arrests, and disorder among the Albanian minority in the Kosovo region, where the government has brought in tanks and troops to subdue student and worker riots. News has been sparse from that part of the country and the issues there are complex. Hundreds of young people have been summarily sentenced after trials resembling court-martials, with punishments ranging up to 15 years in prison.

Since Tito's death a number of petitions have been circulated in Yugoslavia, including one signed by 100 people urging the removal of Article 131, which forbids "hostile propaganda," from the penal code. As in other East European countries, the people who have signed these petitions have subsequently been persecuted, deprived of their jobs or their freedom to publish.

Among the better known victims of cultural persecution are the members of the "*Praxis* group," eight Marxist professors connected with the journal *Praxis*. In 1975, after ten years of publication, the journal was suddenly banned, presumably on orders from Tito who believed that he had been implicitly criticized in its pages. The professors were suspended from their university jobs. In December 1980, after considerable protest from their colleagues in the West, they were partially reinstated: they are now permitted to conduct research in a special institute, but they have not been allowed to resume teaching or publishing.

Another group of intellectuals recently filed a petition requesting permission to start an independent journal called *Javnost* (Forum). No government funds were requested and the petition was enthusiastically received by other intellectuals. Nevertheless, permission to start the journal was denied and the nine founders were attacked in the press.

Like intellectuals in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Yugoslav intellectuals maintain a "flying university." For the last three years about 40 people have been meeting unofficially in a private home where they discuss ideology, history, and just about anything else that they find of interest. The police keep close watch on this group but have not tried to break it up.

All of the intellectuals I met in Yugoslavia were pessimistic about the future. Many believe that a struggle for power within the collective leadership will result in the emergence of a one-man dictatorship.

The Yugoslav economy has been propped up by Western loans, given unconditionally to maintain the "independent, united, and nonaligned Yugoslavia" that the U.S. State Department considers "crucial to European and world stability." Yugoslavia's foreign debt is now estimated at $20 billion, higher per capita than that of Poland. Economic mismanagement has led to higher levels of inflation and unemployment. Of late there have been sudden unexpected shortages of staple goods, an unhealthy sign. Butter was in short supply when I was in Belgrade, and I was told of gasoline shortages that had caused the cancellation of scheduled airplane flights.

YUGOSLAVIA'S SENSITIVITY to Western criticism combined with its dependence on Western economic aid would appear to provide the United States with good leverage to effect some human rights changes there. Instead, the U.S. government has chosen to look the other way. It is a policy that precedes the election of Ronald Reagan.

On July 29, 1980, at a briefing commemorating the fifth anniversary of the Helsinki Accords, a State Department spokesman was asked whether the Carter administration would support an appeal by 36 Yugoslav intellectuals for political amnesty. The response was that it would not be "useful to comment" because the Yugoslav government's "positive approach to many aspects of human rights is an important component of the special respect that Yugoslavia enjoys in this country." Radio Free Europe does not broadcast to Yugoslavia at all and the Voice of America, by some accounts, is indistinguishable in content from Radio Belgrade.

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Yugoslavia's human rights record has gone unchallenged by the West at the Helsinki Review Conference in Madrid. The United States government's Helsinki Commission (CSCE), a monitoring agency that has done an outstanding job of documenting human rights violations in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and even the United States, has omitted Yugoslavia from its reports.

I know of only one public statement made by an official of the Carter administration about repression in Yugoslavia. The official was then Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia Derian. In testifying before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations on September 16, 1980, she included Yugoslavia in a rundown of human rights performance in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. Ms. Derian cited a report by the federal public prosecutor in Belgrade acknowledging that each year there are about 300 prosecutions for political crimes in Yugoslavia and that nine-tenths of those crimes are "verbal statements."

It is interesting to note that Ms. Derian's testimony was immediately attacked in the Yugoslav newspaper *NIN*. Rather than exploit such sensitivity, the United States government has chosen a policy of exempting Yugoslavia from pressure, refusing to recognize that true stability cannot be achieved in Yugoslavia as long as independent thinking is treated as a political crime. □

Stanley A. Gacek

Repression in Brazil

General Jaruzelski's martial-law regime has swiftly and mercilessly trampled on independent trade unionism in Poland for the present moment. We are all aware of this bitter turn of events. But few know of another crackdown on workers that has been occurring in a nation that the Reagan administration considers a friend—Brazil.

The two regimes, of course, are very different. Poland has been a Communist autocracy with a state-run economy for 36 years. Brazil, on the other hand, had the semblance of a liberal democracy with a market economy. But in 1964, after a relatively bloodless coup, the Brazilian military sacked the government. By 1979, the Brazilian national security regime decided that it would return more of the state to civilian control and expand civil liberties. But this process of *abertura*, or "opening-up," has been marred by state repression of trade unionism. It has checked independent unionism by use of police violence and imprisonment of union leadership. The Brazilian state has also entangled the unions in a web of complex laws, making them little more than progovernment welfare societies:

- The government now has the legal authority to intervene in any union and may remove union leaders from office by promulgating an ad hoc decree-law.

- The state establishes the jurisdictional boundaries of all trade unions. It determines which professions or crafts are included in a particular union and the geographic area in which a union can operate. In this way, the government controls the large and highly organized unions and the smaller, more militant organizations.

- The government determines the entire trade union structure, including the vertical relations between the local unions and their national confederations and the lateral relations between the local organizations.

- The government holds the purse strings to union budgets. Revenues from paychecks of all workers are pooled into a common, state-controlled fund and are then allocated to the unions according to a predetermined formula. "Political expenditures," a legal term that can extend to virtually all basic union organizing activities, if necessary, are prohibited.

- The government directs all of the bargaining sessions, which are limited primarily to the discus-

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sion of wage bonuses. Negotiation of job security measures is outside the law.

- Unions can strike only after fulfilling a number of intricate requirements that leave little room for "legal" strikes.

In addition to the Labor Code, the Brazilian government has applied the vaguely worded provisions of its National Security Law (NSL) to labor activity. For instance, "acts of collective disobedience" and "subversive propaganda," including "subversive" rallies and demonstrations, are subject to prosecution, precluding most trade union tactics. This repressive legal apparatus was recently applied to several Brazilian unionists.

On November 19, 1981, the Brazilian Army's Permanent Council of Justice in São Paulo reconvicted 11 metalworkers under NSL for having directed a general strike in the auto and metal trades in the greater São Paulo area in April 1980. Among the defendants was the renowned Luíz Inacio da Silva ("Lula"), often called the "Lech Walesa of Brazil" by the Brazilian and European press. He was the former president of the Metalworkers' Union of São Bernardo do Campo. (São Bernardo is an industrial suburb of São Paulo, Brazil's largest city.) He has been sentenced to a three and one-half year prison term along with several other defendants. The remainder of the convicted metalworkers face sentences ranging from two to two and one-half years. The convictions prohibit the defendants from holding any union or political office.

The 11 unionists were originally tried on the same charges on February 24–25, 1981. The government argued that the defendants' decision to lead the general strike constituted an unlawful act of "collective disobedience." But the government's evidence did not show that the defendants had ordered the metalworkers to walk off their jobs. Rather, the facts indicated that the leaders had simply followed the majority vote of the workers to maintain the strike.

On February 23, 1981, Nelson Guimarães, the chief judge and only civilian justice on the five-member military tribunal, informed the defendants and their counsel that he had examined the record developed in the pretrial procedure and had already reached a guilty verdict. The defendants concluded that they could not participate in a proceeding with conviction the *fait accompli*. They also knew that the justices could not conduct a trial of the first instance without the presence of defense counsel, unless the boycott were of indefinite duration. Only in a second trial would the court be empowered to appoint counsel for the defendants and proceed. Accordingly, the defendants and their lawyers decided not to appear.

The defendants were predictably convicted and sentenced on February 25, 1981. On September 2, the Supreme Military Tribunal in Brasilia reversed the trial court's decision, finding that the lower tribunal had unlawfully proceeded in the absence of the defendants and their counsel. Although the original trial was annulled, military court procedure makes a retrial automatic. On November 19, the São Paulo Council of Justice reconvicted the 11 unionists.

The defense attorneys have appealed the second trial to the Supreme Military Tribunal and an appellate hearing is expected soon. But even if the martial high court should overturn the November verdict (and there will be enormous pressure from the government not to do so), Lula and one other union leader face additional NSL charges.

In July 1980, a farmworkers' union leader named Wilson Souza Pinheiro was murdered near the city of Brasiléia in the state of Acre. The workers suspected that local farmers were responsible for the crime. A few days after the murder, the local unions invited Lula and Jacó Bittar, president of the Oil and Refinery Workers of Campinas, to speak to the farmworkers. One day after Lula and Bittar delivered their speeches, a foreman was murdered. The Federal Police instituted a formal inquest and charged Lula and Bittar with having "incited class struggle and violence among classes" (Article 36, Section 4, NSL).

The state has no evidentiary basis for its recent charges against Lula and Bittar. Neither unionist made the slightest suggestion of murder or violence in the July speeches. Nevertheless, an unfounded indictment, even without conviction, disqualifies the accused from union and political posts. A hearing is expected some time this year.

The general strike of April 1980 was motivated by legitimate trade union concerns—better wage rates and job security. (Brazilian auto and metalworkers averaged about 60 cents an hour in the São Paulo area in 1980–81 and had little or no contractual protection against arbitrary firings.) The Brazilian workers also struck to assert the same right sought by their Polish counterparts in the Gdansk shipyards—independent unionism. Their demands were met with police violence, government intervention, imprisonment, and felony convictions

THE POLISH TRAGEDY should not divert our attention from other despicable cases of worker oppression

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throughout the world. In the interests of independent trade unionism and worker solidarity, the AFL–CIO and the U.S. unions outside the federation might publicly speak out for the unjustly convicted Brazilian unionists If the U.S. government has a consistent commitment to human rights, it will strengthen its moral position by demonstrating a modicum of concern for several Brazilian labor leaders who are no less heroic than their Polish sisters and brothers. □

Gérard Sandoz

The Changing Face of France

What Has the Mitterrand Government Done So Far?

Once the Socialist François Mitterrand assumed power, the catchword "transformation" swept France. The term is rather apt, for since Mitterrand's victory there has been a wave of reforms. The new Socialist cabinet has been tackling several important tasks at once. It has nationalized a number of the nation's largest companies, including virtually all banks and savings and loan associations. (These nationalizations have met stiff resistance from the conservative right and the Constitutional Council, which has forced the government to modify its aims somewhat. According to the right, the cabinet has passed legislation to give a share in the management of industrial enterprises to workers and their trade unions. The 39-hour work week has replaced the 40-hour week, and a 35-hour week is planned for 1985; and a law imposing heavy taxes on large fortunes and aiming at a more equitable income tax structure has been adopted by Parliament.

The "social reforms" Mitterrand had promised were immediately implemented. First came the abolition of capital punishment. Then followed a liberal review of penal legislation that aimed at replacing repressive practices with a system favoring rehabilitation. And, finally, the National Security Court was abolished, a sort of exceptional judiciary body whose function has been to judge "political crimes."

Three changes warrant special mention. First, the budget for social research has been greatly expanded. Second, the budget "for reducing inequality in the access to culture" has been doubled. And third, the Socialist government has passed legislation that will tend to abolish, over the coming years, some centralized, "Jacobin" structures inherited from Napoleonic times, with the aim of replacing them with a more flexible system that will give municipalities, counties, and regions more autonomy.

These measures, of course, have been violently attacked by the country's conservatives, who had found their defeat in the May-June '81 elections rather traumatic. They now have denounced various nationalizations as an attempt to destroy the free-enterprise system, and a quasi-Bolshevik "collectivization."

The truth, however, is somewhat different. Once all the decreed nationalizations have taken place (all are to be effected by 1988, the end of Mitterrand's term), 84 percent of the country's industry will remain in private hands. Moreover, the indemnification of the former owners has generally been accepted as appropriate, even in financial circles. Besides, nationalizations have never produced cataclysms in France: government intervention in business has deep roots in French history, going back to Colbert, and General de Gaulle too didn't hesitate to resort to nationalizations at the end of World War II. Nobody minded: Renault, which he nationalized, still is very much a going concern.

Yet nationalizations do pose a problem—even among Socialists. No doubt, many sup-

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port them out of ideological considerations. For the Marxists, who are not without influence, nationalizations mean "breaking with capitalism," which was one of the planks in the Socialist platform during Mitterrand's campaign. Advocates for this sort of "early Marxism" defend the idea of the collective appropriation of the means of production and exchange. This conception, spurned nowadays by most European social democrats, is still upheld by a minority in the French Socialist party.

In the cabinet discussions, such "moderate" ministers as Jacques Delors (Finance) and Michel Rocard (Economic Planning) argued for keeping the nationalizations down and for a mere increase in government controls of certain important companies. They feared overbureaucratization and the hostility of business interests in a difficult economic period.

If Mitterrand has pushed through the nationalizations promised before his election, it is not for ideological reasons. He believes that strong government influence in the key sectors of the economy is indispensable for catching up with other industrial nations in the machine-tool industry, electronics, and metallurgy.

BUT BEYOND the quarrel over nationalization, just what is the "vision" of the Socialist government? Some "radical socialist" project? Or a social democratic one, adapted to the French situation?

There can be no off-the-cuff answer to this question. If you read the Socialist pronouncements or listen to the speeches of Socialist ministers and militants, you get the impression of internal conflict. The last Socialist party congress, convened after the election victories, voted for resolutions in which a "gradual break with capitalism" occupied a large place. Yet these same texts contain passages that seem to throw a different light on the current Socialist approach: "Political power," says one, "is located in our Administration. Economic power, however, remains with the big banks and industrial cartels. Is there to be conflict or compromise between these two centers of power?" The answer seems clear: "Since we have opted for a gradual transformation of the economic system, we must seek a compromise that will further significant social change and progress for labor. The compromise we want will bring about a new 'power situation' characterized by certain structural transformations and quantitative modifications favorable to labor."

This "compromise" must be described as essentially social democratic. In an interview with Jean Daniel, editor of the left-wing weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*, Mitterrand explained that his approach was that of "radical social democracy." The term is open to various interpretation. For Mitterrand it seems to imply a determination to champion not merely the more feasible reforms, but also those that face strong opposition (which some of Europe's social democratic parties have not done in the past).

The way Mitterrand has put together his cabinet seems quite significant. His premier, Pierre Mauroy, typifies French "municipal socialism" with its "reformist" traditions rooted in the working-class north. Mauroy is a social democrat *à la française*, more eager to effect practical reforms than indulge in ideological harangues. His averred ideal is a socialism of the Swedish social democratic type.

The same is true of the finance minister, Jacques Delors. Formed in the Christian trade union movement and imbued with the "personalist" notions of the Catholic philosopher Emmanuel Mounier, Delors is essentially a pragmatist who has studied the problems of social relations, professional education, and popular culture. More Keynesian than Marxist, he advocates a policy of stimulating demand by raising the wages of low-income workers while also preserving capital's investment capacity. He doesn't in the least mind being considered a social democrat.

The same holds true of several other key ministers. Michel Rocard, minister of planning, was one of the advocates of an idea that has spread like wildfire in France and greatly influenced the non-Communist trade union organization CFDT: the idea of self-management, that is, the participation of the citizenry in economic affairs.

This picture would be incomplete without mention of the four Communists in the cabinet, who hold the portfolios for Health, Transport, Public Administration, and Professional Education—four ministries whose decisions cannot significantly affect the government's strategy.

Four ministers representing the French Communist party, one of the most doctrinaire in Europe, in a Socialist government! The thought gives one pause. Mitterrand, since the 1960s a partisan of a united left, had an easily understandable concern when he invited these Communists into his cabinet: he was aware

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that the French left could not succeed in taking over from the conservative government if it was not able to integrate the powerful Communist party into the normal course of political life.

This strategy of inclusion is full of perils, yet based on an almost incontrovertible argument. It is Mitterrand's bet that the presence of a Leninist party in French society is a historical anomaly, explained partly by the late industrialization of the country and partly by the fact that this lag hindered the growth of a reformist connection between a large social democratic party and a trade union organization—a pattern that may be observed in other European countries. As France has succeeded, during the last 30 years, in closing this gap, and as the country's evolution tends to diminish the importance of the old industrial proletariat and to increase that of new strata characteristic of modern industrial societies, a change in thinking has come about. For in the last analysis, even the working masses under the sway of the CP, far from being convinced of the need for Leninist revolutionary tactics, now have a "reformist" bias.

Developments in the past few years have confirmed this line of reasoning. Gradually the decline of the French CP has become evident; indeed, as we all know, in the last elections the party suffered one of the gravest setbacks in its history. Most of the Socialist leaders reason that this decline will continue; slowly, because consciousness always lags behind social evolution, yet surely, because Bolshevik strategies will be increasingly out of gear with the real situation of the country.

Why then was it necessary to appoint Communist ministers in a Socialist cabinet? The answer offered by the Socialists is simple: since the Communist leaders—though only after great delay and with much reticence—encouraged their followers to vote for François Mitterrand, it was necessary to integrate their millions of voters into the new majority, and to give them the feeling that they belonged to the reformist current that had found its expression in the Socialist victory. It also made sense to co-opt CP representatives in order to bar the possibility of CP pressure on the government from the outside through strikes by the CP-controlled union, the CGT. Finally, it was advisable, and a way of taking advantage of the disarray of the CP—which the French public now views as an accretion of dead weight, desperately trying to maintain its "Leninist identity" in a society that tends more and more to look askance upon this dogmatism.

The French Socialist strategy in regard to the Communists consists essentially in despoiling the CP of the two levers through which it may exert force: the leadership of the CGT, and a strong presence in the mayoralties of several big cities. The Polish coup has provoked violent conflicts in both the CGT's leadership and its rank and file. Thus France has witnessed the astonishing spectacle of four Communist ministers endorsing the French government's severe condemnation of the Warsaw coup, while the leaders of the French Communist party refused to do so. Whether the Communist ministers will choose to remain in the cabinet, and for how long, no one can say. Whatever they'll decide to do, the French CP will end up in a weakened position.*

WHAT NOW are the outlines of Mitterrand's foreign policy? First, and foremost, he wants France to remain loyal to the Atlantic Alliance. On this point there is an indisputable continuity with the policies of de Gaulle, Pompidou, and Giscard d'Estaing.

There is also a continuity in France's will to maintain independence in dealings with the superpowers. It seems essential to Mitterrand that France, by possessing a nuclear deterrent, be able to influence—if only potentially—U.S. foreign policy, which he deems uncertain, unpredictable, and sometimes dangerous. Perhaps Mitterrand overestimates his country's influence in this matter; France is now, after all, a second-rank power. One might argue that this approach may be unrealistic as long as it is not accompanied by a firm will to bring the free European countries into closer association, both in political and military terms. Yet if France's position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union is unambiguous—that is, entirely firm in its opposition to Communist expansion—its position vis-à-vis the United States is more complex.

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* The government's recent decision to conclude an accord with Moscow on the delivery of Siberian gas has tarnished Mitterrand's image and excited great doubts within the ranks of the Socialist party and the non-Communist trade unions. This sort of "*réalisme d'état*" in the wake of the repression of the Polish labor movement has, on the whole, not been understood or accepted.

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Paris reproaches Washington on three issues. The first is American policy toward the Third World. The French believe that, by its failure to take into consideration the basic needs of the underdeveloped countries and by its refusal to modify the terms of trade with these nations, the U.S. is miring itself in a policy of suicidal egoism that opens the way for Communist penetration. The second reproach is closely related to the first. The French maintain that everywhere in these areas, especially in South and Central America, the United States firmly supports the most reactionary circles—thus abandoning to movements of right-wing and left-wing totalitarian inspiration fields of action that might be occupied by movements and organizations of liberal or socialist-tending character. The third reproach—formulated by French Socialists at the time of the Warsaw putsch—is that the foreign policy of the United States, to all appearances directed against Soviet expansionism, reposes in reality upon the Yalta Agreement, which ordained the partition of the world into zones of influence.

I shall not examine the validity of these reproaches. What should be clear is that they explain several of Mitterrand's foreign policy initiatives, such as France's official recognition of the two Salvadoran "liberation fronts," and the decision to sell arms to Nicaragua. These actions reveal a distrust of the United States' aims in that part of the world. They also mark the hope of Socialist France that a "totalitarian deviation" can still be avoided in Nicaragua, and that a liberal evolution may still be envisaged in El Salvador. Mitterrand's attitude corresponds with that of the Socialist International. In the Polish situation, however, the French Socialists severely reproved Willy Brandt, the president of the Socialist International, for his "soft" attitude toward the military regime, and for his refusal to firmly back Solidarity.

Nonetheless, the foreign policy of Socialist France, though clear enough as regards the Soviet Union and the United States, remains a bit tainted with a "nationalist" tone, especially in regard to the European sphere. Two attitudes on Europe are prevalent among the French Socialists: the one, upheld by many "left" Socialists, is distinguished by a certain sense of a "special French mission"; the other emphasizes European solidarity. François Mitterrand seems to entertain both these attitudes, and this at times gives rise to a certain wooliness in his European policy.

WHAT CAN be expected of Mitterrand's France? The French president, who likes to compare his position to that of Léon Blum, head of the Popular Front government in the '30s, has two great advantages over that Socialist figure: more time, and political stability. With his seven-year term, and a Socialist majority in Parliament until at least 1985, he has a reliable political power base. Paradoxically, the system of the Fifth Republic, which Socialists so vehemently opposed for the power it lodged in the presidency, may now be put to use in the service of a Socialist current of thought.

And how does that current like to present itself? French Socialists are fond of evoking the future "cultural, social, and economic transformation," adding that they will strive for a "consequential policy of reforms." A glance at their projects for the next few years shows that these are high ambitions. I've already mentioned a number of them. Of especial interest is the present effort to widen access to culture, which entails the rejection of a policy that had, during the entire postwar period, favored cultural elitism. There is also a plan in the works for large-scale popular housing; schools and universities are to be "democratized"; and measures have been taken to favor a more humane attitude toward immigrant workers.

These are important projects, whose realization will require a sustained effort. The forces of the right, despite their electoral defeat, continue to dispose of large resources, not only in the world of big business but also among the middle class. These groups' resistance (e.g., the doctors' "uprising" against the democratization of health services) must be taken into consideration. Some compromises will be struck. In the economic sphere such compromises may be unavoidable. It is only with enormous reluctance that big business circles have accepted the recent nationalizations, the shorter work week, and the new participation in business management accorded the workers and their unions. The introduction of heavy inheritance taxes—though these are already in force in other West European countries—has elicited a violent reaction from the more privileged strata of society.

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Yet France's greatest problem is that of all other industrial countries—unemployment and inflation. The Socialist government recognizes that there is no cure-all for these ills. Neither reducing the work week nor lowering the age of retirement—two measures already implemented—can decisively reduce the numbers of the unemployed, currently about 2 million. It will also be very difficult to achieve a significant reduction in the rate of inflation (14 percent in 1981) merely by tightening price controls and freezing wages. The government's options are limited by the enormous impact of the economic situation of Western Europe and the United States.

The government is, of course, opposed to the monetarist policies practiced at present in the United States and Britain. In contrast to what is being preached in these two countries, the very first measure adopted by the Paris government was to decree a significant rise in the lowest categories of wages, as well as special allocations of state funds for the elderly and new benefits for pensioners. These moves have not been exclusively motivated by a concern for social justice. There is also a Keynesian intention to create demand, and thereby to stimulate the economy. At the same time, the government, fearing a speedup of inflation, has let it be known that there can be no question of an across-the-board wage hike but only, at the most, of compensation for the steady cost-of-living increase. And indeed with 250,000 new jobs under creation in the public sector, the government can scarcely afford anything that adds to an already serious budget deficit.

Thus the Socialist government must be able to count on the understanding of the trade union organizations, which up to now have in fact "followed the rules of the game," and welcomed the rise of low-level salaries while refraining from asking more for high-wage categories than would be justified by the inflation rate. Such a policy seems all the more necessary in that business, whose difficulties are very real in the current recession, must be encouraged to accelerate the rate of investment, which had sunk virtually to zero after the Socialist victory.

The Socialists, then, have made a huge bet. It is a bet because certain uncontrollable variables, especially economic ones, can gradually entrammel the progress of the "peaceful revolution." But a new spurt of economic growth would create a solid foundation for the profound transformations envisaged by the Socialists. In that case, socialism *à la française* might well come to serve as a model for other nations. □

"Military Council for National Salvation"

Questionnaire

When is it permissible to fire upon workers?

(a) when they trust you as one who would not fire upon his own people.

What is the best location for beating citizens?

(a) next to a hospital zone, so that they can get immediate medical attention.
(b) next to a church, so that they can get the last rites in time.
(c) at home, in the bosom of the family, so that one need not bother to inform the next of kin.

What is the location of the largest and most efficient clandestine printing press?

(a) in the Soviet Union, where they print martial law decrees for their Polish brothers three months in advance.

What is the difference between an "internment camp" and an "isolation center"?

(a) little.
(b) less.
(c) none.

When is a worker, farmer, student, intellectual, or citizen a soldier?

(a) when he/she is tried by a military court.

What is the best defintion of a "nationalist"?

(a) a wolf in sheep's clothing.
(b) a bear in sheep's clothing.
(c) a crow in sheep's clothing.

What gives legitimacy to "democratic" "reform," "renewal," and "national accord"?

(a) the loaded guns of the Military Council for National Salvation.

How does a Military Council maintain legitimacy in representing the best interests of the population of a nation?

(a) by declaring a "state of war" against the population.
(b) by placing the population under a "state of siege," and forcing it to work at gunpoint.
(c) by granting the population an extra potato for good behavior.

ELEANOR HAKIM □

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Stanley Hoffmann

American Liberals and Europe's Antinuclear Movement

This article, by the noted specialist in international affairs, continues a discussion begun, in somewhat different terms, by Bogdan Denitch in our previous issue. Further opinions, we hope, will appear in future issues.— EDS.

The growth of a movement in Western Europe opposing the deployment of American nuclear weapons capable of hitting the Soviet Union has provoked dismay and indignation in many American circles. Not only such certified cold warriors as William Safire but more moderate commentators too have seen in this movement one more proof of the West Europeans' tendency to behave like ostriches—their alleged inclination toward appeasement. The moral limitations of this pacifist or neutralist movement are seen as an idealistic cover for the materialism of governments eager to do business with the Soviets at almost any cost.

These denunciations by American conservatives—who forget that most West European countries, unlike the United States, have a military conscription system, and that reactions in Utah and Nevada to the proposed mobile MX missiles were not so different from the European attitudes they deplore—would almost automatically lead American liberals to look with sympathy at the European movement. After all, the protests against an ever escalating arms race, the presence among the demonstrators of many young people and women, the role of Protestant churches and parts of the Catholic clergy, the close connection with ecological concerns, the fact that the rallies have attracted wide support from the non-Communist left and even the center in several countries: all tend to provoke not only sympathy but nostalgia on this side of the Atlantic, where American liberals remember the antiwar movement of the 1960s and deplore the present mood of skepticism, tepid prudence, and noninvolvement.

Yet there are reasons why the European movement ought to be greeted with concern, and why sober ambivalence is preferable both to scorn and enthusiasm. This movement is complex and heterogeneous, and one can generalize about it only at the cost of some unfairness. But there is the need for some general remarks.

LET ME CITE THREE REASONS for being critical of the movement—reasons that might count not only if one is an American liberal, but also if one is a West European of the democratic left. In the first place, we must distinguish between idealism in politics—which is imperative—and a disembodied idealism that is shrilly moralistic and blithely repudiates politics. To be sure, domestic politics and international relations are all too often corrupt, messy, brutal, and murderous. But while we ought to reform the political realm, we cannot abolish it. Should we try, we would condemn ourselves either to impotence, leaving the field to those whom we condemn, or to being manipulated by those who are always ready to exploit moralism for their own political ends. The European movement now is guilty of unpolitical thinking, or of putting emotions far ahead of thought, in two related ways.

In its indignation over Western (and specifically American) policies, it dangerously misreads Soviet behavior. I can hardly be accused of claiming that the Soviet Union is an inherently aggressive power, or that recent Soviet moves show a deliberate and increasingly confident expansionism, or that internal Soviet weaknesses will necessarily lead to external adventures. But some facts are beyond doubt. There has been a constant buildup of Soviet military power in Europe. While one can present this buildup as a response to military measures taken by the United States or NATO (as the brothers Medvedev have claimed recently), it is difficult to deny that this response has resulted in many areas (such as tanks) in considerable Soviet superiority; or that the Soviets now have weapons (such as the SS–20 missiles) for which there is no equivalent in NATO's arsenal; or that the Soviets have shown

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very little concern for the anxieties that their buildup has provoked, even among such détente-oriented political leaders as Germany's Chancellor Schmidt.

Unfortunately, even those figures in the antinuclear movement who scrupulously ask for Soviet as well as Western nuclear restraint tend both to deny the reality of the Soviet buildup and to present the Soviet Union as a kind of victim of the West's nuclear drives. It is simply not true that the SS–20 represents a mere "modernization" of older Soviet missiles. Rather—as a high Soviet official once told me while arguing this dubious case—there is as much difference between the earlier missiles and the SS–20 as between the Wright brothers' airplane and a 747 jet (to be sure, both are planes). Although it is true that the Soviets could always hit military targets in Europe with their ICBM, it is hard to deny that the SS–20 and Backfire increase their ability to do so. It would be equally hard to discount the fact that building a seemingly redundant new arsenal must have a specific meaning. There is little in the history of the arms race to suggest that, in the absence of NATO's initiative of December 1979, the Soviets would have either stopped the deployment of their new weapons aimed at Western Europe or started to dismantle them. Even those who see some merit in the contention that many of the technological "breakthroughs" leading to a major escalation of the nuclear arms race have been America's responsibility find it hard to follow E. P. Thompson and his friends when they argue that NATO's aggressiveness is to blame for Soviet insecurity and for Moscow's determination to keep control of Poland.

What is more, this somewhat masochistic view of the arms race is accompanied by a grossly exaggerated and, again, unpolitical view of the likely effects of the success of the European peace movement. Many of its leaders seem to believe or hope that a refusal to accept the Pershings II or the ground-launched cruise missiles that are supposed to be deployed in 1983 would be contagious. They foresee an epidemic of abnegation sweeping the world, with the Soviets having no alternative but to follow the example given by Dutch (or Belgian) self-denial or by British unilateral reductions. But in fact the Soviets have never shown much inclination to take the policies of these lesser powers seriously; they have, however, shown considerable ability at taking advantage of political opportunities. Their rival—the target of their moves—remains the United States. As long as Washington does not practice self-restraint or abnegation, it is hard to believe that the Soviet Union will do so. The growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in the 1970s—the very time when, in several respects although assuredly not all, the American effort slowed down—makes one wonder whether *any* kind of unilateral disarmament in the West would be reciprocated. And if Washington is as blind or evil as some of the European "peace" leaders suggest, what chance then is there that the European example would be followed across the Atlantic?

• The European movement, while its deepest impulses are unpolitical or antipolitical, nevertheless sees itself as, and wants to be, a political force. My second criticism is that its politics are defective and clumsy. This shows up in two areas. One is that of the movement's relations to the superpowers. Nuclear restraint can result only from decisions made by both of them. But even when the movement's resolutions have been dutifully addressed to both the Soviet buildup and the NATO decisions, the thrust of the rallies has been aimed much more at NATO than the U.S.S.R. To be sure, this can be explained by the fact that the immediate goals of the movement are to prevent the deployments planned by NATO and thereby to give arms control a chance. But what incentive will the Soviets have to negotiate a sensible agreement that would involve a reduction of their own arsenal, as long as the antinuclear movement concentrates on reversing the military decisions of NATO? Does it not encourage Moscow's tactic of exploiting the divergences between Europeans and Americans if the movement one-sidedly organizes vast protests against NATO decisions, as well as against objectionable American policies (such as in Central America), while remaining extremely discreet about the repression in Poland?

The other area of bad politics concerns Western Europe's own security. Logically, hostility to the use, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons in Europe ought to lead either to a demand for a corresponding reduction in conventional forces by both sides —or to a willingness to increase the West Europeans' conventional efforts. A mere denuclearization of Europe would favor the Soviet Union, whose conventional armaments exceed NATO's. A "mere" conventional war would be rendered more likely by an end to the present quasi-certainty that any war would be escalated to the nuclear level on a continent stuffed with nuclear arms. And a conventional war would be quite enough to devastate Europe. Yet—perhaps because of the cynicism or discouragement bred by years of futile discussion about "mutual balanced force reductions"—the

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European movement has not addressed itself to the issue of conventional disarmament.

Outside this movement, there are many critics of the NATO decisions of 1979 who believe that the planned missile deployments are unnecessary (for instance, Michael Howard in England, George Kennan and McGeorge Bundy in this country) or that extended deterrence is no longer credible. But they all recommend that—in the absence of conventional disarmament—NATO, instead of continuing to rely on the threat of a first use of American nuclear weapons, increase its conventional arms effort. They believe this would be a better deterrent than a dubious nuclear threat can possibly be and that closing the conventional arms gap would, in case of a failure of deterrence, at least make a resort to nuclear weapons less likely. But because the European movement has never shown any inclination in this direction, it will remain a moral or moralistic protest rather than a responsible political movement.

• A third reason for skepticism concerns the West German component of the movement. I am not referring to either the nationalistic tone that has marked some of the speeches or the alleged desire for political German reunification, which lies hidden behind the attacks on NATO's plans. These elements have been much exaggerated. I refer to a point that has been made by Richard Lowenthal in Germany and Pierre Hassner in France: many of West Germany's young indulge in a kind of anti-Americanism that is not just a protest against American policies, but also a revolt against the "Westernization" of postwar Germany; not just a condemnation of capitalism and materialism, but also an expression of nostalgia for German purity, culture, and distinctiveness. This search for a new identity—in a country that has been divided, subjected to powerful external influences, and deprived of political autonomy in international affairs—is not surprising, more than 35 years after the death of Hitler. That this search should take the form of a "peace patriotism," rather than the militarism of the past, is highly welcome.

Nevertheless, we should not forget that the quest for German specificity has often led its champions either to look East rather than West or to want to play a role of intermediaries between East and West, which often turned into a game of *Schaukelpolitik*—balancing East against West. This has never been good for the peace of Europe. Indeed, it has been the policy of Adenauer *and* of the West since 1947 to try to anchor the Federal Republic in the West and to solve Germany's old identity problem by providing Bonn with an eminent role in the new West European entity. That this entity did not succeed in becoming much more than a common market is no reason for loosening the ties between the Federal Republic and the West, and particularly with France (where the antinuclear movement has no force at all, except for Communist front organizations)—especially at a time when the European Community tries to develop an embryonic common diplomacy. It is, rather, a reason to attempt to give that community more political substance, especially in terms of defense. For a purely "civilian" entity dealing only with commerce and agriculture cannot breed either a sense of responsibility or a shared patriotism among the Europeans.

IS THERE, THEN, NOTHING worthy of approval in this welter of emotions and fears? Are we doomed to the logic of the cold war as expressed by the NATO military decision of 1979?

The shortcomings of the European peace movement should not blind us to its virtues. How can we not be touched by the determination of so many West Germans to repudiate a militaristic past, by their will not to be or appear to be a threat to their neighbors; by their repudiation of what, in their eyes, are policies of force? We may deem them misled or confused; we may regret that their pacifism tends to be as excessive as the belligerence of past generations; we may fear that enthusiasm for peace in the abstract could become, in practice if not intention, dangerously close to appeasement in concrete instances. And yet we are in no position to complain: however much the young German protesters may denounce NATO policies, their conversion to peace is proof of the success of the postwar "reeducation," which all of the Federal Republic's neighbors have sought.

We should also sympathize with the concern that lies behind many of the protests—worry and anger about the apparent priority that governments are giving to weapons over economic recovery and the battle against unemployment. None of the West European governments has attempted to dismantle the welfare state in a way comparable to Reagan's reduction of a much less impressive set of social services. But no West European government has been very effective in stopping unemployment or the decline of various industries. It is hardly a coincidence that some of the biggest demonstrations took place in West Germany, just at the time when the highly efficient German economic machine was sputtering, "negative growth" appeared,

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and even the rate of inflation was increasing. True, there have been no protests in France, although the defense budget has regularly gone up. But the French have a sense of providing for their own national defense, while in the other countries that have remained in the military organization of NATO, defense is felt to be an alliance function or an American responsibility: hence a sense of powerlessness, which breeds a mix of discouragement and irresponsibility.

THERE ARE two other features in Europe's peace movement that we should understand and approve of. Dependent on American decisions—the new weapons to be deployed would be under American control—many West Europeans deplore two recent trends in American diplomacy and strategy. They worry about the end of détente. Their own attachment to it deserves to be examined critically, both because they sometimes behave as if détente were so desirable that it ought to be preserved no matter what the Soviets do, and because they have allowed the Soviets to exploit détente without being inhibited by it whenever their own interests prompted them to push it aside.

Yet there is something sensible in their belief that, ultimately, coexistence without war requires not only military strength but also prudent diplomacy, not merely containment and confrontation but also bargains and an effort at defining mutual interests. They are right to point out that no negotiation is more important than arms control; that the linkage of arms talks to Soviet behavior seems to suggest that limiting or reducing nuclear arms is a "favor" we do to the Soviets rather than a vital common interest. An American policy that treats arms control as expendable opens an abyss between our allies and ourselves. This was recognized by the NATO decision of December 1979—the "double decision," as the Germans call it, since it asked for negotiations on theater nuclear forces as well as for new deployments. It was finally recognized by the Reagan administration in November 1981—but in a way that does not allow for much optimism, since it is hard to isolate intermediate nuclear forces from all the other long-range weapons, and to regulate the former even as the latter multiply.

The other trend that West Europeans have watched with concern is the apparent drift from a strategy that stressed deterrence (while including a potential for fighting a limited nuclear war, should deterrence fail) to a strategy for fighting a large-scale nuclear war. There has been a rash of articles and statements on the demise of extended deterrence in an age of American strategic vulnerability, and on the need to prepare for "victory" by adopting a strategy analogous to that attributed to the Soviet Union. There was the Carter administration's adoption of Presidential Directive 59, which made public the plan to strike at Soviet military and political targets. And there is the Reagan administration's decision to produce the neutron bomb. All these have given many Europeans the impression that the Americans are giving up on deterrence, are misinterpreting Soviet strategy, and are moving toward the view that nuclear weapons are as usable as traditional bombs or shells.

The reality is, however, more complex—we had targeted Soviet forces long before PD 59, and the deployments of missiles in Western Europe that could hit the western part of the U.S.S.R. aim at reinforcing deterrence, rather than at making possible a nuclear war limited to Europe, as many European protesters seem to believe. But it is also true that both the vulnerability of the proposed missiles and the ability of the Pershings II to reach Soviet targets in a few minutes are destabilizing factors serving as incentives to Soviet preemption. We also need to remember that for our allies the only sensible strategy is deterrence: in *any* conceivable kind of war, Western Europe is likely to be destroyed.

These anxieties we must share. Americans who do share them ought to put pressure on their own government, in order to move it in directions that will not scare our allies or strengthen the more utopian or delusory aspects of the European protest. But however much we may approve of their criticism of recent American policies and of the rhetoric of the Reagan administration, we must warn against the kind of anti-Americanism that blinds Europeans to Soviet exactions and crimes. And we must warn, for that matter, against the kind of irresponsibility that consists of blaming the United States for imposing its views on Europe, while failing to propose an alternate European strategy (other than the chimera of unilateralism) that would strengthen European institutions. The worst that could happen would be mutually reenforcing, antagonistic utopias on both sides of the Atlantic: the illusion of toughness here, the illusion of romantic abnegation and neutralism there. □

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Irving Howe

In Praise of "Solidarity"

Even in this hour of defeat when thousands of its militants are held in concentration camps, Solidarity remains the most promising social movement to have arisen in Europe since the Second World War.

We live in a dispirited moment, petty in aspiration and bleak in sentiment. Nothing reveals the prevailing smallness of spirit more than the weary sighs with which a good part of the West responded to the crushing of Solidarity. Even if there is little (though surely there is *something*) we can do to affect the events in Poland, we might at least grasp the historic fact that we have been witnesses to a great outburst of human freedom. Socialists who have spent years talking about a working-class upsurge ought to recognize one when it finally emerges before their eyes.

• OF ALL the Soviet-imposed dictatorships in Eastern Europe, the one in Poland has rested on the narrowest popular base. No objective observer has supposed that in a free election during the past 30 years the Polish Communists could have gotten as much as 10 percent of the vote. In 1956, 1970, and 1976 there were popular uprisings against the detested regime—by workers, by students, but not the two together. After each revolt was crushed, the party recognized that it had to put a new face on its shabby dictatorship and there followed a shake-up in leadership. Gomulka, Gierek, Kania: the bureaucrats changed, the bureaucracy remained.

• THE POLES have a long tradition of fighting for independence against the giants of East and West. (They have less attractive traditions too: there was in recent months a touch of anti-Semitism on the edges of Solidarity, firmly repudiated by Lech Walesa, and there was a poisonously deliberate use of anti-Semitism by the Communist bureaucracy; apparently you don't need Jews to exploit hatred of Jews.)

The tradition of struggling heroically, vainly, for independence has taught the Poles how to chip away at the dictatorship even as they also understand that so long as the Soviet regime remains what it is, Communist rule in Poland cannot be destroyed, it can only be modified. By the late '70s, then, the party's reign was still monolithic but no longer quite in the heavy totalitarian style. There were now centers of partial autonomy, secondary institutions forming barriers between people and state—the Church, intellectual groupings, independent journals. The abysmal economic situation, partly a consequence of bureaucratic muddle, drove people to desperation.

Several months ago, at a *Dissent* board meeting, we had a visitor from Poland who told us, in absorbing detail, about the way small groups of intellectuals began to form committees to provide help to families of workers who had been fired or punished after the actions of 1976. Gradually, trust was established between these committees, nonpolitical in character and intention, and important segments of the Polish working class. This was one, though not of course the only, source of that extraordinary solidarity—so often invoked, so seldom achieved—between working class and intelligentsia that enabled the meteoric rise of Solidarity. The main action was of course in the

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factories, where the Polish workers showed astonishing capacities for democratic initiative; but the intellectuals, especially through the group called KOR, provided help, sometimes in harmony, sometimes with friction. And then, to almost everyone's astonishment, the farmers started organizing their Solidarity—everyone, it seemed, wanted to join in the outburst of animated expression.

What followed, as we all know, was a massive rebellion of society against the state. The whole of Polish society—from city to country, Catholic to secular, worker to student—began to speak through free and autonomous institutions. Dozens of outspoken periodicals appeared. Censorship crumbled. At Solidarity meetings, both leaders and the ranks took a delight in the interplay of democracy. Large numbers of people without any previous experience in citizenship now tasted the pleasure of opinion. And most remarkable, sections of the Communist party were caught up in this new spirit of outspokenness, some remaining in the Party out of hope to transform it and others leaving for a whiff of fresh air.

A triple revolution occurred in Poland: *a democratic revolution, a national revolution, and a working-class revolution.* Solidarity quickly grasped that if its immediate demands were to be realized, it would have to insist upon universal political freedoms. The idea of self-management in the factories was discussed not only among Solidarity militants but in other circles throughout the country. And national independence, or that fraction of it attainable in the present circumstances, was a tacit, underlying hope for almost everyone.

A strange kind of revolution! Solidarity knew that it had vast popular support and this gave it a high sense of élan (perhaps also an excess of self-assurance). Yet the knowledge that if it brushed aside the tottering government there would immediately follow a Soviet invasion forced Solidarity to brake its energies and hold back its enthusiasts.

For at least a year Poland experienced what Marxists used to call "dual power." Trotsky, in his *History of the Russian Revolution*, writes that dual power arises when

> the hostile classes are already each relying upon essentially incompatible governmental organizations—the one outlived, the other in process of formation, which jostle against each other at every step in the sphere of government.... Such a state of affairs cannot be stable [for] society needs a concentration of power.

One or the other side must triumph, and "dual power" thereby is brought to an end. Then comes an interesting sentence:

> But before the competing classes and parties will go to that extreme—*especially in case they dread the interference of a third force*—they may feel compelled for quite a long time to endure, and even to sanction a two-power system. This system will nevertheless inevitably explode.

I have italicized a key clause in Trotsky's passage, since in fact it was the dread of "interference of a third force" that kept "dual power" in place for a relatively long time in Poland. The same dread, of course, kept the popular revolution from fulfilling itself by sweeping aside the enfeebled regime.

This dilemma—there is ample documentary evidence—was clearly understood by both the Solidarity leaders and its intellectual advisers. They were at the head of a great popular movement aflame with feelings of hope, anger, impatience; if they tried merely to contain these popular sentiments, they might be displaced as leaders of the movement; yet they still had to work within sharply defined limits. They might be able to seize power, but they surely could not keep it. They had even to avoid the appearance of creating parties that would threaten the monopoly exercised by the CP—though it would seem that many of the committees formed in the major Polish cities were embryonic political parties. (What else, given the new breath of freedom, could they be?)

Yet the Solidarity leaders had to keep pressing their demands: that was why they had been chosen as leaders! So they looked for a formula that might enable a sharing of power. Extended "dual power" came to be envisaged as an improvised "shared power."

It is easy enough, with the abundant wisdom of retrospect, to see that this was a desperate hope. Behind it apparently lay the expectation that segments of the CP might still be open not

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just to the argument that some form of cooperation between government, Solidarity and the Church was essential to national survival, but that such cooperation was a path of patriotism. At least some of the Polish Communists did prefer to share power rather than serve as satraps of the Russians in a government hated by the bulk of their compatriots.

A naive perspective? Perhaps; at least insofar as the Solidarity leaders seem to have thought the government was negotiating in good faith. But the minority of the Polish CP

From Poland, a Voice of Truth

In our Winter 1981 issue we published "A Revolt of the Possible," an article by the Polish journalist Stefan Bratkowski in defense of the uprising of the Polish people. For a time chairman of the Polish Association of Journalists and a member of the Communist party, Bratkowski was a leading spokesman for the liberal wing of the party, which proposed to work out a truce with Solidarity. Expelled from the party last October, Bratkowski has recently issued the following appeal, here somewhat abridged:

My friends, readers I know and do not know,

Facts are facts, regardless of intentions or interpretations. The blitzkrieg of December 13, 1981 started the strangest of civil wars in Poland, declared by the government against its own population. The occupation regime that has been introduced has paralyzed economic, social, political, intellectual, and cultural life. It has ruined our economy and the prospects for rebuilding it. In one month it has caused losses of more than Z200 billion and has destroyed the chances of cooperation with foreign countries. This government, which is so stiff, slow, and indecisive in its actions for reform and justice . . . has had no hesitation in killing and torturing its fellow citizens who were defending democratic rights. . . .

This war was started to defend the monopoly of power held by groups of leaders who now represent less than 1 percent of the population. In the long term they cannot guarantee anybody anything, not even the obedience of the army companies under their command. The draconian restrictions show that our authorities were really afraid of everybody—workers, students, journalists, communications workers, painters, hunters, and actors. But the use of coercion, fear, lies, and slander is not a sign of strength. The leadership groups are weak: no honest people enjoying the nation's respect supported the coup d'état.

Facts are facts and no words can conceal them. For many years my colleagues and I have called for reforms. Over the past few months we did what we could to solve our country's difficult problems, which had built up over years, by means of accord and without tension or the use of coercion. But the leadership groups would not hear of a reduction in their monopoly of power and rejected all constructive proposals.

It is not true that the Solidarity leaders wanted to seize power. They wanted to guarantee the 99.5 percent majority of the nation the right to participate in government. . . . The nation's main forces, especially Solidarity, undoubtedly made a mistake in treating the government as a paper tiger and underestimating the risk of civil war; but that in no way justifies the terribly short-sighted mistake made by the leadership groups.

It is true that they are not mistaken on one point: there is no possibility of a return to the situation as it was before December 13, 1981. The party, which has killed Polish workers for a third time to defend its power, has committed political suicide. It can count on support only from permanent officials of the government apparatus, and not even all of them, and it cannot count on the young people (two-thirds of the nation). . . .

• What awaits us? It will not be possible to repeat the Hungarian or Czechoslovak scenario. In Poland there is a mass movement of all the social classes and the nation's basic forces, and backed by its highest moral and intellectual authorities. These people can be subdued for a short time, but they cannot be broken and forced to capitulate. Today the population, which regards the government as an occupation government, is already drawing up lists of "overzealous people. . . ." Young people and children are feverishly devouring the literature of war conspiracy and minor sabotage. The continuation of the repression will provide new heroes and martyrs and strengthen the resistance. . . . The population will adapt to the conditions of this specific war. There is no point in terrorizing them, because they will ensure that every death is paid for with a death. Under the surface of official life, a new, underground Poland will develop—the Poland of diverse communities, the Poland of democracy. For a state without democracy will not be a Polish state but a Quisling state. . . .

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that did want some version of "shared power" was unable to withstand the pressure of both the Russians and those old-line Polish *apparatchiks* nostalgic for the days of the whip. And ironically, one of the reasons that the idea of "shared power" proved to be workable was the weakness of the CP. In certain cities and factories it suffered a virtually complete collapse, leading the Politburo to conclude that it could not risk any sharing of power because its own share would necessarily decline.

• What can we do now? We can above all develop the mutual aid movement, with the support of the Church, taking care that charitable activity cannot be suspected of having a political nature. Do not be afraid, my brothers, your ability to survive may depend on it!

• We must work for the future. We must waste no time. We must learn about all past cooperative experiments for the future of the cooperative movement and all the self-managed councils. We must gather and popularize knowledge of territorial, local, agricultural, and professional self-management systems both in Poland in the past and in other countries. We must learn the old rules governing the functioning of the economy. That will make it easier to create new and good rules. All must do what they can in this sphere . . . so that Polish democracy and the Polish economy can be set in motion quickly when the right time comes.

For those whom disappointment, destiny, hope or fear have placed in the government's service, I have only one warning: the nation, now silent, is watching you with thousands of eyes. Do nothing of which you may be ashamed or of which you may be afraid when the situation is reversed.

• What should we aim at today? As in any war, we should first aim to conclude an armistice. However, if it is even possible to discuss it, those who might be the population's deputies must be released, and freedom of action must be restored to the democratically elected bodies of the social organizations, primarily to Solidarity.

Two premises can be posed as preconditions for an armistice: first, the government must release the political prisoners or at least guarantee them prisoner-of-war status; second, the population must pledge not to take strike action or stage political demonstrations for the duration of the armistice. The aim of the armistice would be to take the first steps toward a peaceful and constructive solution to the problems among the various parties in conflict in our country. These initial steps should include:

(1) The creation of a social council for the national economy, including representatives democratically elected by the population, especially Lech Walesa. This council will draw up a program of rapid reforms and short-term measures and will form a competent "structure" adapted to the needs of the situation—an economic committee of the Council of Ministers—with the proviso that the economic sphere will be treated as a politically neutral sphere. I state, taking full responsibility for my words, that if this question is not settled, we will face the danger of a physical threat to our national existence.

(2) The creation of a social council for the mass media, in the same way. . . .

We were not and are not aiming to liquidate the system's socialist foundations. We wanted to make those ideals into something more than fine words concealing a totally uncontrollable government and chaos. We are aware of the role of Soviet decisions in the coup d'état, and the participation of Soviet officials. . . . We have experienced a year of Soviet pressure and threats. Now we are told on all sides that the coup d'état merely forestalled a Soviet intervention. Despite that, we do not want to regard the Soviet Union as our enemy, because we cannot regard as an enemy a country that will always be our main neighbor and Poland's main natural economic partner. But we want the U.S.S.R. to be a partner and ally, not a policeman. . . .

We hope that the nations of the world will be capable of doing something to bring about talks among the superpowers and other states whose interests are affected by the situation in Poland, so that the future democratic system in our country can obtain international guarantees for the U.S.S.R.'s military and political interests and for the West's financial interest. This is both possible and vital because a "cold" or "hot" civil war in Poland is a threat to peace throughout the world.

My friends, let us not rely on other people. Let us rely mainly on ourselves. This may be my last public statement, but that doesn't worry me. I know that you will be there and that honor, common sense, and the Polish sense of humor cannot be destroyed by force, money, or slander. Our ancestors had to persevere through the lifetimes of several generations. The present occupation will not last long. But you must turn the numerical superiority—99.5 percent against 0.5 percent—into an overwhelming moral advantage that will render billy sticks, gas, and tanks useless.

STEFAN BRATKOWSKI □

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• WE MAY NOW EXPECT to hear the question debated endlessly: Was there any realistic basis for this perspective of an extended "dual power" that might be mediated into "shared power"? Or is the logic of Communist rule and Communist ideology so inexorable that a CP in power cannot accept any modification of its rule, so that even if it does, out of weakness, make concessions to other forces it will try to regain total power?

Again, it seems to me wise not to rush to conclusions. It is possible that if the Russians had not been bearing down so heavily, the fraction of the Polish CP that favored accommodation with Solidarity would have won out. The recent evidence throughout Europe—from Spain to Italy, from Czechoslovakia to Poland—indicates that within large Communist parties there are many different kinds of people, from thugs to opportunists to half-idealists. Solidarity may have erred, not as Western cynics say, by "going too far" but by being too innocent, too ready to suppose that its own good faith would be matched by others. Jaruzelski and his clique, it turned out, would rather stay in power through the exercise of terror than share power with Lech Walesa. And yet one can readily understand why Solidarity and KOR had to choose the strategy of "shared power" in one or another form. There was really no other choice.

Did Solidarity make mistakes? How could it not? A mass movement arising spontaneously in opposition to a despised dictatorship—how could there not be some hotheads along the edges? In a country like Poland, with its centuries of romantic nationalism and heroic defeat—how could there not be some inflammatory language? Remember, these were people who had long been caged and now were suddenly grasping a bit of freedom. That there were many different strands of opinion and sentiment within Solidarity seems obvious, unavoidable, and even desirable: that's what democracy is about.

For socialists the recent Polish events hold a special drama, a high significance. Here was evidence that men and women would not simply crumble into passivity under the weight of dictatorship. Here was reason to call into question theories that hold totalitarianism invincible, at least short of nuclear war. And here was the exhilarating spectacle of a young and inexperienced working class asserting itself with strength and spirit.

It came as a shock, therefore, when a few days after the Jaruzelski coup I read a statement by Willy Brandt, president of the Socialist International, on the Polish tragedy. At a time when Jaruzelski's thugs were beating up our friends in Warsaw, Brandt called for . . . "restraint." In his statement, hoping that no foreign power would intervene in Poland, Brandt failed so much as to *mention* Solidarity by name, let alone express solidarity with it. And then came an incredible sentence: "The Socialist International is aware that unwanted advice or strongly worded declarations will not help the people of Poland." One rubbed one's eyes: for *this* we need a Socialist International?

Willy Brandt is a good man. I appreciate his reticence as a German who knows the record of his country in the Second World War, especially the mass murder of Poles and Jews, and now does not wish to preach from afar. But what has that to do with saying, "Helpless as we may be, we still want to cry out our solidarity with Solidarity!" I agree with Brandt's emphasis on the need for détente in Europe as a barrier to nuclear destruction. But no one wanted Brandt to propose a war, or even an end to détente. No; the Brandt statement was inexcusable. And especially humiliating was the fact that the Italian Communist party, by contrast, issued a denunciation of the Jaruzelski coup far stronger than Brandt's statement. Indeed, the Italian CP's statement was unexceptionable from a democratic or socialist point of view.

You may ask: Do statements matter so much? If Brandt had put out a strong protest against the suppression of Solidarity would that have changed anything?

As a signer by now of hundreds of statements, I think I know how limited their impact is. Yet there are times when there is nothing one can do but cry out in protest. Yes, we are helpless before the powers of the world, but at least we must say, their fish stink. And while no

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statement from the Socialist International could have changed the situation in Poland, still, one wonders whether Willy Brandt asked himself what people like Lech Walesa and Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuron would think if, in the jails and camps where they are now held, they happened to hear about his statement.

Fortunately, at the initiative of the French and other socialist parties, the Socialist International issued a second statement, quite clear in its support of Solidarity and forming a tacit repudiation of Brandt. But the damage had been done.

• WHAT WE WRITE HERE, several of us, can only be preliminary responses to the tragic events in Poland. I hope we will return to them, trying to understand more fully what has happened. But right now, for whatever it may be worth, our first obligation is to express unconditional solidarity with Solidarity, our comradeship with our friends—we have not met, but friends they are—in KOR. Poland has become a graveyard: grim, silent, fearful. But we believe that the historical greatness of the Solidarity movement will remain in the consciousness of the Polish people and that by one or another name Solidarity will rise again. □

POLAND: II

Pride of Place Goes to Truth

A Conversation with Bronislaw Geremek

Introduction

The interview reproduced below appeared in *Kurier Polski*, the daily organ of the "Democratic party" (one of the groups constituting the "Front of National Unity," controlled by the Communist party and ostensibly the country's highest political body since 1956), barely two weeks before General Jaruzelski's armed forces occupied the country and sent thousands of people to jail and detention camps—among them Dr. Bronislaw Geremek.

Bronislaw Geremek—Chairman of Solidarity's board of advisers and the man probably most responsible for fashioning its remarkable programmatic document—first acquired international renown not as a political leader but as an academic historian. An associate professor at the Institute of History in Warsaw, author of several works on "marginal" social, ethnic, and professional groups in medieval and Renaissance Europe, and former director of the Centre de la Civilisation Polonaise at the Sorbonne (1962–65), Geremek deliberately eschewed any involvement with politics ever since he had turned in his party card after the sordid factional and anti-Semitic campaign of March 1968. But in 1979 he joined the famed "Flying University" and in August 1980, he assisted Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a prominent Catholic lay writer, in setting up a committee of experts to advise the Gdansk strikers in their negotiations with the government. In the months that followed, Geremek—a man of impressive erudition, moral integrity, and enormous personal charm—became known preeminently as a moderate, tirelessly opposing the efforts of the

The interview was conducted by Janina Paradowska. From *Kurier Polski* (Warsaw), Nov. 27–29, 1981.

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radicals within the Union to mount a direct political offensive against Warsaw and the Kremlin. Geremek attempted to steer Solidarity's activities in the direction of accommodation and dialogue—while also imbuing its programmatic aspirations with what he calls in the interview "the values and ideological premises of socialism."

The reward for these efforts has been calumny. Since his arrest, Geremek has been portrayed in the official Polish press as the evil genius of Solidarity. A radio broadcast (subsequently "bolstered" by a campaign of anonymous leaflets and posters) pointed out his Jewish origin (as a child, he spent several years in the Warsaw ghetto, and was later brought up by his Gentile stepfather who gave him his surname).

On January 4, Jaruzelski's paper *Zolnierz Wolnosci* added a few choice details: Geremek, it said, had come by his diploma through the same fraudulent means as the members of Gierek's "team," has an uncontrollable appetite for personal power, had only "pretended to be a Communist" in the past, being in fact an inveterate "enemy of socialism."

In January of this year, while under arrest, Geremek—together with a number of other political prisoners—went on a two-week hunger strike. His present whereabouts are unknown, and his future in the hands of Jaruzelski's jailers can only be a cause for profound concern.

The interview itself deals with the part of the Solidarity program (adopted at the Union's congress in October 1981) that is devoted to Solidarity's ultimate goal—the creation of a "self-governing republic." In reading Geremek's explanations and comments, it may perhaps be tempting to wonder whether we are dealing with a mind manifestly intelligent and subtle yet also victim to its own illusions. Could a person with Geremek's political experience and acumen really believe that the Polish party apparatchiki and Moscow would ever be dissuaded from their lethal hatred for all that Solidarity stood for by any assurances of the Union's commitment to socialist ideals? Had Geremek perhaps forgotten that the Czech reformers too had proclaimed their loyalty to "socialism with a human face"—and that it was precisely this loyalty that proved their undoing? Could he really believe that "a public tribunal" designed to mete out justice to those responsible for Poland's catastrophe did not amount to a political threat?

I phrase these questions with deliberate crudeness, for they are of a piece with the views by some of our Western political commentators, who claim that Solidarity should "have rested on its laurels," that it was being deliberately and witlessly provocative, that, in short, it was responsible for its own downfall.

Yet those who pronounce these *obiter dicta* never bother to examine the political climate that prevailed in Poland in the weeks preceding the coup. Above all, they neglect to ask the question: what *could* Solidarity do, what were its real options and realistic alternatives? At the time of the interview, it was becoming increasingly clear that those elements in the party that were still hoping for an accommodation (and there were such forces) would not prevail; that the various offers of new political coalitions (for instance, the "Front of National Accord" and others referred to in the interview) were probably little more than delaying tactics; that Jaruzelski—despite his meeting with Walesa and the Primate on November 4—was playing for time, and that the party hard-liners, with the blessing and collaboration of Moscow, were preparing the grounds for a final showdown.

What, under those circumstances, was Solidarity to do? A physical confrontation—that is to say, a possible bloodbath—was something Solidarity was anxious to avoid.

If Geremek's words seem (as they may, with the benefit of hindsight) somewhat naive, it is only because he felt that he had little choice but to make his final, desperate appeal to wisdom and the sense of national self-preservation. If "nothing is done," he says, "if painful problems remain unresolved . . . then demands are bound to escalate." In the absence of any meaningful quid pro quo from the authorities, in the face of mounting pressures of a society that had put all its trust in Solidarity and had lost any confidence it had ever had in the government, in the light of the burgeoning

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sense of despair and impatience, the role of Solidarity—Geremek's role—could only be to display and affirm its good faith and good will, to cling—*malgré tout*—to the hope that its warnings would be heeded—and if not, to go down in defeat, bloody but unbowed.

It is in this spirit, it seems to me, that one must read this interview. It does not provide the answer to the question—and it is a legitimate question—whether Solidarity, aware of the forces arrayed against it, could not have prepared itself better for the impending denouement. The interview does illustrate, however, that the leaders of this astonishing mass movement had an exquisite sense of its historical importance—an importance that, I feel certain, history will yet bear out.

ABRAHAM BRUMBERG □

The Conversation

Q: Professor Geremek, the most serious charge leveled against Solidarity's program thus far is that it constitutes the ideological platform of an oppositional political party, one whose aim is to dismantle the structures of the socialist state and gradually to take over power.

GEREMEK: As is usually the case with controversial issues, it is not the words that are important but the substance that lies behind them. To be sure, the program approved by the Solidarity Congress presupposes the dismantling of certain structures of the system. But the question is, which structures?

The existence of Solidarity is compatible neither with the Stalinist system nor with its successor. The program's point of departure, therefore, is the assumption that a new relationship between the state and the society is slowly evolving in our country, a relationship in which society is regaining its prominence and its sovereignty. That this is regarded as a normal process is borne out by the various statements made on this subject at the Ninth PUWP Congress [in July 1981],[1] as well as by the highest-ranking government officials. If we assume that these statements have been made in earnest, it follows that the creation of this new model—the relationship between the rulers and the ruled—should be a joint undertaking. The trouble is, however, that no one has outlined the institutional forms of this new relationship as yet. Solidarity's attitude on this matter seems to be both reasonable and moderate. We do not propose one-sided solutions that are apt to precipitate conflicts; we do not insist on unconditional prescriptions.

Q: Nevertheless, the program goes far beyond what are considered to be the normal concerns of a trade union; it takes a position on almost all areas of our life.

GEREMEK: This is because of the nature of Solidarity, which is both a trade union and a social movement. As such, we must have a general vision of what we strive for, of the kind of country in which we wish to live and for whose fate we feel co-responsible.

Q: It is a very radical vision.

GEREMEK: True, it is a very radical vision. It assumes that human and civic rights will be attained, that the sovereignty of the nation will be assured, and that the society will become the permanent subject of the activities of the state. For that matter, any programmatic vision that provides a direction for human aspirations must be radical. Yet one must also have a sense of realism and know what and when anything can be achieved. The program, then, grew out of a concern for realistic grounds, for a pragmatic grasp of the needs and possibilities of the moment.

Please note that we do not insist on deadlines, for we believe that it is precisely in the process of negotiations with the authorities that we shall determine when to realize any given

[1] PUWP: Polish United Workers party, the formal name of the Polish CP.

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goal. In this sense too our program is an open one.

Q: Certainly, "what" and "when" are subject to negotiation. Yet the vision of a "Self-Governing Republic" has been drawn up with remarkable precision, and as it is approved by Solidarity's congress, it cannot be a subject of negotiations or compromises, at least not until the next congress. And here I fear lies the source of many conflicts.

GEREMEK: Whatever is inscribed in the chapter on the "Self-Governing Republic" is in no way at odds with the constitutional principles that determine the character of a socialist Poland. On the contrary, it seems to me that it is precisely this vision that may make it possible to realize the socialist principles of public life, the coexistence between the citizen and the state .... A system that for over 30 years deprives society of its power and sets so much store by appearances is bound to breed frustrations and catastrophes. To avert them, people must be allowed to participate in the management and determination of their own affairs. This is why a self-governing republic must be built from below—and our program speaks first of all about how the principle of co-determination is to be applied where people live and work.

Q: It is always easier below, but the higher you go, the more complicated it gets.

GEREMEK: Yes, because it is there that we come face-to-face with the principle of "the leading role of the party," which, though affirmed by the constitution, has never been clearly defined. It is not up to Solidarity to do it. On the other hand, Solidarity, speaking in behalf of its multimillion membership, maintains that it is in the interest of the country to spell out the consequences that flow from the constitutional principle of the leading role of the party in the building of socialism.

Q: The program, however, is probably less concerned with the general framework than with how to break the party's monopoly in two areas—mass media and personnel policy.

GEREMEK: Yes, because these are two problems of fundamental importance. The monopoly over the mass media, which is grounded in the formula of the leading role of the party, is something we cannot accept. In its place must come a new relationship of forces, in which truth will occupy pride of place. This is essential—let me put it this way—for the very health of society. We have paid a heavy price for the absence of social control over the media, as well as for the omnipotence of the *nomenklatura* system[2]—and we are bound to go on paying it for a long time to come.

Q: In the course of our conversation, you have used the word "socialism" a number of times. You spoke, for instance, of a "socialist Poland." Yet such terms are conspicuously absent from the program. And as some people have pointed out, that is no mere formality.

GEREMEK: For the sake of realism one should not ask whether the word is employed, but whether the program is consonant with the values and ideological premises of socialism. I am convinced that the new model of relations between the state and society, proposed by Solidarity, is a socialist model. One need only glance at the basic values embedded in Solidarity's program—equality, justice, and freedom—to realize that they spring from the inspirations of socialism as well as of Christian thought. Similarly, the demands for citizens' participation in public life reflect the concerns that have been central to the socialist movement since its inception—namely, the primacy of the individual and the struggle for human rights. The same goes, finally, for the problem of economic organization. Social ownership of the means of production is at the very heart of the program. To achieve it, the present system, in which the means of production are in the hands of an all-powerful state, will have to be changed. In doing this, we would realize one of the fundamental tenets of socialism.

Q: At the same time, the program envisions a considerable extension of the private sphere, particularly that of private farming.

GEREMEK: Yes—in order to strengthen and improve the present system. There are, after

[2] The party is estimated to have absolute control of over 100,000 jobs.

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all, areas whose needs cannot be fulfilled by social ownership. When it comes to agriculture, Solidarity does indeed proceed from the very simple proposition that our national economy can be developed only and unqualifiedly on the basis of family ownership of land and family farming. All the past attempts to break up private farming have produced the most disastrous consequences.

In sum, then, the question of whether or not the program is socialist can be answered only if one reads it in a spirit of good will. It seems to me that this is precisely what is lacking in our partners and in the official propaganda.

Q: How do you expect the authorities to demonstrate good will when pistols are so frequently pointed at their heads? I have in mind such things as the call for setting up a public tribunal if, by the end of the year, the former [party and government] leaders are not brought to justice, and the electoral rules drawn up by Solidarity—all to be ratified and implemented by a specific term?

GEREMEK: It is time that is pointing the pistol, not Solidarity. Elections are approaching. Everybody—and that includes the authorities, Solidarity, and all other forces in our society—fully acknowledges that the elections can no longer be held under the old dispensations. New electoral laws have not been devised, and the longer we wait for them the greater is the danger of conflict.

Now, as for the question of who is responsible for the present state of affairs, it was posed even more sharply at the party congress [in July 1981] than at our own [Sept–Oct. 1981]. Nevertheless, despite the clamor for action, nothing has been done. And if painful problems remain unresolved, if instead the public is subjected to unending provocations—for that is precisely what our television has been engaged in—then demands are bound to escalate. This is a normal psychological phenomenon. How does Solidarity respond to the growing demands of the public? By asserting that if the government fails to honor its promises, we shall call for the creation of a public tribunal—which is to say that we shall ask society to pronounce judgment. I don't see how this amounts to a political threat.

Q: If it's not Solidarity's task to propose institutional changes, how do you explain the proposal for a Social Council on the National Economy?

GEREMEK: We are not concerned with how the government is fashioned, but with how best to organize a representational system. Since at this time we do not have an authentically representative system, and since the society will have to bear the enormous costs of the necessary reforms, it is imperative to proceed at once with the creation of certain provisional bodies invested with representative functions and with moral authority. Unfortunately, the Sejm [Poland's parliament] does not enjoy this authority—though I must stress that the recent development in the Sejm, the fact that the truth is finally being heard there, is as impressive as it is astonishing. Nevertheless, there is still a need for new, independent institutions enjoying the confidence of the public and capable of telling the truth. We are proposing social councils not only for the country's economy, but also for culture, education, radio and television. These councils are not designed to exercise supreme power; they are not intended to govern. But they must provide the people with truthful information, and they must be completely independent of everybody—including Solidarity. And they must have unrestrained access to information and to the public media.

Q: There has been much talk recently about a Council of Accord, or a Front of National Accord. Would such an organization be compatible with Solidarity's membership? After all, the Union firmly rejected the idea of joining the Front of National Unity.

GEREMEK: The Front of National Unity has become thoroughly discredited. As for joining the [proposed] Front of National Accord, it is up to our National Commission to define Solidarity's position on it. That hasn't been done yet, because we don't know what this Front is supposed to be.

I think it absolutely necessary for everyone to realize how crucial a genuine accord is for our country and for our society, and what tragic consequences would result from an attempt to erect yet another fictitious institution.

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A new social accord, if it is to emerge, must provide for the full autonomy of its partners. At the same time, I think it would be a mistake to create a body that would devote itself principally to the forthcoming elections. We must not squander what is perhaps our final chance—that is, for an authentic and genuine national accord—on a current problem such as the elections. We must always bear in mind that the situation in our country is dramatic—and that the solutions to it must therefore be equally dramatic.

Translated from the Polish by ABRAHAM BRUMBERG □

POLAND: III

H. Brand

Solidarity's Economic Program

Solidarity's policies were formulated in a series of statements, agreed upon at its October 1981 convention. This program was the result of years of thought and debate among Polish intellectuals and workers. It draws upon the work of such outstanding indigenous thinkers as Oscar Lange and Wlodzimierz Brus; the intellectual ambience in which it emerged was also created by KOR (the Committee for Worker Defense), established in 1976 to free workers from jail; by the Experience and Future Group, more inclined than KOR to reform the system "from within"; and by the Flying University. Some members of these groups came to function as key advisers to Solidarity during the crucial Gdansk negotiations in August-September 1980, which led to its official recognition as an independent trade union.

Our discussion is essentially based on two documents. One represents the official *Program of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union Solidarity*, adopted by the First National Congress of Delegations and translated by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (*Daily Report,* Eastern Europe, Nov. 4, 1981). The other, *Position on Social and Economic Reform of the Country,* was issued by Poland's Network of Solidarity Organizations in Leading Factories. The latter document does not have quite the official status the former has, but it is much more specific on economic and institutional reform, and I have therefore drawn on it more heavily (the two documents do not diverge in essential respects). The proposals in these documents can be divided into those concerning civil liberties and the rule of law; those concerning self-managed enterprises and their relation to the economy at large; and those concerning economic conditions.

Civil liberties and the rule of law are in both theory and practice indispensable to a society of self-managed social enterprises for, in Solidarity's conception, these enterprises could only operate in a nonauthoritarian environ-

I wish to thank Tadeusz Kowalik, an adviser to Solidarity and participant at the Gdansk negotiations in 1980, for his comments on this article, for whose contents, however, I alone am responsible.

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ment. However, differences in historical origins should not be ignored. On the one hand, civil liberties and the rule of law are rooted in the evolution of bourgeois society. In a sense, Solidarity attempted, and indeed was compelled to attempt, to extend that evolution—nearly 200 years after the Bill of Rights and the Declaration of the Rights of Man. On the other hand, a polity of self-managed enterprises, as in Solidarity's proposals on employee councils, and legally owned by the nation, points to a future of "socialist democracy," of which such protagonists as Roy Medvedev, Branko Horvat, and Mihailo Markovic have written. Solidarity conceived of workers' councils not merely in terms of democratic values but as an institution to perform essential functions, such as legislating the operations of the enterprise, selecting and appointing managers and holding them to account.

The one notion that pervades Solidarity's thinking is decentralization. It is an obsessive concern, so much that the function of the *state* is barely explicit and must be surmised. "The basic principle underlying economic reform is to provide safeguards for independence, self-management, and self-financing of enterprises, which implies the abolishment of the directive-allocative system and the structures associated with it." This dismantling would spell the demise of a vast state bureaucracy, as well as of the patronage base of the ruling CP. There would still exist the Council of Ministers, whose responsibilities would include the formulating of economic policies, and to which a staff of economic planners would be attached. But it would be deprived of the vast authority it now possesses. That would be vested in the Sejm—Poland's parliament. The Sejm would have an economic planning staff of its own, to avoid a "central planning monopoly." Furthermore, the planning authority of the Council would not be inherent in but delegated by the Sejm, for "socialized planning should be operated on the principle that the final decision belongs to representative, not executive, bodies."

Central planning would be drastically reduced under Solidarity's proposals. Its scope would be restricted to the "indispensable, leaving the remainder to the self-controlling mechanisms"—not least because experience has taught "that planning covering all spheres of social and economic life becomes the way for developing a totalitarian system that attempts to predict and control everything." Underlying the conception of autonomous planning is an assumption that each enterprise, being subject to market and social forces, will always plan so as to improve its operations. Yet such efforts must give rise to imbalances, and it is the task of central planning to deal with them, "to determine basic dynamics and structural proportions," including the location of new capital investment. Solidarity saw the central administrative system of the Polish economy as shackling the natural energies of the country's workforce. The "essential matter" was to eliminate "the dictatorial and distributional mechanism of management . . . [This] mechanism is responsible for decrease in economic effectiveness, lack of balance, negative social effects (falsification of information, bureaucratization, disappearance of self-management)." What would take the place of this system?

Some of the pertinent proposals: direct, legally protected contract relations between suppliers and customers to replace directed distribution. Self-financing, regulated by taxation and credit, to supersede centrally controlled funding. Job assignments, plant layout, establishment of work norms and wage rates and similar matters to be within the competence of the self-managed enterprise. Solidarity distinguished several types of enterprise—"social," state, cooperative, private, mixed. The social enterprise was to be "the basic element of the national economy [with] full independence, autonomy of its workforce, and . . . self-financing." By contrast, state enterprises were to be created "only in exceptional cases, inspired by national interest . . . verified by Parliament." Self-financing was conceived to be a condition *sine qua non* of the self-managed enterprise. It was held to be essential to its independence, freeing it from the control of governmental bodies. It would stimulate efficiencies, and penalize the inefficient enterprise. Certain modifications to encourage long-term invest-

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ment should of course be introduced, such as subsidies, low-interest loans, and compulsory reserve funds. But the principle of self-finance should be "unconditionally observed," and the granting of bank credit would accordingly no longer be automatic. The self-managed enterprise as conceived by Solidarity does not resemble the entrepreneurial firm in Western countries. The management authority of the self-managed enterprise would reside with its employees and their elected representatives, assembled in the employee council. The enterprise managers would be appointed by the workers' council, be "subservient" to it, and be obliged to carry out its resolutions on a day-to-day basis. This was intended not merely to ensure the democratic control of the enterprise, but also to sever the link between enterprise management on the one hand, and the central administration and party hierarchy on the other.

Nor can the function of employees' councils be compared with that of a board of directors in Western countries. The directors' authority is usually nominal. The employees' council would, however, determine the direction of the enterprise's operation; labor and training policies; the division of profits; the extent of cooperation with other enterprises, of foreign trade, and so forth. Profits would indeed "become the main stimulus of economic activity of an enterprise," and they would determine the amount of wages above a certain fixed floor. However, profits could not be derived from monopoly practices. Enterprises would be monitored by a state agency to prevent such practices—to be specified by law—and sanctions would be imposed on violators. "Profits" are not defined in the program, however, and it is not clear whether they can be generated under the conditions proposed—conditions that include the regulation of prices by the market, bolstered by competitive imports.

The advocacy of the market as price regulator (with a few exceptions) was not a matter of ideology. It arose from experience with the system of rigid prices. This system had in no way increased supplies and, more important, had fostered bureaucracy. So great was Solidarity's revulsion from bureaucracy that it opposed rationing unless great scarcity of essential foods made it inescapable.

How, in Solidarity's conception, would central planning be implemented? Recall that Solidarity demanded that all administrative bodies charged with resource allocation would be eliminated; that economic enterprises plan autonomously; that no administrative links exist between the planning authorities—at the top there would be at least two of them—and enterprises; that the state budget would be the only financial plan of the state, and would not provide funds outside the state's purview. The key to the answer is the proposal that "instruments incoherent with the logic of economic market relations should be replaced by instruments operating via income-and-demand basis." From the detailed exposition of this point one infers that these consist by and large of taxation and credit. Taxation is recognized as a policy instrument, in addition to financing the state budget. "[The] . . . taxes included in the liabilities of an enterprise would regulate the total financial balance in the economy, and also regulate the amount and distribution of income into production and consumption funds." Taxes on enterprise income, furthermore, would be graduated so as to regulate increases in profits. Taxes on the enterprise's wage expenditures would be assessed so as to eliminate excessive differences in personal incomes between groups of employees. Credit policy would function as it has been intended in Western countries: to protect the purchasing power of money, and help stabilize the economy. The question of credit policy is much more complex than Solidarity's relevant proposals suggest. Controls over foreign exchange or foreign capital investments, for example, are not discussed in this context. The problem of rampant inflation in the current, supposedly administered price system also is not satisfactorily dealt with in the program. Institutional reforms evidently take precedence over current policy problems. The banking system would be autonomous, although accountable to parliament—as it is not, or to only a tenuous degree, in the United States or Great Britain. Enterprises would be free to avail themselves of

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credit, subject only to criteria of solvency and interest rates.

• DECENTRALIZATION and the self-managed enterprise directed by a workers' council is one of the axes of Solidarity's program: the abolition of privilege and social inequality is the other. We are using the term "axes" deliberately, for we are speaking of one coordinated system in which efficiency and equality are not tradeoffs but indispensable to each other. That is the sense of Solidarity's program. The extent of privilege and inequality in Poland has been well summarized in a few passage of the Experience and the Future Group's *Report on the State of the Republic:*

> The seventies were a decade when incomes rose rapidly, albeit most rapidly in the highest income brackets, the end result being a widening of the income differential to a ratio of 1 : 20. . . . Part of society continues to live with lower than the social minimum income, while another segment, consisting of the privileged, has incomes several or even dozens of times the average. . . . There exists in Poland a very large group of people who live in poverty, quite often near the subsistence level. [*Poland Today: The State of the Republic,* compiled by the Experience and the Future Group (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1981), pp. 55, 65.]

Solidarity's program features many proposals dealing with poverty and deprivation in Poland. Among the most important is that minimum wages be fixed at one-half the average wage level, but no lower than the social minimum.

At another point, the *Report* states:

> "The mere fact of belonging to the Polish United Workers' party does not automatically yield benefits. Only members of the active political core of the party, its allied political groupings, and the administrative apparatus enjoy a privileged position in society. Their privileges extend to almost all spheres of life: access to status positions, real incomes, easier shopping, health, education, and foreign travel. . . . During the 1970s, these privileges were extended to relatively large groups in society; the decade also witnessed the inheritance of privilege. These groups, which do not share the concerns of the majority, are more interested in supplementing existing privileges and acquiring new ones than they are in improving any aspect of public life.

Abolition of such privileges is implicit in the proposed economic reforms. Employees' councils could readily control the pay and other compensation of appointed managers. They could institute personnel policies based on competence rather than party membership. And the proposed abandonment of the system of allocation and directed distribution would also eliminate many jobs to which privileges attach. The abolition of privilege is considered inseparable from the creation of a more productive economy. "The union calls for reform. Its purpose is to abolish the privileges of the bureaucracy and to rule out the possibility of their restoration."

The reform would imply "public costs," not further specified in the program. People would lose jobs and income. Inefficient enterprises would close. Existing inequalities would have to be mitigated, poverty attacked. No central authority would be established to cope with such problems. The idea of the state as service state does not enter. It is left implicit at best and usually ignored. For example, the program declares that "the Union will resist the growing differences among enterprises and regions." Appropriate tax measures can help somewhat, but it has been the experience in Western countries that central authority must actively intervene (as in federally sponsored area redevelopment, certain kinds of urban aid), however limited in value such intervention may turn out to be. Solidarity would assign this task mainly to territorial bodies. A national social fund would be created to shift means to needy regions. It is not clear but appears doubtful if, in Solidarity's conception, the central planning or banking authorities would have sufficient power to influence the flow of investment funds so as to compensate regional imbalances. The ambivalence on this and related points represents another instance of Solidarity's profound distrust of the state as it has experienced it.

• THE SUPPRESSION OF SOLIDARITY by the Polish generals does not lessen the significance of its program. On the contrary, the program articulated the threat Solidarity ultimately

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posed to the "New Class" and to its monopolistic control over social property. The program corresponded to profound social needs that, of course, will persist and, if postwar history is any guide, will reassert themselves in political action.

It is not unthinkable that Solidarity's adversaries will adopt those parts of the program that promise to raise the efficiency of Poland's economy. This might well include a considerable slimming-down of the state bureaucracy, and increased authority for enterprise management. But only if Solidarity had remained the great autonomous social movement it was would the future of Polish social democracy have been assured. □

POLAND: IV

Joseph Clark

What Could the West Have Done?

For more than 16 months the world watched in amazement a Communist country where workers were organizing, striking, and winning concessions from the government. Solidarity, a truly independent trade union, reached a membership of 10 million, almost the entire working class of the country.

During all that time the brainpower of Alexander Haig and the other anti-Communist experts in the Administration (including President Reagan, who again broke the news that Communists don't believe in God) was concentrated on the threat of a Soviet invasion of Poland. However, for at least a year before December 13, the Soviets and their Polish agents were preparing their coup—the institution of martial rule. Not a detail was omitted, down to every mimeograph machine in the country.

Certainly, there might have been circumstances under which the Red Army would have marched as they had to Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. But that was low on the list of contingencies. Why invade—when the Polish security police are under KGB direction? When the Polish army is subservient to the Soviets? When there are two mechanized Soviet divisions stationed permanently in Poland?

So there was Washington caught without a semblance of an idea, let along measures to take against the violation of the Helsinki accords by the Soviets and their Polish satraps. The efficacy of the Soviet armed forces has not been tested in recent times. But in one respect they are unsurpassed—in their use of the *threat* of invasion. When the crackdown came on December 13 the Reagan administration sputtered along for several days, just fuming. The European members of the Atlantic alliance gave every indication that they favored appeasement rather than sanctions. Then the Administration took some steps to stem the flow of militarily useful articles to the Soviets, while making exceptions for firms such as International Harvester that might be inconvenienced.

The contrast between the Reagan and Carter administrations was startling. When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan President Carter, saying he had finally learned what the Russians were up to, embargoed most American exports to the Soviet Union. This included the most important item—grain. Carter stopped shipment of high-technology items and canceled U.S. participation in the Moscow Olympics. But Reagan, who had made a campaign

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issue of Carter's desire for mutual limitation of nuclear arms, refrained from decisive action after December 13. He had already lifted the grain embargo, though there had been no reduction of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and there would be martial rule in Poland.

The payoff came, literally, when Reagan bailed out the American bankers who had been making unsecured loans to Poland. As investment banker Felix Rohatyn put it, "The West has been relieving the Soviet Union of what may be its greatest shortage—capital—at the cost of making bad loans while pretending to oppose Communism. This is bad business, bad policy, bad morality."

While Lech Walesa and thousands of other Polish trade unionists were still imprisoned, the Reagan administration moved in secret to save the Polish military junta from default. But while this "secret" was being kept from the American public, the Administration was informing the American banks that had made the loans, the West German bankers who had made even more loans, the Polish junta, and obviously also the Kremlin. The American people were then given a tax bill of $75 million, payable to the American banks. It was elementary solidarity on the part of the AFL–CIO when it raised its voice against saving the Polish junta from default.

Among those who have berated the Polish workers for "going too far" has been George F. Kennan. Here was the man who described with uncanny precision the proclivity for aggrandizement of the Soviet Union, and who had outlined a sensible way to stop them without

Did Solidarity "Go Too Far"?

Lovers of the Polish junta among politicians and journalists keep repeating three irrefutable arguments:

First: The junta had to impose the military dictatorship in order to avoid something worse. Of course it had to. It had to send to concentration camps and prisons thousands of workers and intellectuals. It had to order its executioners to pull wounded miners from ambulances and hospitals and finish them off on the street. It had to do all that and a thousand similar things if it wanted to avoid a society with free workers' unions, that is, a society in which the Communist party would not be in full despotic power over all areas of life.

In the same sense Hitler had to gas six million Jews if he wanted to remain faithful to his ideology, and the Cambodian liberators had to exterminate a third or so of the population if they wanted to build a happy Communist society as they conceived it. Cannibals have to eat. Briefly, everybody has to do what he is doing: whatever is, is right. So is the Polish junta.

Second: Solidarity went too far; it provoked the government. Of course it did. It did so from the first day of its existence and by the sheer fact of its existence. By demanding independent unions and a relaxation of censorship, by protesting against police arbitrariness, by denouncing the institutionalized lie, by trying to get some time on TV to limit the Communist mendacity, by thinking of asking its members what they thought of free elections, by restoring human dignity in an enslaved society, it went too far.

In the same sense blacks who want equal rights in South Africa go too far: the government cannot accept that. People in Argentina who ask about the fate of those who disappeared go too far: the rulers cannot tolerate that. Whoever in whatever despotic country is not quite satisfied with the despotism *goes too far.* Serves him right.

Third: The direct Soviet invasion and occupation would be worse for the Poles than the occupation by Polish security forces. This is the famous "I-will-be-a-milder-hangman" argument: we have known it in Poland for decades. This argument is irrefutable, and it is bound to be true always and everywhere simply because we do not know yet the absolute hangman and we can always imagine a worse one. Whoever followed the trials of the guardians of Nazi concentration camps has heard these pleas of innocence ad nauseam: "Other SS-men would be much worse in my place." The ungrateful Europeans, for some strange reason, failed to understand the humanitarian motivations of hangmen. The ungrateful Poles are not likely to understand the tender feelings of the junta either, now or later.

Leszek Kolakowski □

These comments by the distinguished Polish philospher in exile are excerpted from his article in the *Wall Street Journal*, Dec. 31, 1981.

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risking war (see Kennan's "Long Telegram," from Moscow to Washington, Feb. 22, 1946), now urging continuation of the bad loans to the Communists.

Too many good friends of Solidarity in this country have been blaming the Polish victims of oppression for the deeds of their oppressors. The Hungarians were reproached for the same thing as were the Czechs during their peaceful effort to give "socialism" a human face. The record shows that Solidarity's leaders were urging moderation before the military crackdown. Walesa and his associates knew how cautious one has to be about demanding the right to choose one's government. It was the rank and file who realized that their unions could be safeguarded only under freedom.

Solidarity surely had the right to expect support from workers of all lands. If pressures on the governments of Western Europe and in our country had been stronger, more effective sanctions might have been imposed.

Conflicts as those engendered by the Soviets in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland raise questions about peace in a nuclear age. One doesn't play chicken at times like that. But here was the Reagan administration moving less than decisively in the face of the December 13 coup, while threatening to halt negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the Soviet Union. But this is the *one* area where there is mutual interest, indeed imperative need: the avoidance of nuclear war. Obviously, moves such as the invasion of Afghanistan and the suppression of Polish freedom create a difficult climate for any sort of negotiation. Even those who favor a real easing of tensions between the superpowers must know that appeasement of aggression is no path to peace.

Poland faces bleak days in the foreseeable future. But those who predict a Czech type of terror and somnolence in Poland may not be reckoning with the significant differences between Poland and other East European countries. Poland is the only part of the Soviet empire where the Catholic church maintains an independent status and some 90 percent of the people adhere to that church. The alliance of Solidarity and the Church was a source of strength and although the Church will put its own interests first, it could continue to be a decisive factor in the future.

There are some who advise the Poles that they shouldn't expect anything better than a Hungarian goulash type of solution. On the other hand, the *New York Times* correspondent in Warsaw, John Darnton, cabled (Jan. 13) that the Solidarity experience "raised the vitality of the country to a fever pitch in all its arteries, and it is difficult to imagine them freezing up again." In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to suggest that stronger sanctions by the Western powers and moral and material solidarity by the world's trade unions could have helped to redeem the promises of Polish Solidarity. □

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Jim Sleeper

Neighborhood Gentrification

More Inequity than Meets the Eye

"Sorry about this mess, I don't want to drive down your property values!" exclaims the young hostess, tripping over stray sheetrock and spackling compound toward 30 members of the new block association gathered stiffly in her living room—including a few minority tenants who'd be relieved at the moment to have property values to worry about.

Learning that one of the young professionals has been living on the block for ten years, the hostess trumpets, "You're really one of the pioneers!"—in front of some older Italians who've been raising their kids on these stoops since the 1930s.

Our heroine is seriously over her head, of course. But she's determined to take charge of her confusing new environment and, with professional skills and "can-do" bravura, she probably will. The question is whether today's well-meaning myopia will become tomorrow's embattled confederacy with certain middle-class neighbors who want to "take charge" in more ominous ways.

Now that the City of New York, for example, turns out to have been losing 20 white people an hour for the past ten years, some of those involved in the contrary whitening of its brownstone neighborhoods are pressing their demands with an urgency and self-importance that surprises even wizened politicians and bureaucrats accustomed to the clamor of neighborhood groups. In Washington, meanwhile, an Administration especially solicitous of middle-class needs has given champions of our born-again neighborhoods fresh hope of banishing the subsidized housing they claim despoils the rebuilding of their kingdom and coddles their lower-income neighbors into indolence, and insolence.

The subsidy recipients "suck the blood of the private sector," snarls one renovator from Boston: "they make war on civilization."

The war for new homeowners' loyalties is all out, its Donnybrook every proposal for housing subsidies—no matter how modest or enlightened—developed by community groups with broader constituencies. Mini-inquisitions replace the Welcome Wagon: has the newcomer a perverse fascination with the poor, or readiness to help beat back the jungle? Platitudes about diversity, or a serious commitment to strengthen civilization and its investments? Before her first year is out, our hostess will probably have to take a stand. The odds are that her vast gaps in perception concerning her lower-income neighbors will be converted to chasms of hatred more swiftly than their apartments can be converted into condominiums.

These transformations suggest that gentrification's impact may prove to be as much ideological as economic, that it is less likely to revitalize cities than to shape a fateful new "consensus" about their continuing fragmentation. Gentrification is becoming a front line of the larger counterrevolution: while suburbanites aren't confronted intimately by blight and despair, and ghetto minorities have a tough time facing the bankers, brokers, and slumlords who always seem a step ahead of the storm, gentrification battles bring "society" face to face with the hideous class differences it has created. Even as it recoils from them, it winds up entrenching itself behind them and in effect ratifying them.

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The zealots of upscale conversion lead that ratification by promoting certain invidious conclusions about low-income neighbors. Driven by the myriad pressures of the urban housing market, these zealots aren't given to compassionate exploration of the hurts and hopes of people driven even harder. They want them out. Period. Their antisubsidy furor legitimates an accelerating urban spiral of inequity and fear upon which gentrification has curiously come to depend.

It wasn't always so. "This is a tale of urban accommodation," the *New York Times* rhapsodized in 1977 when Manhattan's Community Board 7 presented a balanced plan for mixed subsidized and market-rate housing in the West Side Urban Renewal Area east of Broadway, insuring at least 2,500 units for some of the 12,000 low-income families who had once lived there.

> By assuring high-income families they will not be outnumbered [the *Times* noted] the plan should make these sites attractive to people who have the choice to move elsewhere. It has taken a long time for good sense to make itself heard above the din. . . .

In Brooklyn's Park Slope, similar if more modest plans were afoot in the Fifth Avenue Committee's efforts to rehabilitate small city-foreclosed buildings for moderate-income ownership and low-income rental, with financing from Aetna Life and the City. In other neighborhoods, yet other groups were crafting stabilization proposals to cushion market upswings.

It was a time when wisdom and policy spoke with one voice: properly subsidized housing (not high-rise "projects") was a low-income person's chance to escape the constant uprooting that ravages individuals and society. Middle-class people know how disorienting and exhausting it can be to move by choice, the consensus reminded us; what must it be like for poor people bulldozed or priced out of neighborhood support networks they desperately need?

The crusading gentry would have none of it. Surely more low-income people had been thrown out of their homes by the final predatory stages of disinvestment, like milking and arson, than by upscale rehabilitation and its conceits. The renovators had become astute pupils in the school of liberal government failure: they argued that disinvestment and the poor's uprooting had been hastened less by gentrification than by such liberal artifices as FHA mortgages facilitating the white exodus to suburbia; by inner-city projects facilitating ghettoization; by agency "dumping" of welfare families into market areas already weakened by white flight, redlining, and rent control. Had liberal government now repented its sins and become wise? Even so, the new gentry couldn't see why they should have to live with the pathological damage of government's past mistakes while struggling to sink roots of their own.

The leaders of the protest spoke of their neighborhoods' long-neglected physical beauty—not of their long-neglected neighbors. They attacked the refusal of banks to extend credit to people like themselves, people adroitly entering blighted areas now beginning to turn, people who had taken brave risks with buckling plaster and menacing junkies, and who would dust off once-grand local parks and libraries while nursing whole blocks back to a soupçon of lost loveliness.

The battle for the bankers' attention left the suitors excruciatingly conscious of neighborhood "reputation" as the critical factor in local revitalization. It left them feeling entitled to shape that reputation and guard it. It leant a fevered, boosterish quality to yearly local housing tours. Most of all, it spawned an apocalyptic fear and hatred of subsidies.

After all, the militant gentry declared, we're recreating the tax base from which the poor's housing comes. Attack us with their crime, filth, and projects—insult us by giving neighboring property we've made valuable to people who've done nothing to earn it and won't even maintain it—and you'll drive out the only hope of revenue and stability the City has.

Without apology, the West Side's Committee of Neighbors to Insure a Normal Urban Environment (Continue) sued the federal and city governments in 1971 and again in 1979 over one of the low-income urban renewal sites,

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charging literally that the poor are hazardous to the environment under the terms of required environmental impact statements.

As the new militants marched on the mayor's residence at Gracie Mansion in 1980 to demand that the plan be killed, inflation and real estate conversions marched up Columbus Avenue, reinforcing the crusaders' view of reality. Beginning as a benign revival of shabby tenements by young urban integrationists, the trend quickly drew promoters. It became an inflationary, luxury-oriented juggernaut that raised the stakes of homeowners while gobbling up low-income rental units for overpriced co-ops and weakening the building power of limited federal subsidies. Soon you were either on the housing bandwagon or off; Continue was on, picking up speed, while lower-income people fell off into ever more unacceptable housing, income decline, and deeper unemployment. Crime soared. A lot of folks got religion.

As times changed, the *Times* changed, opining that residents priced out of a booming local market will do society and themselves a favor by going quietly, rather than calling in subsidies to crash the party. By the time the City gave its formal approval to the West Side plan, hostility to subsidized housing in privately marketable areas had reached such a pitch that Continue's Eugene Halpern could tell a reporter, in a vulgar appropriation of the Holocaust, that he and his members were sick and tired of being "the human lampshades of subsidy."

HAPPY DELIVERANCE for the embattled soldiers of capitalism and civilization arrived last March, when Continue was elevated after years of frustration to the high ground of public policy by no less an apostle of free enterprise than Senator Alfonse M. D'Amato.

In a pattern typical of such encounters, D'Amato first helped his once-liberal supplicants witness their new faith with a stirring catechism:

- *Who Made Us?* We are self-made, by the grace of the Free Market, from which all blessings flow.
- *Who Made the Poor?* Liberals and bureaucrats made them, by contravening market forces in a misguided "war" on what the false prophets told them was Poverty, but which we swear unto you is really Opportunity; for all who come into the marketplace with willing hands and open hearts shall be saved.

THEY GOT DOWN TO BUSINESS: D'Amato had Ronald Reagan's Housing and Urban Development Secretary Samuel Pierce (himself a middle-class black resident of the West Side) delay long-expected concurrence with the urban renewal plan, developed by the community board over months of laborious compromise, supported by all local elected officials, passed unanimously by New York City's Board of Estimate, and sustained against Continue in all the courts.

Gratified by its end run around democracy, Continue endorsed Margaret Clemons, a private investigator and past Conservative party candidate for State Assembly who took the Republican line against left-Democratic Council Member Ruth Messinger.*

The militant gentry's worst venom seemed reserved for middle-class whites who had helped draft the subsidy proposals. "They are trying to develop an empire of buildings and public funds that will enable them to pursue the socialist propaganda that will encourage hatred and economic depression," cried Frederick Baar of the Park Slope Improvement Committee (PSIC) in a letter to a local Brooklyn weekly, in reference to the Fifth Avenue Committee's subsidized home-ownership proposal. Both Continue and PSIC circulated thousands of leaflets identifying the subsidies with "crime" and misrepresenting the proposals as more "projects."

By passing themselves off as defenders of their neighborhoods, the zealots misrepresent something far more serious. For even though a renovator's scramble to stay in place often brings out the heroic strengths of early

* Senator D'Amato's pressure on Housing Secretary Pierce was finally offset by the City late last year. HUD has now removed itself from the West Side Urban Renewal Project, leaving the Project in the hands of the mayor and the Board of Estimate. Continue may bring suit.

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brownstone struggles, it accelerates housing inflation while trying to outrun it, and deepens housing inequities in other ways. By latching onto blight in areas with the greatest investment potential, newcomers reinforce the larger system of real estate credit and tax subsidy that created blight in the first place.

A free-enterprise mythology that reserves all honor for personal initiative while leaving social consequences to an Invisible Hand makes it as difficult as it is necessary to explain these matters. And to be fair, the newcomers' dilemma is profound. Brownstoners know that even with good educations, willingness to camp out in unfinished shells, financially helpful parents, and ability to come up with out-of-pocket money for piecemeal renovations, their sacrifice and hard work would have come to nothing without the reentry of the banks. Yet banks are by nature risk-averters; winning credit entails sustained and assiduous promotion of the neighborhood, in which enormous credibility is attached to the subjective preferences and fears of potential middle-class investors. This in turn entails a clash of cultures even when low-income people cannot be accused of crime or disruption. In short, serving big capital's interests means promoting displacement.

As fateful, if less obvious, is the federal tax code's role in destroying balanced neighborhoods. Unlike direct subsidies, which reach only 1 out of 9 eligible low-income families, the right to reduce your taxes on any income spent for mortgage interest or property levies is automatic and exercised by 4 out of 5 homeowners. It's an incentive to put your money into housing, the more expensive the better if your income bracket's high enough.

As housing analyst Rolf Goetze illustrated in the January 1981 issue of *Working Papers*, even a modest $30,000 co-op with a 20 percent downpayment ($6,000) and $500 monthly costs really comes to only $367 a month after tax deductions for a family making around $25,000. And with each monthly payment, equity and resale value are rising. So the tax code dictates that early pioneers and small landlords in a "gentrifying" neighborhood will be joined by developers and promoters, some of whom engage in arson and thuggery to empty whole blocks for conversion. Why not turn working families' rental apartments into overpriced shoe-box co-ops, when the tax code makes it so tempting for upscale people to buy them as a hedge against inflation?

Here, really, is the hidden rip-off of low-income people by the middle class. As housing consultant Cushing Dolbeare notes, the total cost to the federal government of all its directly assisted housing programs, from their inception in 1937 to 1980, has been less than the cost of housing-related tax deductions granted to homeowners and developers in 1980 alone. Of all federal housing outlays, 25.5 percent went to households making over $50,000, for an average monthly assist of $309 per recipient, while only 18 percent went to households earning under $10,000, for an average monthly assist of about $100.

Yet the zealots tell us it's the latter who "suck the blood of the private sector," presumably because subsidies are direct appropriations. More generous indirect tax subsidies are supposed to be okay because they spur investment in new housing, relieving price and space pressures in lower-income markets as the middle class moves out of older homes, thereby benefiting everyone, as tax policies and expenditures are supposed to do.

• *But the essence of gentrification is the opposite: not only will tax deductions build no additional units; they are utilized to take old units away from the people who need them most*—whether through single-family conversion of brownstones, co-op conversion of rental units, or luxury conversion of single-room occupancy residential hotels. The remaining rental stock is bid up too high for people who can barely afford their present rent, let alone make co-op downpayments.

For owners, by contrast, property is appreciating, and when it's sold the profits may be largely tax free. Surely the gentry work hard, but the very sacrifices squeezed out of them by developers and bankers, along with the very real benefits that do accrue, accelerate displacement and the destruction of low-income housing.

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Even when gentrification's aplogists acknowledge its excesses, they remind us contemptuously of the blighted condition of brownstone neighborhoods before their arrival. They imply that the poor were to blame.

It seems necessary to remind the apologists that gentrification's intimate affair with blight reflects inequities far beyond the poor's control. Blacks and Hispanics came north after World War II not to go on welfare but to take factory jobs vacated by white ethnics who were upgrading their careers on the GI Bill and moving to suburbia on FHA mortgages. The problem was that the factory jobs left, too.

White outmigration in the early years wasn't a flight from minorities and urban ills; indeed, urban strengths like decent schooling and union pay checks made possible a mass response to a heavily advertised public/private-sector lure to greener pastures. Industrial flight from the high taxes and payrolls responsible for those strengths was another matter. Its impact on housing conditions was harsh and inequitable.

In a fascinating doctoral thesis for CUNY's Department of Environmental Psychology, Timothy O'Hanlon first cites Columbia urban planner Peter Marcuse's discovery that the median rental household income in New York City fell a whopping 26 percent in the years 1969–77, while rents rose an average of 20 percent, consuming almost a third of income by the decade's end. Job-seeking minorities, last hired and first fired, bore the brunt of this rent gap.

But what hurt housing even more, O'Hanlon argues, was the banks' withdrawal of credit from whole minority neighborhoods. That put a stop to the easy credit investors had used to finance the routine resale of buildings from their right hands to their left (under dummy corporate ownerships) for tax deduction purposes. Because these landlords couldn't finance the sales under redlining, they now had to get from the rent roll what had previously come from inflated resale and the consequent renewed depreciation allowances and capital gains. To squeeze the rent roll, they had to cut building maintenance and seek welfare tenants, whose shelter allowances at the time were allowed to exceed regulated rent ceilings.

And why were welfare families so desperate to move in? Because, along with declining real income, redlining was devastating their old neighborhoods. The denial of credit in Bushwick or Harlem, regardless of an individual applicant's credit standing, meant that neither homeowners nor investors could borrow to improve their properties; and without mortgage availability, they'd be hard put to sell them to new buyers. The consequent decline in property values, added to existing outmigration and income decline, left milking or the torch as the only means of extracting one's investment.

O'Hanlon notes that minority flight from these conditions temporarily pumps up demand in softening white markets, especially when that flight is carefully steered and exploited by block-busting brokers. The resulting predicament for the middle-class minority family is poignant: even if it can survive income decline and mortgage discrimination and make the downpayment in a better neighborhood, its very arrival is used by some brokers to induce white owners to sell cheaply. The consequent devaluation and softening of demand make rental owners milk buildings, and in no time the middle-class minority newcomers have been leap-frogged by the poverty and devastation they tried to escape.

Today many black and Hispanic residents of the West Side and Park Slope—areas with at least a possibility of stable economic and racial integration—have been burned out or frozen out several times. Even the vast majority of them who pay their rents, work hard, and send their kids well-scrubbed to school can't seem to escape the ministrations of speculators and slumlords. *The point is that even were tenant behavior exquisitely "civilized," the flying wedge of blight would continue.* Yet the zealots seem to have decided that the poor richly deserve whatever constraints oppress them, if only because their pronounced cultural differences impeded the process of neighborhood promotion.

Fran Justa of Park Slope's Fifth Avenue Committee sees it differently. Driving through once-lovely Crown Heights, surveying the

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black faces amidst the devastation, she muses, "You can say either, 'Look what these animals have done to the neighborhood,' or 'Look how people are trying to survive amidst the conditions in which they find themselves.' " Those who blame the victims of blight and uprooting remind Justa of an old Jewish joke:

"Rabbi, why is the sea so salty?"

"Because of the thousands of herring that live there."

The "moral," of course, is that the truth is the other way around.

WHATEVER IT MAY have been at first, gentrification is now one of the saltiest currents in the ocean. But why the venom and near-hysteria of those who ride it, who have time and market forces on their side?

We find the answer less in any threat the poor pose than in the pressures the zealots themselves experience. The zealots may think of living on welfare and playing bingo with one's shelter allowance as a kind of holiday, rather than the imprisonment it surely is, because they are caught bitterly in a kind of imprisonment of their own, more constraining than the "mortgage-poverty" homeowners willingly complain about. Marx called it commodity fetishism—an obsession with consumption styles that insinuates itself into personality when all human relationships have been plunged into the icy waters of calculation by market forces: the trappings of dignity that money can buy, such as brownstone ownership in an elegant neighborhood, become virtually the only substitutes for the dignity of life in more stable, supportive communities.

The craving for those substitute trappings, and the semblance of "acceptance" they bring, cripples concern for the dilemmas and experiences of those cast out of the market altogether; it reduces decent poverty to social invisibility broken only by the poor's power to disrupt. And when that craving to "pass" is deepened by minority experience, be it the pit of the Holocaust or the reception accorded one's black skin in a gentrifying neighborhood, the need to prove oneself to one's adopted elite never ends, not even with prosperity.

Middle-class people who work with low-income residents to cushion market displacement become targets of special rage. They threaten the zealots, because they uphold the possibility of an economy and a society in which the zealots' desperate scramble might not have to be made, in which the extremes of heroic escape from the gutter and pathetic immersion in it would dissolve.

Yet those extremes grow starker in our cities each year, making some people cling all the more desperately to their narrow prerogatives within this system. Hence their inability to respond warmly to real dignity, wherever it is found across class lines, without fear of degrading themselves; and hence their blindness to the violence of speculators who send poor tenants packing on cold winter nights.

Since housing-subsidy advocates have faults of their own and the debates are so acrimonious and complex, moderates are tempted to leave the field. But they, and all progressive people, have to speak up firmly at chaotic public meetings, and tell elected officials that the zealots don't represent all tax-paying middle-class opinion. Where electoral contests have been turned into referenda on subsidized housing, as in Continue's challenge of Council Member Messinger, people ought to turn out to defeat the zealots resoundingly.

Of course, more subsidies in the context of an unreformed tax code and the inflation it causes are no solution. Capping housing tax deductions at $5,000 a household, as Cushing Dolbeare proposes, or offering a flat 25 percent tax credit in place of present deductions, as the Urban League would like, certainly won't hurt the average Continue or PSIC member yet will recoup billions wasted on the truly greedy.

New taxes on deliberately inflationary paper resales, as the one passed by the District of Columbia, would produce more revenue and reduce speculation. Municipal property tax give-aways for luxury rehabilitation, however, as New York City's J-51 program, should be restricted; ironically, we give away millions to high-income people who can deduct most of the cost of local property taxes from their federal returns anyway.

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Properties foreclosed by cities should be reserved and developed as low- and moderate-income, nonprofit cooperatives, free of the vagaries of speculation and rent control battles. New York City's pioneering programs in this area should be expanded, not precluded by quick auctions.

The failures of liberal government lie not in having done too much but in having done the wrong things. We face a choice: either government returns to what the conservatives think are its proper minimal functions—merely policing the apartheid for which the gentry's social theories are preparing us; or government will structure new forms of nonspeculative housing investment to bring some sanity to the current chaos.

Such solutions, of course, require political organizing that goes beyond litigation and log-rolling. That can happen only if class lines harden and people despair of accomplishing, Horatio Alger-style, what they might do better through movements and parties. Along the way we may see such direct actions as squatters' movements like the West Side's "Operation Move-In," which brought hundreds of low-income people back to city-owned buildings vacated years earlier for the urban renewal that Continue has blocked. Moderates who've ignored violent eviction tactics by speculators can hardly condemn squatters' movements.

Surely, as long as middle-income people remain absorbed in their short-run aspirations to make neighborhood "reputation" a marketable substance while ignoring real human needs, they invite social disaster. For years we've been told that the emphasis on aspirations and intangibles at the expense of the "real world" is the problem of the left. Watching the real estate industry's exploitation of the gentry's fantasies, and their unholy alliance with conservative crusaders from D'Amato to George Gilder, we can begin to insist that the truth is otherwise, and that the most constructive solutions in housing and other areas lie with the groups and programs we've worked so hard to develop. □

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

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Lester Thurow

Why Do Economists Disagree?

The public perception that economists do not agree upon anything is probably even more disconcerting than their failures in prediction and control. Something happens and then upon the TV screen appear two economists who in the 30 seconds alloted them seem to be giving diametrically opposing economic views. If economists disagree that sharply, how can they possibly know anything?

Economists disagree much less about economics than the general public thinks. Most of the disagreements are about noneconomic aspects of economic problems. But perception of disagreement is not surprising given the characteristics of economics.

Economics is a nonexperimental science and disagreement is common in nonexperimental sciences, where it is impossible to conduct laboratory experiments with their tight control of extraneous variables. In 1980 there was a great dispute among nutritionists in the United States as to whether Americans should, or should not, eat butter. No agreement was possible in what after all seems like a relatively trivial problem. When it comes to burning more coal to generate electricity, meteorologists cannot agree whether the extra CO_2 will cause the earth to warm up, melt the polar ice caps, and flood most of the major cities of the world, or whether the extra CO_2 will cause the world to cool off and crush our major cities in another ice age. Before Mt. Saint Helens erupted, the MIT earth sciences department thought something might occur; so they set up some remote telemetry instruments in the Pacific Northwest, but they put their instruments on the wrong mountain.

Put in the context of such scientific disagreements and failures, the disagreements in economics are not surprising. Scientists are only in agreement when they are talking about some phenomenon that can be produced and replicated in the laboratory. Very few economic activities are laboratory phenomena. Nonlaboratory scientific phenomena are subject to just as much disagreement as those that exists among economists.

The same problem exists in forecasting. Economic forecasts are often wrong, but scientists can accurately forecast what will happen only when they are working in laboratory conditions. They are no better than economists when it comes to real world events. Earthquakes, major floods, volcanic eruptions—they are all more unpredictable than economic events.

Often the failures are interrelated. If the weather cannot be predicted, then economists cannot predict food prices or the demand for heating oil. If the political scientists cannot predict revolutions in Iran or wars in the Middle East or geologists cannot predict future oil supplies, then economists cannot predict energy prices.

For both economist and scientist, forecasts are difficult. No one—scientist or economist—can predict the large irregular stochastic shocks that regularly occur outside the laboratory.

• PUBLIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS are subject to dispute for yet another reason. There are no public policies so good that everyone's income goes up; there are no public policies so bad that everyone's income goes down. Every policy has income distribution effects. As a consequence economic recommendations contain two major elements. First, there must be some hard economic information as to whose income will go up, whose income will go down, and what is the net result of those gains and losses. This is the scientific part of every economic problem. Second, however, there is an ethical value judgment as to whose income "ought" to go up or

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down. This ethical value judgment has nothing to do with technical economics, but it is usually at the heart of differences between liberal and conservative economists.

"What should we do about problem X?" Where X may be inflation, productivity, unemployment, or some similar problem, this question is commonly posed and answered by economists, but it is a question designed to produce disagreement. It is only partly a technical economic problem. Ought America to raise unemployment to stop inflation? Different economists have different answers to the "ought" question, even if they agree on the outcome and the distribution of gains and losses.

To find the professional economic disagreements, a different question must be asked. "If we were to adopt policy Y, whose income will go up, whose income will go down, and how much?" In most circumstances that second question will generate a substantial amount of agreement. Liberal and conservative economists most frequently disagree on who ought to be hurt and who ought to be helped. Their technical disagreements on who will be hurt and who will be helped are much less frequent.

By the very fact that we use the words "liberal or conservative" with respect to economists, we are saying that the discipline is somehow different. No one talks about liberal or conservative chemists. There are only chemists who in the rest of their lives happen to be liberals or conservatives.

No economic dispute better illustrates the problem of value judgments than the perennial dispute over the minimum wage laws. What is fought out as if it were a dispute about economic facts is in reality a dispute about the values that society "ought" to follow. All of the economic facts are widely accepted by both economists who are for and against the minimum wage laws.

Everyone agrees that the minimum wage will create some unemployment for those whose productivity is below the minimum wage. Everyone agrees that it will raise the wages of other intramarginal workers who remain employed and get the new higher wage rate. Everyone agrees that if the elasticity of the demand curve is less than one (a 1 percent increase in wages leading to a less than 1 percent reduction in employment), the total income going to those in the low wage group (employed and unemployed) will go up. The elasticity of the demand curve is estimated to be less than one by both liberal and conservative economists.

Aggregate incomes are up, but that still leaves a group of losers. There is agreement on who those losers are. The minimum wage raises the income and employment of adults, particularly females, while concentrating unemployment among teen-agers. There is also agreement that the minimum wage laws are only loosely enforced with minimal penalties for those who are caught violating them. As a result millions of workers are simply illegally paid less than the minimum wage. Whatever the theoretical effects, the actual effects are much smaller.

Given all of this agreement, why the enormous disputes about the minimum wage in general and a subminimum for teen-agers in particular? The answer is simple. The minimum wage dispute is not a dispute about economics, but a political dispute as to whether government should or should not intervene in the labor market to alter market incomes—in this case to raise the income of low-wage workers. Is the good society a laissez-faire society or is the good society one where government intervenes to alter earnings? It is an important question, but not primarily an economic one.

• THE WORLD is also a complicated place where you can see what you want to see. An industrial psychologist, McGregor, has constructed what he calls theory X and theory Y. A theory X person believes that people are motivated with draconian rewards and punishments. In terms of children's nursery rhymes man is basically a grasshopper who likes leisure and must be forced to work and save. Wherever a theory X person looks he sees lazy people who confirm his belief that harsh economic whips and large economic carrots are necessary to keep people working and saving.

A theory Y person believes that man is basically a working, tool-using animal. It is

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possible to construct disincentives to work and save that will stop man from working, but relatively mild rewards and punishments will keep him at work. Man is basically a beaver. Wherever theory Y persons look, they see industrious people who are working without harsh whips and large carrots.

Both theory X and theory Y people can easily observe real people who confirm their theories. There are lazy people and industrious people. The relevant question revolves around the proportions of each. But most people are not willing to change their basic view of human nature based on what must inevitably be imprecise statistical evidence as to what those proportions are.

The United States has just completed a large number of negative income tax experiments that attempted to study the work incentive effects of different tax and benefit rates. The studies reached a common conclusion. Individuals cut their work effort 5 to 10 percent when they were given a poverty-line income ($8,414 for an urban family of 4 in 1980) and were facing tax rates in excess of 50 percent. Given income and substitution effects both working in the same direction, the result was not surprising or alarming. And everyone agreed that the existing welfare system with its implicit tax rates that could go far above 100 percent was more detrimental to work.

Yet it is fair to say that the experiments changed the minds of not one U.S. senator or congressman. Those who were convinced that the poor would retire to the beach if they were given a negative income tax remained convinced. Lacking support on the "laziness" front, they attacked the programs for promoting divorce and breaking up families, since there was evidence that the poor used some of their extra money to purchase legal divorces although there was no evidence that the extra money increased the poor's divorces—informal separation or desertion.

Table 1

Performance and Redistributional Effort

Country	Real Per Capita	Distribution of Income		Government Income	
	GDP Growth 1960–1977	*Pre-Tax* (Income top 20%/ income bottom 20%)	*Post-Tax*	*Final Consumption* (Percent of GDP)	*Maintenance* (Percent of GDP)
Japan	7.5%*	5.6%	5.2%	10%	3%
Spain	5.0	—	7.1	10	—
France	4.1	8.6	10.9	15	12
Norway	4.0	8.3	5.9	19	10
Italy	3.8*	—	9.1	14	10
Canada	3.4	10.1	8.2	20	7
Netherlands	3.4	7.8	6.6	18	19
Germany	3.1	7.9	7.1	20	12
Sweden	2.7	6.8	5.6	28	9
Australia	2.6*	5.9	5.9	16	4
United States	2.5	11.8	9.5	18	7
United Kingdom	1.9	7.5	6.1	21	8

*1960–1976

Source: Malcolm Sawyer, *Income Distribution in OECD Countries*, Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, Occasional Studies, July 1976.

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Economic recommendations also differ because there are many routes to success.

A belief in a harsh trade-off between equity and efficiency is the keystone of many economic arguments. Everyone has often heard that "more equality means less growth" and, given the economic problems of the 1970s, countries must decide to opt for "more rapid growth and less equality." But if the performance and equality of different economies are examined, this dilemma does not exist. There is no relation between the amount of inequality that different countries have been willing to tolerate and their economic performance. There are many routes to economic success—some paved with equality, some paved with inequality.

In Table 1 various countries are ranked in accordance with their economic performance from 1960 to 1977. The Japanese were most efficient with a 7.5 percent rate of growth of per capita GDP, while the British were least efficient with a 1.9 percent rate of growth of per capita GDP. The rest of the data in Table 1 indicate the degree of inequality in each country and the extent of the redistribution efforts. As can be quickly seen there is no rank order correlation between performance, the degree of equality, or the extent of the redistributional effort. Different data sets would present slightly different rankings in the degree of inequality and extent of redistributional effort, but they would not alter the conclusion that there is little or no rank order correlation between equality variables and economic performance or efficiency variables.

Pre-tax, the country with the most equal distribution of income, Japan, has the best performance while the country with the most unequal distribution of income, the United States, is near the bottom of the performance distribution. Wide differences exist in the extent to which countries succeed in redistributing income. Norway, the country with the largest pre-tax to post-tax movement toward equality, has a relatively good economic performance, but so has France, a country with relatively little or no redistribution according to these data. Countries at the bottom of the performance distribution do not systematically make larger redistributional efforts.

Similar conclusions can be reached looking at the proportion of GDP going to government consumption or the proportion of GDP going to income maintenance activities. With the exception of the Japanese, the three countries that spend the least on income maintenance are at the bottom of the performance distribution. High proportions of government consumption seem more correlated with economic performance, but the differences mainly reflect military spending. If defense spending is removed from the totals, the differences in final consumption are small. U.S. final consumption, for example, drops to 13 percent.

Some good performers have a high degree of inequality and no redistribution; others have a low degree of inequality and substantial redistribution. Poor economic performers are equally mixed in terms of the degree of inequality and the extent of their redistributional effort. Whatever the connection between equity and efficiency, it is not a simple one where the willingness to tolerate inequality guarantees efficiency or is necessary to achieve efficiency.

No one doubts that there is a direct trade-off between more equality and efficiency in a perfectly competitive static neoclassical economy operating at 100 percent efficiency. The only question is the size of the effect. But dynamic real world economies are another matter. They may or may not have reached real political limits on redistribution, but most of them have not reached any harsh economic limits.

Consider the case of the United States—one of the poor economic performers. More inequality would produce more savings, but it is equally clear that there are many other ways to raise a society's savings rate. If society chooses to raise the savings rate with more inequality rather than one of these other options, that is a political decision and not an economic necessity. Japan, a country with one of the world's highest savings rates, is also a country with one of the most equal distributions of income. Governments can run surpluses in their budgets, require greater funding of private or public

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pension plans, decrease consumer and mortgage credit, or do a host of other things to raise savings.

Individual work incentives are more of a problem since there is no option to individual work effort. But work-effort studies do not indicate that the United States has reached any redistribution limit. Three kinds of work-effort studies have been done in the United States.

One set of interview studies focuses on the work-effort effect of high taxes on high-income individuals. These studies have uniformly found that even when taxes were much higher than those now in place (there is now a 50 percent maximum tax rate on earnings), there was no adverse effect on work effort. Two factors accounted for this result. For the types of individuals who actually pay high tax rates, income effects (with a lower take-home income you must work harder to achieve some standard of living) dominate substitution effects (with a lower take-home wage rate leisure becomes more attractive), and such individuals face a wide variety of nonmonetary incentive systems. Power, prestige, promotions, fame—they all help to keep high-income individuals working hard in the face of high marginal tax rates.

The second set of econometric studies focuses on aggregate labor-supply functions and is dominated by the labor-supply characteristics of the average worker. Aggregate labor-supply functions consistently show that taxes either have no impact on work effort or that the labor-supply curve actually bends backward. This is confirmed in the enormous increase in working wives. If current tax rates were a strong disincentive to work, they would not be entering the labor force in massive numbers since they often enter at their husband's marginal tax rate.

The third set of studies, focusing on the work behavior of those on welfare, has already been mentioned. Adverse work-effort effects were found to be small.

The results of such studies can be confirmed in another way. Compare the distribution of earnings for fully employed white males with that for the rest of the labor force (see Table 2). Unless you believe that the culture in which women, minorities, and unemployed white males exist is different from that of employed white males, there is every reason to believe that a reward structure capable of keeping white males on their economic toes is also capable of keeping other Americans on their economic toes.

Yet as can be seen from the data, white males have a much more equal distribution of earnings than the rest of the population. There is a 5 to 1 gap in the relative earnings of the top and bottom quintiles for fully employed white males, but a 27 to 1 gap for everyone else. Can economic efficiency really require five times as much inequality among minorities and women as it does among white men?

Table 2

Distribution of Earnings in 1977

Quintiles	Full-Time Full-Year White Males	All Other
1	7.7%	1.8%
2	13.9	7.2
3	18.2	15.8
4	23.5	27.0
5	36.7	48.2
Mean Earnings	$16,568	$5,843

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Report*, Consumer Income Series P 60 #119.

• THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY is also advanced as evidence that income redistribution has reached economic limits. But here again the evidence does not lead to that conclusion. Underground economic activity is still economic activity. It still contributes to output and well-being. When production leaves the taxable sphere it may affront our political institutions, but the only economic penalty is a reduction in government revenue. The real Gross National Product has not become smaller even if there has been a reduction in the statistically measured GNP.

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In the U.S. the growth in the underground economy, if it has grown, is supposed to have taken place since the late 1960s. But this has been a period with a substantial reduction in the progressivity of the tax system. The maximum rates are lower on both earnings and capital income than they were in the '40s, '50s, and early '60s. If the underground economy is growing, it is clearly related to changes in other cultural values or to the examples set by national leaders. If presidents (like Nixon) can legally or illegally avoid paying taxes, the average citizen will do the same. If legal loopholes are not "fairly" distributed, then the average citizen can simply go underground and make some loopholes of his own.

If governments want to stop the underground economy, there are also many enforcement procedures that can be employed. Reducing the level or progressivity of taxation is only one of many options. If taxes are reduced to solve the problem, that is a political decision and not one required by economic necessity.

Advanced industrial societies may not wish to increase income equality, but this has to be argued as an ethical proposition. Economic growth does not require it. But Americans are, uncomfortably, ethically arguing for more inequality for its own sake. Inequality has to be justified as leading to something else. Hence we cast a fundamental ethical debate as to what constitutes the good society—a society with a high degree of equality or a high degree of inequality—as an economic debate. Having disguised an ethical debate as a technical economic debate, it should not be surprising that the result is confusion, with economists weighing in on each side of the issue. . . .

Many of the disputes among economists come from a failure to understand the many different uses to which economic models can be put.

(1) They can be used to describe and organize events.

(2) They can be used to understand what would happen in a controlled environment.

(3) They can be used to predict what will happen in the real world.

(4) They can be used to design policies to influence and control economic events.

(5) They can be used as normative models to infer how a perfectly rational *homo economicus* should act and how his activities should be organized.

None of these five uses automatically leads to the others. Physicists can predict heavenly motion but they cannot control or influence it. A model of how *homo economicus* ought to act does not necessarily let the economist accurately describe how *homo sapiens* actually does act. To understand the chemistry and physics of interactions between air, water, and earth in the laboratory does not necessarily allow the meteorologist to predict the weather.

Given a clever economist and completely elastic nonobservable concepts such as utility or psychic income, any activity can be described and organized as if it were the outcome of a free-market maximization process. All consumption purchases represent utility maximization; all job choices represent income (psychic plus money) maximization. There is nothing wrong with formulating models with unknown and in principle unknowable variables if everyone is clear that the result is merely a descriptive model that may be useful in cataloguing activities. The ability to give such descriptions, however, does not mean that the model is an economic model in any of the other four senses. To be a model in the other four senses, the model must be capable of being proved wrong.

Because economists cannot predict or measure the elastic nonobservable variables, they cannot make economic predictions. Not understanding the process whereby these variables are generated, they do not understand economic actions. Without understanding, influence or control is impossible. Yet economists often talk as if they can do all of these things simply because they are able to build a descriptive model.

• In its extreme form economists cling to the following syllogism:

(1) Free market-maximizing games are the most efficient economic games that man can play.

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(2) More efficient economic games drive less efficient economic games out of business.

(3) Therefore the actual economic game must be a free market-maximizing economic game. The only problem is to describe the game in the right way. Markets are as close to perfection as they can be, not because we have proved it but because we know that it must be so. Other than recommending that government get out of the way (there are even recent tendencies to eliminate this reservation), there is nothing that must be done to ensure maximum efficiency.

Economic understanding is also often confused with the ability to make accurate economic predictions. Most physical sciences understand rather than predict. To understand a phenomenon is to be able to predict the outcome of a laboratory or controlled environment experiment where "other" variables are held constant and stochastic processes limited. With the single exception of heavenly motion, physical scientists predict outcomes in controlled environments. They are no better, for example, at predicting the real world's meteorological phenomena than economists are at predicting the real world's economic events. To judge economics in terms of its predictive record is to judge it in a way that no other science is judged.

Although the use of economic models to design policies to influence economic events springs from our understanding of economic processes, economists have not placed enough emphasis on the distinction between control and influence. For the same reason that economic events are not predictable, they are not completely controllable. At any moment in time there will be unpredicted influences and stochastic shocks other than the policy variables that were adopted. The 1968 tax increase influenced the economy—it grew more slowly than it would otherwise have done—but the economy expanded faster than was desired or predicted. Policies can hope to influence the economy, but they cannot hope to control it.□

PRAXIS

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Editors: Richard J. Bernstein & Mihailo Marković

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H. A. Feiveson

Thinking About Nuclear Weapons

The German physicist and philosopher C. F. von Weizsäcker once asked Martin Buber why all the Church's appeals for an end to the nuclear arms race were so ineffectual. Buber's reply was that the appeals have failed to state what one's individual responsibility is. On no issue so vital have citizens felt so excluded and so unclear about their responsibility. Even those who believe there will be nuclear war in the next few years carry on with business as usual. A Gallup poll during June 1981 found that one American in five believes the United States is "very likely" to get into an all-out nuclear war in the next ten years![1]

The Exclusion of the Public

THE SENSE OF EXCLUSION and helplessness felt by the public is rooted in an almost total lack of relevant experience. Of course, a lack of experience doesn't always discourage strong and loud opinions. But in regard to nuclear weapons, the radical ignorance of the citizens is impossible for them to ignore. They feel they must defer to experts and professionals. And so the citizens turn to the experts in part because they appear to possess an esoteric technical and political knowledge, including secret information not available to the lay public. The seeming inaccessibility of arcane and secret technologies is then compounded by the doctrine of deterrence, where the objective effectiveness of the weapons—as difficult as this is to comprehend—is less important than the adversary's perception of the likelihood that they will actually be used. Nuclear strategy thus becomes an exploration of the enemy's mind and soul, requiring still more arcane knowledge and turning weapons debates into an inquiry into the psychology and character of the Soviet leadership.

The potential citizen-critic is further disarmed by the fact that the weapons policies of one's own country are hostage to those of the enemy's. The citizens' demand addressed to their government is therefore usually formulated as a negotiating proposal—say, a freeze on all nuclear systems for both superpowers. But what is negotiable? This too is the realm of the expert. The inevitable emphasis on negotiability also underscores the importance of Soviet dissidents to the strategic debate. At present, the helplessness of Soviet critics of nuclear policy—Sakharov preeminent among them—imposes a further caution on the American public.

The root common sense of most citizens is that nuclear war can never make political or moral sense but that, nevertheless, we have to threaten retaliation in kind, even including nuclear destruction of cities. This paradox of nuclear deterrence—that "nuclear weapons are politically and militarily unusable only because and insofar as we can plausibly threaten to use them in some ultimate way. And it is immoral to make threats of that kind"[2]—also, I believe, makes the public want to look away from the reality of nuclear weapons. We do not want to think of the weapons used either against us or by us.

In principle, the public is asked to make judgments on budget outlays for nuclear weapons systems and, every four years, on the nuclear policies of the presidential candidates. But most commonly the judgments are cast in simple terms—whether the defense budget should be increased or not. Only rarely will the public (or Congress) address the actual merits of a weapons system or argue about what the weapons are supposed to be for. So the decisions that have marked the strategic arms race have been made with little democratic input or reaction.

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The experts who have made the decisions—the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the stationing of ballistic-missile nuclear submarines in the deep ocean, the development of multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), the stationing in Europe of thousands of nuclear artillery shells and other short-range nuclear weapons, the development of high-accuracy guidance packages, the proposed deployment in Europe of cruise missiles and medium-range ballistic missiles—have of course done so under many of the same drawbacks that have excluded the public: lack of relevant experience, uncertainty and fear of what the Soviets may be scheming, and, simply, the awesomeness of the weapons. Hence they have struggled to be "prudent," defining national security in narrow and excessively cautious ways, always hearing "the murmur of the most distant drums before the cry of a hungry child."[3]

And so the experts have slowly moved from thinking about the hypothetical uses of nuclear weapons to thinking that the weapons can actually be used. At the root of the current debate there is, I believe, this division: ordinary citizens, insofar as they are engaged, mostly believe that nuclear weapons can never rationally be used; the experts, for reasons to be explored below, insist that they can be used; and political leaders are willing to go along or perhaps better are carried along with the experts' bluff. Is it possible for the public to impose its common sense—to challenge the technical and doctrinal expertise of the high priests of nuclear theory?

The Problem of Relying on the Experts

IN THIS CAPTURE BY THE EXPERTS, the political leader is as much a victim as the general public. The former chief scientific adviser to the British government, Lord Zuckerman, has explained this as follows:

> The normal run of political leader, whatever his ambitions, has inevitably been nurtured in an environment of politics. It is his business to appreciate what the public wants. . . . He learns to take decisions within the limits of the resources at his disposal. And he can inspect the results—whether roads or power stations—with his own eyes. . . .
>
> But when it comes to the technicalities of the arms race, he is on different territory, on territory where the experts rule. And when we move into the nuclear world, I would go further and submit that military chiefs, who by convention are the official advisers on national security, merely serve as a channel through which the men in the laboratories transmit their views. For it is the man in the laboratory—not the soldier or sailor or airman—who at the start proposes that for this or that arcane reason it would be useful to improve an old or to devise a new nuclear warhead; and if a new warhead, then a new missile; and, given a new missile, a new system within which it has to fit. . . . It is he who has succeeded over the years in equating, and so confusing, nuclear destructive power with military strength, as though the former were the single and a sufficient condition of military success. The men in the nuclear weapons laboratories of both sides have succeeded in creating a world with an irrational foundation, on which a new set of political realities has in turn had to be built. They have become the alchemists of our times. . . .[4]

McGeorge Bundy, national security adviser under President Kennedy and President Johnson, made the same point in a slightly different way:

> . . . There is an enormous gulf between what political leaders really think about nuclear weapons and what is assumed in complex calculations of relative "advantage" in simulated strategic warfare. Think-tank analysts can set levels of "acceptable" damage well up in the tens of millions of lives. They can assume that the loss of dozens of great cities is somehow a real choice for sane men. They are in an unreal world. In the real world of real political leaders—whether here or in the Soviet Union—a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history, and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable.
>
> Presidents and politburos . . . may not themselves be persuaded by the refined calculations of the nuclear gamesman—but they do not find it prudent to expose them for the political irrelevance they are. . . . In consequence, the internal

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politics of the strategic arms race has remained the prisoner of its technology. . . .[5]

The momentum of the arms race has been (momentarily) checked only when the public became involved in a direct and decisive way. This happened, for example, at the time of the limited test-ban treaty—the product, in part, of widespread anxiety about radioactive fallout. It happened later in a crucial prelude to SALT I when citizens in several large cities that were to be defended by ABM systems rose up against the systems; they didn't want the things near their homes. It happened again in the outcry against basing the MX system in the valleys of Utah and Nevada.

These times of public intervention were all marked by the sense of ordinary men and women that they were going to be affected personally—fallout in the air, nuclear weapons in the suburbs, impact on water and land. The abstractions of nuclear deterrence suddenly became concrete. In West Germany, the publication in a popular magazine of the locations of U.S. weapons sites set off a storm of protest against the government's policies. Although the outcry in all these cases began as a "backyard" protest, it also led citizens to think harder about what nuclear weapons really are for. The Mormon Church, for example, which opposed the MX on many parochial grounds, noted finally the irony that the area in which the Mormons intended to "establish a base from which to carry the gospel of peace" had been selected for a "mammoth weapons system potentially capable of destroying much of civilization."

Unfortunately, these protests have been too narrowly cast. The limited test-ban treaty led to a sharp increase in (underground) nuclear tests; the ABM treaty and SALT I led to a dangerous expansion of strategic offensive forces by both the United States and the Soviet Union; the end of the MX-basing scheme for Utah and Nevada may lead to a still more provocative and dangerous deployment of the MX missile in fixed silos. If the momentum of the nuclear arms race is ever to be checked, the public will have to become more deeply and consistently involved than in the past, more willing to examine the specific issues, and more passionate.

Is this possible? In my remaining pages I will look more closely at the three areas that have seemed to bar an active public participation in the past—the technical character of the nuclear debate, the doctrinal mysteries of nuclear strategy, and the general ignorance of the public regarding the effects of nuclear weapons.

Experts and Technology

HOW DO THE EXPERTS weave their spells? Let us use as a cautionary tale the acceptance by the U.S. political leadership of the claim that our land-based missiles had suddenly—or would soon—become vulnerable to a Soviet first strike. From this picture of a "window of vulnerability" grew the elaborate shell game, in which 200 large (MX) missiles would be deployed amidst 4,600 concrete shelters, embraced by the Carter administration. This picture has permeated the world view of the Reagan administration as well, and to some extent its strategic weapons deployment decisions.

At present the U.S. has 1,000 land-based Minuteman ICBM launchers and 52 older Titan missile launchers in several fields in the Midwest, South, and Southwest. The number and radii of destruction of Soviet warheads that could in principle be used to attack these missiles can be estimated. The crucial question then becomes the accuracy of each individually targetable Soviet warhead. If these warheads can be relied on to land within about 300–400 feet of their targets on average, then a few thousand Soviet warheads could destroy almost all of the U.S. land-based launchers. However, if on average these warheads could be delivered within only 1,000 feet (less than two city blocks) after a journey of over 6,000 miles, the "kill probability" of one warhead against one ICBM launcher would be sufficiently low to make an attack on all the launchers impossible; the Soviets would not have enough warheads to destroy a sufficiently high fraction of the missile force.

How is the accuracy of Soviet systems deter-

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mined? Since for many strategic weapons technologies—nuclear submarines, sub-launched ballistic missiles, and multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles—the Soviets have eventually matched very sophisticated U.S. technical advances, one way is to project for the Soviet Union accuracies that it is believed the U.S. can achieve. In this manner, U.S. research and development establishes the technical parameters of the Soviet threat.

However, the accuracy even of U.S. missiles is not so simply determined. At best, through careful observation of missile flight tests, an accuracy over the test trajectory can be estimated. But U.S. flight testing is done east to west (from California to a point in the Pacific) and in a manner where various geophysical anomalies peculiar to a specific flight path can gradually be accounted for. An actual missile attack, by contrast, would have to be south to north over the pole, a virgin flight path where there may be unanticipated anomalies degrading accuracy.

Soviet missile accuracies may also be determined through direct monitoring of Soviet missile flight tests. This is accomplished by U.S. intelligence through observation of flight paths and evidently also from interception of Soviet telemetry during the tests. From such observations of a dozen or so flight tests in 1977–78, U.S. intelligence believes it was able to establish that the Soviets were testing a new guidance package and to estimate the accuracy achieved *for the test missiles over the test range* by this package. But to imagine such an accuracy repeated with nary a mistake under real operational conditions requires several heroic assumptions.

For a coordinated attack on U.S. missiles, the guidance package—where the slightest error due to unanticipated changes in temperature, humidity, or vibration could degrade the accuracy catastrophically—would have to behave reliably and almost perfectly in a thousand different cases. Furthermore, since Soviet ICBM flight-testing is done west to east, from European Russia to Kamchatka, Soviet planners must worry about a variety of systemic errors in the model of the atmosphere, magnetic drift due to unknown electronic charges, or other uncorrected and unforeseen anomalies that would affect the path of missiles shot north over the pole. Nor could a Soviet planner confidently assume that during a coordinated, virtually simultaneous, attack on the entire U.S. land-based missile force by several thousand nuclear warheads, the nuclear effects of the first many blasts wouldn't degrade significantly the accuracies of the slightly later arriving reentry vehicles. Finally, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, there must always be the vexing uncertainty that some of the U.S. land-based force would be launched on warning; that is, that the U.S. would not wait for all the Soviet warheads to strike before launching some of its own missiles.[6]

In short, numerous detailed and specific assumptions, tied to a relatively few actual observations, are packed into the finding that U.S. land-based missiles are "vulnerable." As long as vulnerability is treated as a technical finding not to be further questioned, it seems ominious. But under examination, it begins to appear fanciful and unconvincing—even leaving aside the question whether such vulnerability is relevant at all, given the likely survival of U.S. bombers and missile-firing submarines (a question I will examine presently). Nevertheless, this finding of a theoretical vulnerability flowing from extrapolations of Soviet missile accuracies has had a mesmerizing effect on recent administrations.

Why were these technical judgments so compelling? We enter here the land of "worst case." It is highly implausible that the Soviets should ever consider with confidence that a first strike against U.S. ICBMs could be achieved, but can one be quite sure that some Soviet planner wouldn't whisper the possibility to the Soviet leadership? Is it "prudent" to think otherwise? Imagine the debate within the U.S. government, one group relying upon subjective judgments of human and political behavior to argue the implausibility of a Soviet attack, the other looking only at the worst-case "facts." And indeed, the worst-case pessimists in such debates have one unanswerable argument—that, if *they* think a Soviet attack possible, imagine what their counterparts in the Soviet Union might think. The pessimists pro-

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vide their own proof for the power of nightmares.

In fact, there is a limit to worst-case imaginings. Those most worried about "windows of vulnerability" appear seldom to concern themselves with the reliability of U.S. missiles (the U.S. has never successfully fired an ICBM from an operational launcher), with the real capacity of U.S. missile silos to withstand nuclear explosions, or even with the operation of the U.S. command and control network, all issues central to missile vulnerability. And aside from vulnerability, other grim futures can be constructed: for example, computer failures leading to a nuclear exchange by accident, unauthorized conspiracies to launch nuclear weapons (one missile-carrying submarine contains enough warheads to destroy over a hundred cities), or a preemptive attack during a time of crisis when one side mistakenly believes the other about to attack. Whether these possibilities are made more or less likely by planning to forestall the conventional worst case of a premeditated Soviet attack is usually not addressed. The worst cases that have bureaucratic power appear to be those that can be ameliorated only by new and expanded weapons systems, and that can be confounded mainly by appeals to the humanity or common sense of the enemy, never by hard evidence. There are, in short, many extreme and dangerous contingencies of varying degrees of plausibility to guard against, and how one orders these dangers is crucial to strategic policy. The worst-case strategists cannot be permitted to throw out political judgment.

The worst case (and, indeed, its opposite, the wishful case) derive their force from treating technical issues as if they were locked within a black box. It is important that the public look into the black box to understand how plausible and how extreme are the technical conclusions drawn from it. This can be done. The issues are often far simpler than the technical jargon that surrounds them. Lord Zuckerman, who has been in a position to understand the uses of technical arguments in nuclear debates, has noted:

> The longer term view of the top advisers—that the arms race feeds itself, that there is no technical solution to the problem of defense against nuclear weapons—that view is too difficult to put across, strangely, I believe, not because it sounds soft and defeatist, but because it is too simple and too logical, and because the basic facts have become submerged in a sea of acronyms and numbers, a sea of MIRVs, of particle beams, of "throw-weights," and so on.[7]

Nevertheless, there *are* technical questions that one has to get straight if one is to think sensibly about the arms race, and this imposes a special obligation on scientists—above all, scientists not beholden to the defense industry—to inform themselves and then the public.

In such an endeavor, both the scientists and the public may sometimes be hampered by not having access to security data. In principle, we can imagine secret information that would affect significantly the attractiveness of a specific weapons system or arms-control measure. For example, at one point in the 1960s, when nuclear test bans were being debated, a few persons in the U.S. government and weapons laboratories came to realize that our missile guidance systems might be vulnerable to radiation from very high-altitude bursts. It would be difficult to claim that this phenomenon was not relevant to a full assessment of the need for nuclear and missile-flight testing and to arms-control measures to restrict such testing. So outsiders may sometimes not have the full story and insiders may be unable to put the full truth before the public.[8]

This, however, is far from an argument that scientists outside the defense bureaucracy should never challenge the experts. In general, defense experts are not driven to get even the technical facts straight or to put them in as broad and sensible a context as possible. They mostly talk to one another and read each other's studies. They produce technical reports that often are not read at all, in which the authors remain anonymous, and where there is, in striking contrast to serious scientific work, little survival value in being right, little stigma in being wrong. There is often no effective peer review in the bowels of the great technical bureaucracies, and this explains why the enormous resources available to them can so often

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be misused. This is one reason why it is so important that the wider technical community, and the public more generally, participate in defense debates. One should not be too modest.

> . . . it is easy to assume that even if a large technical organization doesn't know what it is doing, its mistakes must be of a type too subtle for a non-expert to detect. Like the adults in Hans Christian Andersen's fairy tale, when the Emperor appears to be naked, we tend to assume that the problem is with our own eyes. . . .[9]

Doctrine

TECHNOLOGY PLACES A BARRIER between the experts and the public, but nuclear doctrine, I believe, has an equally stifling impact on public debate and a still more important influence on the arms race. I will try to illustrate this through a continuation of the saga of missile vulnerability.

Even if one grants the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles to a Soviet first strike, this would not appear particularly worrisome so long as the United States could rely on submarines and strategic bombers to inflict massive damage in the Soviet Union in retaliation. So it became necessary for the nuclear strategists to invent a "scenario" to show how the Soviets could politically exploit the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles, notwithstanding the strength of the sea and air components of the U.S. "triad."

The scenario imagines a "limited" Soviet attack on all U.S. land-based missile forces and missile submarine bases. With a portion of their own ICBM forces, the Soviets could (the scenario assumes) destroy most of the U.S. forces. In retaliation, the U.S. could not strike the Soviet nuclear forces because our sea-based missiles are not sufficiently accurate and our bombers too slow. Nor could the U.S. attack Soviet cities for fear of retaliation against U.S. cities, which had hitherto been spared. The U.S. deterrent would thus itself be deterred, and the U.S. would be compelled to back down in a confrontation with the Soviets. Indeed, with this scenario clearly understood, the Soviets would not actually have to undertake the attack in the first place to achieve their aims. The vulnerability of the U.S. land-based missiles would provide the Soviets with important political advantages.

But this scenario really is a far-fetched concoction. First, for reasons already suggested, Soviet planners could never be confident that all U.S. ICBMs would be destroyed in a first strike. Second, the U.S. would not have to respond to a "limited" Soviet attack on its land-based missiles by an all-out assault on Soviet cities. On the contrary, a whole range of Soviet military targets could be struck—there are over 20,000 such targets in the U.S. strategic operational plan—causing damage to the Soviet Union commensurate with that suffered by the U.S. But perhaps most important, after such a "limited" attack with thousands of nuclear warheads causing untold millions of casualties, it is absurd to suppose that Soviet planners could count on a cool decision by the U.S. to do nothing in retaliation.

Nevertheless, this scenario and others like it have persuaded many U.S. strategists that effective deterrence against a Soviet attack cannot be based solely on the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage in retaliation, and therefore that the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles must be taken seriously. It is a view that has led in two directions: first, to the demand for less vulnerable basing of land-based missiles (such as the ill-fated MX system proposed by the Carter administration); and second, to the insistence that deterrence requires that the U.S. maintain a full range of nuclear-war fighting options, including a capability to strike Soviet hard targets, a doctrine now embodied in Presidential Directive 59, signed by President Carter on July 25, 1980.

PD59, which codifies and refines a U.S. strategic targeting policy that has been evolving over the past decade, directs military planners to develop detailed targeting options for the use of strategic forces in limited nuclear strikes. At present, the U.S. has approximately 10,000 independently targetable warheads available for strategic attack. The targets, according to Defense Department testimony, have been divided into four major categories covering about 40,000 potential installations:

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Soviet nuclear forces such as ICBM sites and submarine bases; conventional military forces, including supply depots, marshaling points, air fields, etc.; command posts and communication facilities; and economic and industrial targets, such as defense factories, petroleum refineries, electric generating plants, coal and steel plants. PD59 directs that these weapons and targets be matched in a variety of attack options or packages, some highly selective, some not, among which the authorities carrying out an attack can choose.[10]

The fundamental objective of PD59 is said to be deterrence. But as explained by Harold Brown, secretary of defense under Carter:

> Deterrence must restrain a far wider range of threats than just massive attacks on U.S. cities. We seek to deter any adversary from any course of action that could lead to general nuclear war. Our strategic forces also must deter nuclear attacks on smaller sets of targets in the U.S. or on U.S. military forces, and be a wall against nuclear coercion of, or attack on, our friends and allies. And strategic forces, in conjunction with theater nuclear forces, must contribute to deterrence of conventional aggression as well.[11]

This expansive view of deterrence requires "greater attention to how a nuclear war would actually be fought by both sides if deterrence fails." For successful deterrence requires credibility; the Soviet leadership must be convinced by the U.S. capacity to fight a limited nuclear war that "no course of aggression by them that led to use of nuclear weapons—on any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict—could lead to victory, however they may define victory." Thus PD59 is in one respect a response to the nightmare scenario sketched earlier. By emphasizing options other than massive attacks on the Soviet industrial base, it tries to increase the credibility of nuclear deterrence, while at the same time preserving the specter of all-out nuclear war as the "likely" outcome of any limited nuclear war "through a series of escalatory steps" (Harold Brown's phrase). Through such sophisticated tightrope walking, it has turned the apparently simple deterrent idea of "repayment in kind" into a doctrine of nuclear-war fighting.

Deterrence of nuclear attack, however, is not the only reason that notions of nuclear-war fighting have gained such a grip on the imagination of experts in recent days. In some measure, the elaborate PD59 theology is merely a rationalization after the fact of new weapons technologies—improved accuracies, more compact propulsion systems, greater numbers of MIRVs, etc. As the number of warheads in the U.S. inventory has expanded and their accuracy become finer, plausible targets and uses for these weapons had to be dreamed up. Similarly, it is clear that the Reagan and Carter administrations both have wanted large, accurate land-based missiles able to threaten Soviet hard targets simply because the Soviets had such missiles, with the strategic justification for such counterforce symmetry tagging along later.

The quest for nuclear-war fighting options also has the attraction of providing justification for all kinds of new weapons systems. In the race to be sure that there is no "options gap" and to match the adversary at all levels of conflict in all conditions of limited nuclear war, it is difficult to see any end. To support the PD59 concepts, several new systems are now being developed or planned, including very accurate cruise missiles in numbers much beyond what might be justified by simple deterrence, new and accurate land-based (MX) and sea-based (Trident 2) missiles, and expanded command and control systems—all of which could be used to target hardened, difficult-to-destroy Soviet weapons and command posts.

Finally, it is clear that nuclear-war fighting doctrines have grown from an unwillingness by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to give up the idea that nuclear weapons can be used for purposes beyond deterrence. The choice that the U.S. has continually to make has never been put more clearly than by George Kennan in 1950:

> Here the crucial question is: Are we to rely upon weapons of mass destruction as an integral and vitally important component of our military strength, which we would expect to employ deliberately, immediately, and unhesitatingly in the event that we become involved in a military conflict with the Soviet Union: Or are we to retain such weapons in our national arsenal only

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as a deterrent to the use of similar weapons against ourselves or our allies and as a possible means of retaliation in case they are used? . . .

The weapons of mass destruction . . . reach backward beyond the frontiers of Western civilization, to the concepts of warfare which were once familiar to the Asiatic hordes. They cannot really be reconciled with a political purpose directed to shaping, rather than destroying, the lives of the adversary. They fail to take account of the ultimate responsibility of men for one another and even for each other's errors and mistakes. . . .

It is entirely possible that war may be waged against us again, as it has been waged against us and other nations within our time, under these concepts and by these weapons. If so, we shall doubtless have to reply in kind, for that may be the price of survival. I still think it vital to our own understanding of what it is we are about that we not fall into the error of initiating, or planning to initiate, the employment of these weapons and concepts, thus hypnotizing ourselves into the belief that they may ultimately serve some positive national purpose.[12]

These sentiments perfectly reflect the common sense of the citizenry—that nuclear weapons cannot be considered for any wartime role whatever, with the single exception of a measured repayment in kind. This common sense of the nuclear age, however, has never been fully accepted by the nuclear powers. The U.S., for example, has consistently threatened to use nuclear weapons to repel a conventional invasion of Western Europe and has steadfastly refused to rule out the use of nuclear weapons in the Persian Gulf—why not keep the enemy guessing? In a revealing and tortured response to a congressional inquiry relating to PD59, recently declassified, the Carter administration noted that "Secretary Brown's point that nuclear war is not a 'deliberate' instrument of policy means that we realize nuclear war cannot be an affirmative instrument of U.S. policy, not that nuclear weapons cannot be used deliberately as an element of broader deterrence" (i.e., deterrence against conventional attacks).[13]

The nuclear experts really do imagine fighting a nuclear war, a theme reflected in our doctrines, forces, and rhetoric—doctrines of selected attack and first use, projected deployments of thousands of accurate cruise missiles, and a suffocating use of language: "TNF [Theater Nuclear Forces] provide a wide range of options designed to allow the U.S. and its allies to deny the enemy his objectives at conflict levels below all-out nuclear war, while at the same time threatening escalation to general nuclear response."[14]

And this is all surrounded by a razzmatazz of strategic theories and fanciful scenarios that, although mostly simple-minded and perhaps initially rationalizations of new technologies, soon begin to develop a reality of their own. Technology and politics beget the new doctrines, and then the doctrines in their turn generate new technical requirements—a vicious circle forcing weapons systems to higher and higher levels.

In an analysis of PD59 presented in *Aviation Week*, the widely read journal of the defense industry, an unnamed high U.S. official was quoted to observe: "The overriding issue was and still is, do you reject nuclear war fighting capability as absurd or do you try to cope with it?" This seems to me a fair assessment.

The Effects of Nuclear Weapons

THE WILLINGNESS of people to contemplate doctrines of nuclear-war fighting thrives, I believe, on an abstract and arid vision of what such a war would look like. The nightmare scenario central to the vulnerability logic, for example, depends upon the view that the Soviet first strike against U.S. land-based missiles would in fact be "limited"—that relatively few persons would be killed. Those arguing the possibility of the Soviet first strike have therefore tended to minimize the number and significance of the casualties to be expected.

In an instructive instance of this, in March 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger commented at a Senate hearing about the aftermath of a full Soviet attack on all U.S. land-based missiles: "I am talking here about casualties of 15,000, 20,000, 25,000,—a horrendous event, as we all recognize, but one far better than the alternative."[15] Later calculations raised these estimates 2 million to 22

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million or greater, depending on wind and fallout patterns and the actual pattern of attack, a hundred to a thousand-fold increase over Schlesinger's estimates.

For most citizens and policy-makers, it is not a casual view of nuclear war that dulls judgment so much as it is the abstractness of the whole idea. As long as this idea remains buried —as long as we are not forced to think of the anxiety, anguish, and terror of nuclear survivors—we can pretend that limited nuclear war is possible. As crises impended, no doubt, the horror of nuclear destruction would at last be propelled into public consciousness. But with our doctrines and deployments tuned to the use of nuclear weapons, it may then be too late to avert catastrophe.

There have in recent years been a few efforts to convey clearly to the public the effects of these weapons, notably by the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress,[16] and by the Physicians for Social Responsibility, a public interest group founded with the intent to analyze and describe in detail the medical consequences of nuclear war. Perhaps the most compact and compelling of these studies appeared as an article in the 1976 *Annual Review of Nuclear Science* and was written by J. Carson Mark, then director of the Division of Theoretical Physics at the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.[17] In the next few paragraphs I sketch a summary of Mark's analysis.

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The vulnerability of urban centers to mass destruction from the air did not begin at Hiroshima. Over 2,000 tons of explosive bombs were dropped on Dresden on February 13–14, 1945; over 2,000 tons on Nuremberg on February 20 and 1,800 tons on February 21; almost 5,000 tons on Essen on March 11, and on Dortmund on March 12; 1,650 tons on Tokyo on March 9; 1,800 tons on Nagoya on March 11; 1,730 tons on Osaka on March 13. At Dresden, fatalities were estimated at 25,000 to 135,000. The March 9 raid on Tokyo killed over 80,000 civilians. There were by comparison 70,000 fatalities in Hiroshima, 40,000 in Nagasaki.

The fateful impact of nuclear energy was that it enabled the explosive yields of these massive attacks to be achieved in a single weapon. The Hiroshima bomb, with an explosive energy equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT, produced damage equivalent to the greatest thousand-plane raids of World War II. It carried an explosive yield over 1,000 times that of the largest ordinance. Thermonuclear weapons today allow another factor of 1,000 in the explosive yield contained in a single package, so that many warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear powers contain over 1 million times the yield of the great one-ton bombs of World War II.

The staggering energy density achieved by nuclear weapons causes "a corresponding and appalling increase in the ease and cheapness—the casualness, even—with which [destruction] could be imposed." It has provoked the development of intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the development of a wide array of battlefield nuclear weapons. It gives to small and medium-sized countries the potential to develop a destructive capacity far beyond that expended by all countries during World War II. And—an important point neglected by the purveyors of first-strike imagery—it permits so many means of delivery, including clandestine delivery by suitcases, packages, etc., that no country can ever again be immune from nuclear devastation no matter how elaborate and sophisticated its first-strike offensive forces and its ballistic missile and air defenses.

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A feature of the Carson Mark analysis, mentioned on page 191, is a careful, dry, and ultimately shattering account of the effects a 15 MT explosion would have on the surface a few miles west of Elizabeth, New Jersey, and approximately 20 miles south of lower Manhattan:

Gruesome disaster would have struck in New Jersey. There, in a series of rings around the point of burst, particular effects would have resulted in various kinds and degrees of damage. First, to a radius of about a third of a mile, there would be the crater. Though some hundreds of thousands of tons of the displaced material would have been vaporized and incorporated into the rising cloud, most of it would have been thrown into a ridge extending to a radius of about half a mile and having a maximum height of about 175 feet (14 stories). Out to one and one-half miles the fireball, which would have stopped growing at about that radius, would bathe the surface in an atmosphere of incandescent air with temperatures of a few thousand degrees centigrade for the first 15 seconds or so until it started to rise clear of the ground. . . . Out to 5 miles almost all buildings would have been destroyed, or suffered considerable damage, and most of the occupants would have been injured—many fatally. Almost all persons in the open would have been killed, or have suffered fatal injuries—from flash burns, being thrown about, or being hit with flying or falling objects. In a further ring, to the 10-mile radius, many residential and apartment-type structures would have been severely damaged and many fires started (as also, of course, at closer location) by the incendiary effects of thermal radiation, by electrical short circuits, and as a result of broken gas pipes. In the inner half of this ring many streets would be blocked with wreckage and overturned vehicles. Even near the outer part of this ring persons standing in the open, when struck by the blast wave sweeping out from the explosion, would be bodily impelled at such a velocity that collision with a wall or merely tumbling in the street would be extremely hazardous. . . .

The number of fatalities in this phase of this single engagement could exceed the number of U.S. battle deaths (¾ million) in all wars from the American Revolution through Vietnam. Of course, many considerably "richer" targets—of larger population density—could easily be found.

As pictured, both Manhattan and Long Island, with their 8.5 million inhabitants, escaped with very little direct damage. However, the debris cloud when fully developed would overcast all of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and Queens, as well as the Bronx on the mainland. Within the hour fallout would begin to arrive over most of this area. On Long Island it would first appear and be most intense in the region where all the bridges are located. Only from the outlying suburbs on the mainland would evacuation to the north offer a reasonable prospect for any appreciable fraction of the population. Assuming a steady moderate west-by-south wind, the cloud would drift over Long Island. In about 5 or 6 hours it would have moved off to the east, but by that time enough fallout would have accumulated on Manhattan and the whole of Long Island to provide a radiation exposure greater than 1,000 r [a fatal dose] in the 96-hour period following the explosion. Over much of this area the 96-hour exposure would exceed 3,000 r.

To avoid radiation injury with serious early effects, a person must keep his total exposure during any period as short as a few days below 150 or 200 r. . . . At standard rates, among the 7 million persons huddled in shelters on Long Island, there would be one birth every 4½ minutes, and from cardiovascular causes alone, one death or ominous attack every 15 minutes. Shattering decisions would be called for; to run the gauntlet of radiation (of unknown intensity) in order to reach hospital facilities and medical care, or take one's chances with what might be at hand. . . .

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This scene repeated a hundred times—or a thousand times—as it would be in an all-out Soviet attack on U.S. urban-industrial centers is commonly estimated to kill 100 million persons. Similar calamities could be inflicted on the Soviet Union and Western Europe.

A Soviet attack aimed only at U.S. strategic forces (which include 46 SAC bases; 1,000 Minutemen silos located in six fields in Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Missouri; 52 Titan silos located in bases in Arizona, Arkansas, and Kansas; and various submarine and naval bases and shipyards) is often referred to as a "limited" nuclear attack. Department of Defense studies have resulted in fatality estimates for such an attack in the millions to tens of millions—"which means nothing is really known about them except that the number is likely to be very large."

The Citizen's Responsibility to Choose

THE NUCLEAR STRATEGISTS, diplomats, analysts, defense scientists, and others who are charting our destiny are intellectually and politically hobbled. Most of them are hobbled by self-interest, caught in a snare where it is rewarding, professionally and psychologically, to go along with the prevailing wisdom, and where even if they did not, they do not believe they could make much difference. They are happy to construct elaborate strategic embroidery about the concept that nuclear wars can actually be fought without assuming individual responsibility for the costs and risks of that path. The experts and insiders who *have* pioneered new paths within the government—the designers of the SALT agreements, for example—are also hobbled by being forced not to stray far from the conventional wisdom as the price of being listened to in the corridors of power.

We cannot do without the experts and without detailed analyses of weapons systems and arms limitation agreements. But we cannot rely on these experts either. There must also be a public challenge to the pretense that nuclear weapons can be used by rational persons for rational ends.

Within the logic of our current expert view of nuclear weapons, we have been incapable of asking, "How much is enough?"—much less of answering, "This much and no more." In *Aviation Week*, for example, a nuclear weapons laboratory official is quoted as worrying about the amount of plutonium available for weapons: "There is a sufficient amount in the stockpile and in the projected supply for MX, but after we go through MX, Trident 2 warheads and cruise missile warheads, then we are in a bind."

The alternative to nuclear-war–fighting doctrines is what I have called the common sense of the public, that nuclear weapons not be considered for any role whatever except possibly a measured repayment in kind: a strategy of minimal deterrence. Even within this restricted view of nuclear weapons, there are many possible emphases, for example, a no-first-use policy, a city-avoidance policy, and so on. We have in fact become too used to thinking favorably of weapons systems that can destroy the other country's cities. In his 1980 State-of-the-Union speech, President Carter sought to reassure Congress and the American people by reminding them that just one U.S. missile-firing submarine could "destroy every large and medium-sized city in the Soviet Union." Some reassurance!

What is striking is how little these different concepts of nuclear use have been addressed by the public. In the event of a nuclear catastrophe, who in principle could be held responsible? We have sleepwalked from decision to decision with no clarity about what nuclear weapons are for and how they are to be used: Kennan's image is "like men in a dream, like lemmings headed for the sea, like the children of Hamelin marching blindly along behind their pied piper."[18]

Most of us have not had to take a position on nuclear weapons, to define our own individual responsibility. A public debate on nuclear doctrine would force us to choose among the conflicting concepts of nuclear use. And it would force us to think about where we want to end up, how far we are willing to relinquish the nuclear genie. Our present policies appear to

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assume a never-ending nuclear arms race. In all the strategic literature, there is virtually nothing on what a less hostile world might look like; there is no picture of a world other than one bristling with nuclear weapons. And yet, does anyone supporting our present course believe we will be more secure by the end of the century?

Notes

[1] *The Gallup Poll*, Released Princeton, N.J., August 2, 1981.

[2] Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977) p. 278.

[3] A point made most forcefully in Herbert York, *Race to Oblivion* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1970).

[4] Lord Zuckerman, "Science Advisers, Scientific Advisers, and Nuclear Weapons," *Proceedings*, the American Philosophical Society, vol. 124, no. 4, August 1980 (November 8, 1979), pp. 10–11. See also York, *Race to Oblivion*, pp. 228–39.

[5] McGeorge Bundy, "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1969, pp. 9–10, 13.

[6] The questions of accuracy and vulnerability have been discussed recently in several places. Readable starting points are James Fallows, *National Defense* (New York: Random House, 1981), chap. 6; also William Kincade, "Missile Vulnerability Reconsidered," and Kosta Tsipis, "Precision and Accuracy," both in *Arms Control Today*, May 1981.

[7] Lord Zuckerman, "Science Advisers . . . ," p. 13.

[8] See, for example, William Broad, "Nuclear Pulse: Awakening to The Chaos Factor," *Science*, May 29, June 5, June 12, 1981.

[9] Frank von Hippel, "The Emperor's New Clothes," *Physics Today*, July 1981, p. 34.

[10] Desmond Ball, "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?" *Arms Control Today*, February 1981. Harold Brown, "Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Convocation Ceremonies for the 97th Naval War College Class, Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, August 20, 1980," Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs, No. 344–80.

[11] Harold Brown, "Remarks . . . ," p. 6.

[12] George Kennan, "International Control of Atomic Energy," Department of State Atomic Energy Files, *Foreign Relations*, 1950, vol. 1, p. 39.

[13] "Nuclear War Strategy," Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 96th Congress, 2nd Session, on Presidential Directive 59, September 16, 1980, p. 38.

[14] *United States Military Posture for FY 1982*, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1981, p. 76.

[15] "US–USSR Strategic Policies," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 4, 1974, p. 19.

[16] *The Effects of Nuclear War*, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1979.

[17] J. Carson Mark, "Global Consequences of Nuclear Weaponry," *Annual Review of Nuclear Science, 1976*, vol. 26, pp. 51–87.

[18] George Kennan, Address on the occasion of receiving the Albert Einstein Peace Prize, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1981. □

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John C. Cort

The Catholic Church and Socialism

Strange things have been happening on the interface between religion and socialism, and few more strange or interesting than some of the developments within the Catholic church.

In Poland, at this writing, the Communist bulldozer has buried the first offspring of free trade unionism and democratic process, and the Church is solidly aligned with Solidarity in the struggle to disinter them. How this will ultimately affect the Church's stance toward socialism is not clear, although the present strategy is to deny any opposition to socialism as such, merely to the violation of human rights. It *is* clear that the experience will not diminish the Church's general distaste for the Leninist variety of socialism.

. A different scenario emerges in Latin America. There the Church, once its defender, is more and more actively confronting a power structure of the right. Even cardinals are making speeches denouncing international capitalism. There more and more members of the Church, from laymen to archbishops, are not only committing themselves to the poor but to socialism as well. The problem is, what kind of socialism? Democratic or dictatorial?

In Poland the situation is pushing the Church toward a stronger commitment to democracy. In Latin America the situation is pushing the Church toward a new commitment to socialism. Will the net result be a Church that is, if not committed, at least benignly favorable to democratic socialism? If I may be permitted a religious expression, only God knows. But we can hope.

The effects already may be noted in America. On February 25, 1981, a representative of the American Catholic bishops put them firmly on record as opposed to any military aid for the government of El Salvador, locked in murderous conflict with an opposition that is predominantly socialist in one sense or another. Archbishop James Hickey, head of the Washington archdiocese, put it this way in his testimony before Congress:

> The conflict [in El Salvador] has deep roots; it reaches into the life of a people too long denied the fruits of their labor, too long denied meaningful participation in the life of their society. The U.S. response should address the roots of the conflict. It is not principally a matter of guns but of justice.

The archbishop was of course also saying that it is not simply a matter of whether the Soviet Union or the United States will dominate Latin America, and that if the pursuit of justice involves a risk of Soviet infiltration à la Cuba, better to go with the risk than to sanction injustice and oppression. This is not the sort of stand one can imagine the American hierarchy taking as recently as, say, ten years ago.

In Nicaragua Catholic priests were among the leaders of the revolution that toppled Somoza and installed a mainly Marxist government. Four of them have been serving in the first Sandinista cabinet, with the reluctant permission of their more conservative bishops.

The ancient opposition of the Catholic church to socialism as well as to communism, most forcefully expressed in such encyclicals as *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), is giving way to dialogue, flirtation, and cohabitation with all kinds of left-wing isms, from the most cautious expressions of social democracy through bolder commitments to democratic socialism over to all-out cries for revolution now and the dictatorship of the proletariat afterward.

One ingredient of the new attitude has been the growing realization that socialism too has

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changed. Those Catholics who took a dim view because they identified it with oppressive regimes in Russia, China, and so forth, or with a rigid concept of public ownership of the means of production, or with a closed system of Marxist metaphysics, are beginning to understand that those matters are no longer synonymous with the socialist movement, at least not with its Western, more democratic manifestations.

The Frankfurt Declaration of the Socialist International (1951) makes this clear with its emphatic repudiation of communism and dictatorships of any kind, its insistence on liberal democratic process as an essential component of socialism, its acceptance of a pluralist economy that combines public ownership with consumer and producer cooperatives and private ownership in "agriculture, handicraft, retail trade, and small and middle-sized industries," and its more open attitude toward religious and non-Marxist systems of thought.[1] The example of democratic socialist governments in Western Europe in putting these principles into practice also could not help but be reassuring.

On the Catholic side some important revisionism has been taking place over the last century and especially during the last two decades. From Leo XIII to Pius XI, John XXIII, the Second Vatican Council, Paul VI and John Paul II a social theory has been developing that reveals some remarkable similarities with the Frankfurt Declaration. The partiality for democratic government has not been so emphatic, though Poland is changing that, but there has been a sharp critique of capitalism and its grasping materialism, a strong defense of workers' rights, support for various forms of cooperative and employee ownership and worker participation in management, as well as approval for public ownership where necessary.

There has also been a rethinking of the Church's teaching on private property and a switch from the more modern emphasis on inalienable rights of dominion to the older tradition of the Hebrew prophets, the Fathers of the Church and Thomas Aquinas, the notion that the goods of this world were given by God to all and for all, a view that is oversimply but forcefully expressed in the aphorism of St. Basil, "The coat that hangs in the closet belongs to the poor."

The dominion view of property suited the too customary role of the Church as defender of the status quo. It also produced some peculiar ambiguities in the papal encyclicals. Leo XIII is scarcely less forceful than Marx in some of his denunciations of the rich and powerful ("a very few rich and exceedingly rich men have laid a yoke almost of slavery on the unnumbered masses of non-owning workers"), but anyone who reads *Rerum Novarum* must be impressed with the extended paeans of praise for an almost absolute right of private property, which then becomes the basis for his rejection of socialism.[2]

Forty years later Pius XI repeated those views in *Quadragesimo Anno* and reaffirmed the rejection of socialism, though conceding it is far preferable to communism and "its programs often strikingly approach the just demands of Christian social reformers."[3]

In the abandonment of this negative stance John XXIII, as in so many other matters, played a key role. His whole approach to the world outside the Church, his ability to distinguish between what people say and what they do, his wonderful openness to the good wherever it may be found, all these had a powerful impact. He expressed this attitude in the encyclical *Pacem in Terris* (1963) in a clear reference to Marxism:

> . . . Neither can false philosophical teachings regarding the nature, origin and destiny of the universe and of man be identified with historical movements that have economic, social, cultural or political ends, not even when these movements have originated from these teachings and have drawn and still draw inspiration therefrom. . . . Besides, who can deny that those movements, insofar as they conform to the dictates of right reason and are interpreters of the lawful aspirations of the human person, contain elements that are positive and deserving of approval?[4]

At the same time Catholic theologians, stimulated by John's creation, Vatican Council II, were reexamining the sources of the Church's social teaching and beginning to question the assumptions behind the dominion concept of

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property. This return to the older tradition was most dramatically expressed by Paul VI when he wrote in reference to the plight of the undeveloped world,

> We must repeat once more that the superfluous wealth of rich countries should be placed at the service of the poor nations. The rule which up to now held good for the benefit of those nearest to us must today be applied to all the needy of this world.[5]

Basil's coat was out of the closet once again, or, to put it more accurately, the door of the closet had at least been pried open.

A few years later Paul picked up and developed the distinctions that John had made in *Pacem in Terris* between Marxism as a metaphysical system and socialism as a historical movement that is pursuing a form of political economy more in keeping with notions of justice and freedom that are shared by believers and nonbelievers. He worded it cautiously and repeatedly warned against the more extreme varieties of Marxism-Leninism, but in practical terms it was a kind of left-handed blessing for those Catholics who still cared what the popes might think about their joining socialist parties. In effect, the bars were down.[6]

In the new labor encyclical, *Laborem Exercens*, the most impressive of them all in some ways, the present pope, John Paul II, has flung wide the door of the closet. The only thing missing is an explicit, right-handed blessing for democratic socialism. By no other pope has the Church's indictment of capitalism been made so clear or been so convincingly argued as a violation of "a principle that has always been taught by the Church: *the principle of the priority of labor over capital*" [emphasis in original].[7] Even more clearly than Paul VI, John Paul corrects the ambiguities of Leo XIII on the right of private property by resurrecting the teaching of Aristotle, adopted and expanded by Thomas Aquinas, that "*the right to private property is subordinated to the right to common use*, to the fact that goods are meant for everyone" [emphasis in original].[8]

John Paul, like preceding popes back to and including Pius XI, gives his approval, when and where circumstances dictate, to the "socialization" of the means of production, either by the state or by "*joint ownership of the means of work*, sharing by the workers in the management and/or the profits of businesses, shareholding by labor, etc." [emphasis in original].[9] Whether privately or collectively owned, production is subject to this key test: does labor, the worker, the human being, receive priority in respect, compensation, and security over capital, the tools, the machines, the dead matter? By this test, John Paul emphasizes, either private or collective ownership may be either approved or condemned.

In Latin America, as noted, these new attitudes of John and Paul in particular and the Church in general have seen their most radical expression. Moved by the indescribable poverty and suffering of their people—a poverty and suffering caused and sustained, at least in substantial part, by the sins of multinational capitalism—even the bishops and cardinals began to sound like socialist agitators. Before the more conservative prelates knew what was happening their progressive brethren put the whole Latin American hierarchy on record at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, denouncing "institutionalized violence" and the "international imperialism of money" and committing themselves firmly to "the option of the poor." Penny Lernoux, a knowledgeable student of the Latin American Church, has written of this conference,

> Medellin produced the Magna Carta of today's persecuted, socially committed Church, and as such rates as one of the major political events of the century. It shattered the centuries-old alliance of Church, military, and the rich elites.[10]

One of the most progressive members of the most progressive hierarchy, that of Brazil, Dom Helder Camara, archbishop of Recife, took the initiative in drawing up "a pastoral letter from the Third World" entitled *Gospel and Revolution.* Among other things it declared,

> Far from working against it, let us learn to embrace socialism with joy as a way of life better adapted to our time and more in accordance with the spirit of the Gospel. Thus we will avoid causing anybody to confuse God and religion with feudalism, capitalism and

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> imperalism, the worldly oppressors of the poor and of the workers of the world. These inhuman systems have engendered others which, in their attempt to free peoples, have instead also become oppressors, falling into totalitarian collectivism and religious persecution.

This last sentence was an obvious attempt to distinguish socialism from communist and/or Leninist regimes. The letter was signed by 15 bishops and 2 apostolic vicars—from Brazil, Colombia, Algeria, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, Lebanon, Oceania, and Yugoslavia.[11]

Dom Helder, an engagingly enthusiastic prelate, presides over a cathedral whose walls are pockmarked by the machine-gun bullets of right-wing elements intent on scaring him into silence. He is clearly the most popular, best-known and most widely traveled of all the spokesmen of Christian socialism in Latin America. He is also one of the more outspoken critics of Soviet- or Cuban-style "socialism." In 1976 he gave an interview to an American magazine in which he said,

> I don't see any solution in capitalism. But neither do I see it in the socialist examples that are offered us today, because they're based on dictatorships and you don't arrive at socialism with dictatorship. My socialism is a special socialism, a socialism that respects the human person and goes back to the Gospels. My socialism is justice.[12]

You can fault this statement for its apparent ignoring of democratic socialism in the West European style, but there is no question that it is a repudiation of the Leninist, Soviet or Cuban approach. Unfortunately, such statements are not easily come by in reading the books and articles that have flowed from the theoreticians of Christian socialism south of the border, most of whom fall into the category of exponents of "liberation theology."

This theology is now being studied with enthusiasm all over the world in both Catholic and Protestant seminaries. Its dean and most persuasive practitioner is Gustavo Gutiérrez, Peruvian author of *A Theology of Liberation* (Orbis, 1973), which is still the seminal book on the subject. Other important representatives are Hugo Assmann, a German who has worked mainly in Brazil and Costa Rica; Leonardo Boff in Brazil; Enrique Dussel in Argentina; José Miguez Bonino, a Brazilian Protestant; José Miranda in Mexico; Juan Luis Segundo in Uruguay; and Jon Sobrino, a Spanish Jesuit who has studied in America and Germany and taught in El Salvador.

These theologians encompass a variety of emphases. What they have in common is a passionate commitment to the plight of the poor and an insistence that Christ came not simply to save souls but to save bodies as well, not simply to preach the Kingdom of God in heaven but the Kingdom of God on earth. Matthew 25 (unless you feed, clothe and shelter the poor, you don't get to heaven) is of course a basic text, but almost more common are references to the Exodus, the archetypal liberation from slavery and oppression.

The latter-day Pharaohs are, locally, the military juntas and dictators, behind them the native capitalists and behind these the international capitalists—most especially, those of the U.S.A. There is no lack of evidence to support their thesis that our most profitable export, the multinational corporation, is knee-deep in the sweat and blood of the Latin American worker and peasant, and the history of the Reagan years in the White House will doubtless add to that evidence.

Most, if not all, of these theologians are Christian Marxists, casting aside the atheism and materialism, but accepting the class analysis, the dominance of the economic factor, tending to accept the necessity of violent revolution, tending to accept the possibility, if not probability, of some form of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a sort of necessary evil. I have not yet read anything by any of them that could be construed as critical of Fidel Castro and Cuba, although my reading has not been exhaustive. It is understandable that Castro would be admired, or at least respected, as one who delivered his people from a reactionary dictator and then stood up successfully to the Colossus of the North. It is not so understandable, given their presumed knowledge of Christian psychology, that these theologians should be so reluctant to join Dom Helder Camara in his rejection of dictatorships of the

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left as well as of the right. After all, what does "liberation" mean? Are they interested only in liberation from capitalism and military juntas? Are they ignorant of or, worse, indifferent to the oppression of the poor and the powerless that has issued from the seats of the mighty on the Marxist-Leninist side?

To the liberation theologians democracy in the Western sense is damaged goods suffering from guilt by association with capitalism. The bias is evident in the "Final Document" of the founding convention of Christians for Socialism in Santiago, Chile, in 1972, while Allende was still in power—that is, before Chilean democracy had been strangled. This document was prepared by a group of theologians that included Gutiérrez, Assmann, and Giulio Girardi, an Italian theologian. The 400 delegates were mostly priests from Latin American countries but included Protestant ministers and lay activists.

One paragraph in the document reads as follows:

> The revolutionary process is in full swing in Latin America. Many Christians have made a personal commitment to it. But many more Christians, imprisoned in mental inertia and categories that are suffused with bourgeois ideology, regard this process fearfully and insist on taking the impossible pathway of reformism and modernization. The Latin-American process is all-embracing and one in character. We Christians do not have a peculiar political approach of our own to offer, and we do not wish to have such an approach. The realization that the process is all-embracing and one in character makes us comrades, uniting all those who are committed to the revolutionary struggle in a common task.[13]

The implications of this statement, including the extraordinary boast that the delegates had no "peculiar political approach" of their own other than commitment to "revolutionary struggle," were made even clearer in an article by Gonzalo Arroyo, a Chilean Jesuit, the chief organizer and first president of Christians for Socialism, several years later in a French journal. It included the following:

> President Allende was betrayed by his trust in democracy.... Liberal democracy is a fiction, an ideological ruse which safeguards the interests of the ruling classes and functions exclusively within the confines of the capitalist system. If the reproductive capabilities of the latter are threatened, then liberal democracy is choked off at its roots by the bourgeoisie—shamelessly and, in the case of Chile, without any pretense.[14]

This is an interesting statement, mingling sense and nonsense in about equal proportions. A suggestion of the nonsense may be seen in a more recent statement by Allende's successor, President Pinochet, as he entered his new eight-year term. It reveals a strikingly similar contempt for democracy:

> Nothing will change.... To those who believe that democracy is the magic formula that resolves all problems, it must be perplexing to see a young country like Chile realistically confront the need to strengthen liberty, security, justice and general progress through the use of strong and energetic authority.[15]

Switching the context, Father Arroyo could not have said it better.

The common sense of Arroyo's statement is more obvious. The bourgeoisie, ably asissted by its North American branch and Richard Nixon, did indeed choke off Chilean democracy. We can expect that Ronald Reagan and Alexander Haig will be devoting their talents to similar chokings over the next few years. We have already seen Vice-President Bush, appropriately clad in *barong tagalog*, standing before Dictator Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines and congratulating him on his "dedication to democratic methods."

The suspicion or distrust of democracy that recurs in the writings and statements of the liberation theologians of Latin America is echoed in those of their friends and admirers around the world. (Christians for Socialism has branches in America, Western Europe, the Philippines, and elsewhere.) It is a foolish fancy for those of us who are devoted to democratic socialism to think that we are going to exorcise these suspicions by appeals to reason and the complex experience of history. What will persuade those who harbor them are such

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facts as the triumph of democratic socialism in France and the assurances of François Mitterrand to the struggling government of Nicaragua that it can find friendship and help elsewhere than in the reactionary democracy of Ronald Reagan or the stultifying dictatorships of Russia or Cuba.[16]

A recurring phenomenon in Latin America has been the radicalization of once-conservative bishops such as Camara and Romero, which was the result of the persecution and martyrdom of their priests and laity who were striving to put into practice the true teachings of Jesus and the Hebrew prophets in regard to property and the poor. Now we are beginning to see the same process of radicalization spreading among the Catholic laity, clergy, and hierarchy of the northern hemisphere. The first powerful impulse comes from the blood of martyrs such as Romero and the American nuns, which concentrates the mind on the reasons for which they died. Despite what I have said about the careless thinking of the liberation theologians on the subject of democracy, it is important that we give full credit to them for their more careful and persuasive thinking on the question of what Jesus demanded of his followers as regards the poor.

The clarification of this question should inevitably produce Christian socialists, as it has produced them in the past, usually among the more progressive Protestants like Frederick Maurice in England in the 19th century or Reinhold Niebuhr in America in the 20th. Against this tendency the Catholic church stood like a great immovable boulder in the middle of the road. Latin America has now proven that the boulder can be moved, is in fact being moved.

The clarification of the question of democracy should produce *democratic* socialists among these converts. Some of the socialist governments of Western Europe have contributed to that clarification, but it will not be complete until we in the United States, the heartland of capitalism, can prove to any reasonable person's satisfaction that a flowering of democracy is not compatible with capitalism but could be realized in a democratic socialist society. Which will take a lot of doing.

Notes

[1] The full text of the Frankfurt Declaration can be found in the *New International Review*, Winter 1977. It includes this statement: "Socialism is an international movement that does not demand a rigid uniformity of approach. Whether socialists build their faith on Marxist or other methods of analyzing society, whether they are inspired by religious or humanitarian principles, they all strive for the same goal—a system of social justice, better living, freedom and world peace."

[2] Pope Leo XIII, *Rerum Novarum*, 1891, Vatican translation (Derby, N.Y.: Apostolate of the Press, 1942), pp. 5–14.

[3] Pope Pius XI, *Quadragesimo Anno*, 1931, Vatican transl. (Derby, N.Y.: Apostolate of the Press), p. 54.

[4] Pope John XXIII, *Pacem in Terris*, 1963, Vatican transl., from *The Gospel of Peace and Justice: Catholic Social Teaching Since Pope John*, ed. Joseph Gremillion (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1976), pp. 235–36.

[5] Pope Paul VI, *Populorum Progressio*, 1967, in *The Gospel of Peace. . . .*, p. 402.

[6] Pope Paul VI, *Octogesima Adveniens*, 1971, in *The Gospel of Peace. . . .*, pp. 499–501.

[7] Pope John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*, 1981, reprinted in full, *National Catholic Reporter*, Sept. 25, 1981; from Sec. III of the encyclical, see *NCR*, p. 13.

[8] *Laborem Exercens*, see *NCR*, Sept. 25, 1981, p. 14.

[9] Ibid.

[10] "Medellin Documents," in *The Gospel of Peace. . . .*, pp. 445–76. Lernoux is quoted by Alan Riding in "The Sword and Cross," a good review of four recent books on the Church in Latin America, *New York Review of Books*, May 28, 1981, pp. 3–8.

[11] The pastoral letter was written in Recife on August 15, 1967, under the direction of Dom Helder and first published in French on August 31, 1967, in *Témoignage Chrétien*, Paris.

[12] Interview in the *Sign*, July–August 1976, p. 12.

[13] *Christians and Socialism: Documentation of the Christians for Socialism Movement in Latin America*, trans. John Drury, ed. John Eagleson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1975), p. 162.

[14] Ibid., p. 240. The article by Gonzalo Arroyo, S.J., "Christians, the Church and Revolution," appeared in the Paris periodical *Politique Aujourdhui*, January–February 1974.

[15] *Boston Sunday Globe*, March 15, 1981, p. 40.

[16] With the French bishops expressing public neutrality, approximately 25 percent of France's *practicing* Catholics voted for the Socialist candidate, as indicated by French pollsters. This is a new high. □

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James B. Rule

The Future of Freedom: Politics & Technology

I

Surely no literary vision of the future can match the power and enduring influence of Orwell's *1984*. Perhaps the most provocative element of that vision is the prospect of using sophisticated technologies of intrusion and manipulation to consolidate totalitarian power. Since Orwell, it has become impossible to speculate on the future of freedom without considering the role of freedom-destroying technologies.

Politically, the Western democracies have thus far fared better than Orwell feared they might. Representative processes still funnel meaningful pressure from the grass roots to the power centers of these societies. Civil rights and liberties, though under constant pressure, continue to safeguard significant diversities of opinion. Orwell's fears notwithstanding, the West has not given up democratic institutions.

For that, we have a right to be grateful. But the technological side of Orwell's prophecies is much closer to fulfillment. Since he wrote, new technologies—especially those involving electronics and computing—have made concretely possible many forms of intrusion and control that figure as science fiction fantasy in *1984*.[1] Often these new capabilities have been developed simply as solutions to routine bureaucratic problems. Data banks on people now streamline the provision of credit or the collection of taxes. Fingerprint and voiceprint identification have been developed as adjuncts to established crime-control programs. The sponsors of such innovations have shrewdly soft-pedaled their larger social significance, presenting them simply as new ways of doing things that have long been accepted.

Clearly this portrayal has nothing to recommend it, other than as a public-relations device. The new information technologies, especially those applied to information about people, are full of political and social significance. But what is that significance? What attitude should we take to the headlong growth of technologies full of manipulative potential, yet not immediately mobilized for political purposes?

Perhaps the most glib and also the least convincing response to these questions is that the new information technologies can only help create a more efficient, more "rational" social world. Such a position has at most the virtue of a certain primitive consistency. If state and private organizations must deal with individuals, it might be argued, more and better information can only help them do their jobs better. Up-to-date, pertinent information can only save money and heighten bureaucratic efficiency, thereby making any human system more humane.[2]

The faultiness of such a thoroughgoing technocratic line, in this extreme form, is transparent. Information systems—like any other technology—always serve some particular purpose. Are these purposes liable to favor freedom and democracy or to hinder them? Will the technologies further the persecution of political "unreliables" or serve some more humane ends? No position that ignores these questions deserves to be taken seriously.

Another approach is to consider the social intents served by the new technologies as somehow constrained by the logic of the technology itself. In this view, technologies that seem merely to *permit* manipulation and repression

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ultimately *demand* these things. Those who take this rather pessimistic view disparage the idea that technologies can ever be "mere instruments" in human hands.[3]

But this argument, suggestive in many contexts, seems to me at its weakest when applied to information technologies. The same technologies that could sustain totalitarianism and facilitate intrusive surveillance could equally well support new democratic forms. New applications of computing, for example, perhaps in conjunction with closed-circuit television, could make possible exchanges of views and information on public issues through "town meetings" for which the participants need never leave home.[4] Other applications of home computing could enable people to inform themselves about the activities of their governments and other powerful institutions, at minimal cost. The possibilities of the new technologies are endless, and often antipathetic to one another in political implication. Which possibilities will be realized can hardly be understood by considering technology alone.

Sponsorship, then, is the key to the role of information technologies in shaping human freedom. What social forces, what concrete interests are most likely to dominate the growth of these new electronic tools?

This central question has not received the attention it should. The writer who has come closest to confronting it is Daniel Bell—whose studies stress the centrality of information in shaping the world of the future. Given this bent, and given his background as a political sociologist, one would expect Bell to have much to say about the interests most likely to be served in the development of these technologies.

Yet strangely enough, he does not. He acknowledges the totalitarian potential of the new technologies as follows:

> the new revolution in communications makes possible both an intense degree of centralization of power, if the society decides to use it in that way, and large decentralization because of the multiplicity, diversity, and cheapness of the modes of communication.[5]

But he declines to question which of these possibilities are most likely to be served:

> Real as these issues are for liberty. . . , they are not the true locus of the problem. It is not in the technology per se but in the social and political system in which that technology is embedded.[6]

True enough. But it seems peculiar to let matters go with this sort of intellectual shrug. The political forces likely to shape these developments are not mysterious matters, beyond speculation. They are the same ones that have been shaping similar systems in the recent past.

II

In an inflationary world, computing is one major organizational activity whose cost is dropping. Thus the enormous attractions of substituting electronic processes for human labor and for the movement of things and people. It is increasingly cheaper to commit information to electronic storage, to manipulate that information electronically, and to transmit information to people electronically than it is to move the people themselves, or to move data about on paper. As more and more families in America come to have home computers or computer terminals—perhaps using their television screens as display units—the nature of information exchange between ordinary private citizens and large organizations will alter profoundly.

But these new informational relations will bring demands for access and monitoring by agencies of the state. These demands will grow directly out of similar demands apparent in the working of information systems already in existence.

Electronic Payments

PROBABLY EVERYONE has noticed that all but the smallest organizations now maintain financial accounts by computer. Large financial institutions now make payments and debits to and from one another's accounts through the electronic media—using paper, if at all, merely to confirm the electronic reality. Thus private individuals' tendency to rely on checks and other paper instruments for their transactions now represents a costly archaism. The processing of paper-based instruments is relatively energy- and labor-intensive; as a result, many banks are investing vast amounts in "electronic

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funds transfer systems" for consumer payments.

If these changes come about—they are already being experimented with on a large scale—electronic terminals linked to banks and other account-holding institutions could be placed everywhere. Using these terminals, one would be able to make deposits to or debits from one's account without going near the bank. Some supermarkets have already initiated "electronic tellers," which effect deposits to and withdrawals from customers' accounts from a special cashier in the store. Another application of the technology will be the use of terminals in retail establishments for effecting payments for goods and services. Thus one would pay one's bill at a restaurant by having the cashier tap instructions into a terminal debiting one's account for the amount of the meal, and crediting that of the restaurant. An interlocking net of computer lines could potentially link every terminal with every account-holding organization—including not only banks but also savings and loan companies, credit-card firms, and credit unions.

The question is, who is going to monitor the personal information generated by these systems? Today in the United States *all* personal checks are microfilmed and the copies retained for at least five years by the institution holding the account. This is the response to federal requirements aimed at making persons' financial affairs accessible to investigative agencies. Not only the Internal Revenue Service but also a wide variety of federal, state, and local agencies enjoy ready access to these personal records, often without subpoena and indeed without the individual's knowledge. The total number of these inquiries is not known, but in one survey 22 banks reported responding to an average of 500 requests per year. The great majority of such investigations under present conditions arise from routine law-enforcement concerns, including tax evasion and other crimes. But under oppressive political conditions, as during the Nixon years, such investigations can and do also serve as a vehicle for political harassment.

The main check on such investigations today is that they are extremely expensive. Going through microfilm records of all of a person's financial affairs can tie up an agent's time for days or weeks. If such records become computerized, however, this constraint will be much relaxed. The "log" of a person's financial transactions may be located by searching the computerized net and examined by simply printing out the record of a particular account. By making the collection of and access to private persons' account data cheaper and more efficient for themselves, financial institutions will also have made monitoring of individuals' lives easier for state agencies. If precedent is any guide, state interests will not neglect these opportunities.

Mail

MOVING letters and packages is a labor- and energy-intensive business, much like the processing of personal checks and other financial documents. Thus the impetus to electronic mail. Mailgram service, in which messages are electronically relayed to the recipient's nearest post office and delivered in the next day's regular mail, represents the beginning of this trend. As home terminals become common, the proper electronic "net" could make it possible to tap out a letter in one's own study and have it transmitted instantly to any address served by another terminal. Some multinational corporations are already using systems of this kind, which can also transmit copies of documentary material. Mass production will probably bring big reductions in the costs of these technologies, while ordinary mail is becoming costlier and slower all the time. Unions representing postal workers have already begun to register alarm at the massive displacement of labor that would result.

But the prospect of replacing conventional mail service with a computerized electronic net should raise deep political concerns. Ever since colonial times in America, authoritarian political climates have led to state monitoring of the mail's contents.[7] Even when mail is not actually opened, it has been subjected to "mail covers," in which the frequency and origins of correspondence to a particular person is systematically recorded. During one two-year period in the 1960s, some 24,000 Americans were sub-

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jected to such surveillance—a practice, incidentally, that is not illegal.

Like in-person investigation of microfilmed checks, however, mail openings and mail covers are a labor-intensive business. Electronic mail would make such activities much cheaper—and probably also easier to conceal. Whatever interests had access to the "net" through which electronic mail was transmitted could readily monitor communications going to and from any particular address. Indeed, the new technologies would threaten to erase the distinction between "mail covers" and actual opening of communications, since access to the "inside" of an electronic letter would presumably be no more difficult than access to the address.

News and Home Data Services

AS TONY SMITH HAS SHOWN in his fascinating book *Goodbye Gutenberg*, modern newspapers have thrived by becoming large, heterogeneous "bundles" of information. When we "consume" a hefty *New York Times* or *Washington Post*, we in effect rummage through these bundles, discarding most of their contents and using only a few nuggets of information that particularly interest us. But with the costs of newsprint and transport rising, publishers are feeling pressure to disaggregate these "bundles" and eliminate waste by sending readers only the informational elements they are most likely to read.

This process has already begun, in the creation of special editions for special subsets of readership—suburban editions of newspapers, and "businessmen's" or other special editions of certain national magazines. But these changes are minor compared to what could be accomplished if paper were dispensed with altogether, and informational "products" delivered directly to people's living room via computer. Subscribers could then indicate in advance what news, features, and ads they were prepared to read, and the material so selected could be displayed on their TV screens. Some cable TV providers have already instituted systems allowing for considerable flexibility in program selection by viewers. As people's informational requirements are identified with more and more exactitude, the "waste" of untargeted journalism and broadcasting would decrease in favor of what some have called "narrowcasting."

But who will be able to monitor the use of such services? Patterns of personal information consumption tell a great deal about people's political attitudes and interests. It is difficult to imagine any home information system as those envisaged above that could avoid creating a "log" of the informational choices of the users—if only as a by-product of the billing process. There would certainly be no technological barrier to direct state monitoring of the choices of each user, much as the use of a mail or payment network might be monitored. And if state authorities are willing to go to the trouble of harassing subscribers to periodicals of a particular slant—as they indeed have been in our recent history—will they resist the more tempting possibilities of such systems?

Electronic Dossiers

THE GROWTH of systematic record-keeping on individuals has been a feature of "advanced" social systems for much longer than have the new electronic technologies. Since the turn of this century, large organizations—both governmental and private—have increasingly developed written dossiers on members of the general public, and used the records as bases for organizational action against these individuals.[8] These record systems are more and more widely computerized. But computerization does no more than intensify a central fact of life in the modern world—that one's record matters enormously in one's dealings with all sorts of powerful institutions.

In the past, the labor-intensive requirements of dealing with paper-based records have posed a check on their use—both for routine bureaucratic purposes and others. Computerization, however, is now streamlining the collection, storage, and above all transmission and use of personal dossiers. A key feature of the new, computerized systems is their ability to produce very rapid responses to requests for information and to make what would otherwise be enormously laborious cross-checks at minimal delay and cost.

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One application of these techniques has now made it possible for federal officials to check anyone entering this country from abroad against elaborate computerized federal records. At present, roughly two-thirds of all incoming travelers have their identities checked against this central file; further improvement should raise this level. The computerized inquiry in effect determines whether the traveler—who may be foreign or a U.S. national—is of interest to any of a variety of federal agencies. The nature of this interest may run from that of an agency, which simply wants to be kept informed of someone's movements, to that of a local, state, or federal law-enforcement body seeking that person's arrest. In 1978 this system—TECS or the Treasury Enforcement Communications System—checked more than 7 million entering persons and made more than 21,000 identifications of persons of interest, leading to more than 2,000 arrests. Where no action is taken at the time of entry, a record of the traveler's name, date and place of arrival is retained in the computer memory for six months.

Most of the arrests made through TECS are of persons listed in the National Crime Information Center—the FBI's computerized roster of persons wanted for arrest throughout the United States. This listing is accessible through the TECS files and is available to other law-enforcement personnel in America. The quick checking of names against this list has made it possible to identify all sorts of persons who would otherwise pass through the net of law-enforcement attention too rapidly to be apprehended. There are now plans to computerize the daily reports written by every FBI investigator, including the reported *associates* of persons under investigation. The names of these persons could then be checked against the computerized listing of wanted individuals—or monitored by FBI staff for any other purpose they deemed fit.

We see new evidence of imaginative uses of similar capacities all the time—for instance, in the cross-checking of welfare roles against computerized payrolls. Often the applications in question are for purposes hardly anyone could dispute. But in the long run, dare we assume that these sophisticated capabilities will not be used for the harassment of political dissidents, for tracking political enemies, or identifying and discrediting opponents of the state? The recent record of the FBI and other federal "law-enforcement" agencies hardly warrants full confidence. One of the main thrusts of repression in the Nixon era, after all, was the use of federal data files and investigatory capabilities to disrupt and harass those defined as political enemies.

III

The new electronic technologies promise a change as fundamental as the rise of mass communications—and with political implications no less fundamental. Instead of *mass* communications—uniform messages directed wholesale to very large populations—we are moving into an age of *individualized* exchanges between central institutions and large publics. Thanks to the new information technologies, organizations can now send and receive specific, tailor-made communications to and from specific individuals on a very large scale.

Indeed, not just messages but also organizational action—ranging from the provision of health insurance to political surveillance—can be allocated to individuals in light of the precise detail of what their individual "cases" warrant. This fine discrimination in organizational action and communication stems from the ability to collect and store vast amounts of data on individuals, and to use such data quickly and efficiently in decision-making. The new social realities emerging from these capabilities promise to combine the personal attention to individual affairs that was previously exercised by the community or extended family with the scale of coverage possible before only in mass communications.

It is true, I have argued, that nothing about these technologies *in themselves* marks them for repressive use. In an environment free of repressive political tendencies, we would hope to see them yield all sorts of humane, democratizing, life-giving applications. But the application of these technologies will most likely be dominated by the same interests prevailing thus far. Daniel Bell notwithstanding, there is

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nothing obscure about how these interests are liable to shape the treatment of the new riches of personal data. Under repressive political climates—which recur with regularity in American life—the uses of personal data themselves become repressive. This is not a matter of speculation, but a straightforward reading of the recent historical record.

Orwell foresaw—and made unforgettable—a world in which ruthless political interests mobilized intrusive technologies for totalitarian ends. What he did not consider was the possibility that the development of the intrusive technologies would occur on its own, without the spur of totalitarian intent. This is what is happening. For the most routine and indeed often praiseworthy ends, technologies are being developed that concentrate information on people's lives, and make it accessible to those who control the technologies. And the control of information on individuals, in a political environment like our own, inevitably means influence over their lives.

Thus I believe that we have a great deal to worry about in the growth of the new information technologies, even when there is nothing overtly political about their initial form. As a recipient of mass communications, one can at least ignore a propagandistic media event or thumb one's nose at the president's televised news conference. In the new computerized communications, the recipient will leave an electronic record of his interactions with the system. That record provides central powers with opportunities for deeper and more powerful penetration into individuals' private affairs. The accumulation of such records represents a blank check to the political intentions of those who can control the systems. We would be better off not to write that check, even if this means renouncing some of the unquestionable benefits of the new technologies.

Notes

[1] See David Goodman, "Countdown to *1984*," in the *Futurist*, December 1978. Goodman claims that the majority of the technological innovations described in *1984* have already been developed.

[2] Anyone who imagines this position too simplistic to attract serious exponents should note some very similar arguments by Ithiel Pool for scholarly support for the CIA: "On the Necessity for Social Scientists Doing Research for Governments," in I. L. Horowitz, ed., *The Rise and Fall of Project Camelot* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967).

[3] The best known exponent of this position is Jacques Ellul.

[4] Various sociologists, including Amitai Etzioni, Roxanne Hiltz, and Kenneth Laudon, have recently been exploring this possibility.

[5] Daniel Bell, "Communications Technology—For Better or for Worse," *Harvard Business Review*, May–June 1979, p. 36.

[6] Ibid.

[7] See David Flaherty, *Privacy in Colonial New England* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1972).

[8] See James Rule, Douglas McAdam, Linda Stearns, and David Uglow, *The Politics of Privacy* (New York: New American Library, 1980). □

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The Daughters of Karl Marx

Excerpts from a Correspondence

This spring an extremely interesting volume, The Daughters of Karl Marx: Family Correspondence 1866–1898, *will be published in New York. By the kind permission of the publisher, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, we print below several letters (written in English, like much of this correspondence) by Marx's daughters. The editorial commentary and notes are taken from the book. We have added a few bracketed items of information.* — Eds.

In the following letter Jenny reports to Paul on the troubled situation in Ireland.

The Fenians, a revolutionary organization dedicated to the overthrow of British rule in Ireland, had staged a brave but unsuccessful uprising in March 1867, with the aid of a militant group of Irish-Americans who had emigrated after the Famine of 1845–50. Marx was sympathetic to the Fenians' objectives but could not wholly approve of their conspiratorial, often violent, tactics. Both Jenny and Eleanor, however, were fervent supporters of the Irish Nationalist movement.

After the Liberal party's triumphant success in the 1868 elections, Gladstone came to office declaring that his mission was to "pacify Ireland." This he attempted to achieve by severing the connection between the Protestant church and the state—a major source of discontent given that the overwhelming majority of the population were Catholic peasants—and by securing a fairer relationship between landlord and tenant.

The disestablishment and disendowment bill, formally known as the Irish Church Act, had been passed in the House of Commons soon before Jenny's letter; the Land Act, which on paper offered the tenant increased security but still failed to protect him against eviction, was passed the following year.

Jenny to Paul Lafargue

[London, end of March 1869]

My dear Paul,

As you have of your own accord interrupted your *tête-à-tête* by visits right and left, you will pardon me, if for a few moments I draw your attention from private to public affairs: in our little family circle nothing happens worth speaking of (today Papa proposed a fresh leg of mutton for dinner, by way of an excitement, as he said). We live on in the normal way, indifferent to the march of time, even unaffected by the change of seasons—but fortunately there is a great busy world out of Modena Villas, a world all astir. The Irish question has given a new lease of life to demagogues great and small, to penny-a-liners of all descriptions! Tongues and pens are running a desperate race. *Mais ne craignez rien.* It is not my intention to inflict on you a report of the "words, words, words" of English political costermongers, it is of the conduct of the Irish at this critical

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moment that I am anxious to give you an account, for no doubt at Paris you have the strangest information respecting it. Of course you have seen from the French papers that the vote for the disendowment of the Irish church was carried in the House of Commons by a majority of sixty,[1] but no doubt those papers have given you a very incorrect notion of the impression made by that event on the Irish, that is, if they have taken their information from the London press. To judge from the articles in the *Times, Star, Standard* all is *couleur de rose* in Ireland, throughout the length and breadth of that happy land there is a feeling of tumultuous joy, the mere vote has proved a sop for the hungry monster discontent, who *now* has nothing to do but to crawl about on all fours in order to catch a ray of sunshine from the luminous body of all Royalty.[2]

Irishmen, we are told by special correspondents, are decorating their wretched hovels so that things may look pleasing to royal eyes, are furnishing their rusty harps with strings to prepare a proper accompaniment to the performances on royal light fantastic toes—they are prepared, it is said, ever after the glorious advent of the Queen's son, you know gratitude is one of their chief characteristics, to starve themselves, their wives and children, and fatten sheep and oxen and pigs for their English masters.

This is the English translation and now listen to the Irish original. The following are the words of the Irish leader John Martin[3]: "If, he says, the Prince of Wales is authorized to bear to Ireland any reassuring message from her Majesty or the English Cabinet, with an intention to restore our national rights, then let the Irish people receive him not with cold and silent politeness only. . . . If the Prince comes authorized to open the prison doors for every Irishman convicted and suspected of political offence, then let the people cheer him heartily. . . ."

Yes, their nationality, an amnesty for their imprisoned countrymen,[4] the Irish are willing to receive at the hands of a Royal or any other "Jolly Nash"—and that is about the whole extent of their loyalty. Of course I do not mean to deny that great preparations *are* being made for the royal reception. The question is by *whom* are they made? By official corporations, by the Lord Mayor, by worthies elected to their lucrative offices by the English, by householders who have houses to let, by shopkeepers who have goods to sell, by the servile scum that floats on all societies?

On the church question the Irish also have opinions of their own, opinions that do not find their way into English journals. In a capital article, the *Irishman*[5] declares that there are in Ireland other and greater grievances than the endowment of Protestant parsons, and in reply to the phrase now much *en vogue*, that the Church is a "badge of conquest" and ought therefore to be removed, it wittily observes: "If it is intended to remove the badge of conquest, what are we to say to the great and grand evil of the conquest itself. Until our independent legislature is restored, we are not only *wearing* the *badge* but *enduring* the *reality* of conquest." Even the *Universal News*, the particular organ of the Catholic party, does not go into ecstasies at this defeat of Protestantism, but simply observes that the removal of the Church will do little for Ireland if the great and overshadowing evil of the land question be allowed to remain as it is.[6] This is an unmistakable sign of the times, a proof that religious fanaticism is dying out—that even in priest-ridden Ireland Gods are shelved when there is serious work to be done. Men are growing out of their childhood, toys no longer attract them, no longer have the power to divert them from the great objects they are determined to attain. (As you are a *Mêridional*[7] and rather addicted to the vice of enthusiasm, whatever you may profess to the contrary, I do not mind confessing to you that I have been sufficiently stupid twice to walk to the Red Cap[8] for the sole purpose there to feast my eyes on a placard bearing the inscription "The destruction of the Church is at hand!" You see I have yet much to learn even of imaginative Paddy.)

Gladstone, the *Irishman* treats sarcastically and is rather surprised at the fact that that patriotic statesman should now rush about in frenzied haste to redress in the twinkling of an eye a wrong which has existed for three centur-

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ies and against which he never before opened his lips. The case is suspicious and therefore he advised his countrymen to be on their guard and to have no confidence in the Liberal leader, to trust neither Whigs nor Tories, Gladstone nor Disraeli, and to avoid above all things the position of partisans in parliamentary contests of English factions. If the *Irishman* proceeds to say, "we owe a debt of gratitude"—it is not to Gladstone but to Stephens the Head Centre.[9] Fenians have effected in a few months that which moral force, agitation, constitutional means had for years, nay centuries, striven ineffectually to bring about. (A lesson for the Working Classes of England! a proof that Greek fire and a few shots are useful when applied at the right moment!) Yes, the *Fenians* have forced the most respectable Englishman to tear from that venerable institution the Church, the mystical covering that has protected it for years. Nay they have done more, for the disendowment question leads to the question of vested interests to the desecration of that Holy of Holies—*private property!* Is there to be *no* compensation for those who are losers by the disestablishment of the Church? are vested interests not to be respected? is the shriek ringing out high and clear above all other sounds? Bradlaugh last Sunday at Cleveland Hall gave the best and most popular answer to it I have yet heard. "What," cried he, "when you take from a thief goods, which he has unlawfully acquired, do you give him compensation for the loss he has sustained! The parsons on the contrary should be grateful to us for taking the weight of riches off their shoulders; unencumbered by worldly goods they will slip like eels through the narrow lock which leads to Heaven!" [several lines illegible]

But stop. I fear I am taxing your patience—the deciphering of so many pages of my *pattes de mouche*[10] will give you an incurable headache, Worthy Benedict.[11] I pity you and now leave you to pleasanter occupations—and beg you to believe me.

Always affectionately yours

JENNY MARX

Not free yet!

Challey [Marx] wants me to copy for you the description given in the *Irishman* of Disraeli and Gladstone or others [illegible] to the House of Commons. It is most amusing. I think your "better half" will appreciate it. It is entitled—"The Rivals."

"I was as near to Gladstone as the paper on which this is being written. His face was unmistakably the colour of nacre. A black dress coat, and a white tie lent a greater ghostliness to the stolid pallor of his countenance. His head as he left the carriage drooped forwards, as if the weight of the destinies of his party had been superimposed on his shoulders. He went in and Dizzy came. He, Disraeli, had taken a friend's arm. Who that friend was I have not yet discovered. The Premier was cheered but he was also hissed, and I could find in his look or manner none of the trepidation which make his great rival so painfully remarkable. For Benjamin held his head high and walked on to his goal with something like the confidence of Alexander Selkirk,[12] who, as everybody knows, was 'monarch of all he surveyed.' If none of your readers have seen the man in the flesh, then they have lost a sight. Fancy a placid-faced Jew, with broad nostrils and full luminous eye, a mouth as flexible as india rubber and a great rice-coloured forehead, over which a dyed ringlet hangs carelessly dependent. Then he dresses well, wearing by way of contrast to the remainder of his . . ." [letter incomplete]

[1] In fact the bill was carried, at its second reading, by 118 votes (368 for, 250 against) at 2.30 A.M. on March 24, 1869, after lengthy and heated debate in the House of Commons.

[2] Prince Arthur was to tour Ireland from April 5 to May 4, 1869. He received a mixed welcome and there were violent riots during his visit to Derry in early May.

[3] A former Young Irelander who, 20 years earlier, had been briefly deported to Tasmania for seditious activities. Martin was outspoken in his denunciation of the inadequacy of the disestablishment bill.

[4] A reference to Fenian prisoners serving terms of penal servitude in English prisons.

[5] *The Irishman* was an Irish Nationalist weekly paper. It has proved impossible to trace the extracts referred to in this letter.

[6] Probably a reference to the leader of March 27,

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though this opinion was frequently expressed by the *Universal News*.

[7] "From the Midi."

[8] The Mother Red Cap Tavern, situated at a busy crossroads in Camden Town, was well known in Victorian London as an omnibus station and meeting-place.

[9] James Stephens, one of the founders of the Fenian movement. The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) was organized on highly ritualistic lines, with "Head Centre" the code for "Chief Executive." Stephens was arrested in 1865 but escaped to America, where he energetically rallied support for a Fenian rising.

[10] "Scrawl."

[11] A reference to *Much Ado About Nothing* and one of Paul's family nicknames.

[12] "I am monarch of all I survey": William Cowper, *Verses Supposed to be Written by Alexander Selkirk*. Selkirk was the prototype of Defoe's Robinson Crusoe.

Eleanor to Jenny

Ventnor, 15 January 1882

My dearest Di,

Papa told me you had written to him about me—and from what he has said I see how kindly you have spoken of me. After I wrote you last Sunday I almost regretted it—for it seems selfish to worry you with my affairs, when you must assuredly have worry enough of your own. Still more selfish does it seem that I think at all about myself—instead of thinking only of our dear Mohr [Marx]. How I love him no one can know—and yet—we must each of us, after all, live our own life—and much and hard as I have tried I could not crush out my desire to *try something*. The chance too of independence is very sweet. But if all this has been troubling me it is not all. There has been *much* else. For a long time I have tried to make up my mind to break off my engagement [to the Communard Lissagaray]. I *could* not bring myself to do it—he has been very good, and gentle, and patient with me—but I have done it now. Not only that the burden had become too heavy—I had other reasons (I can't write them—it would take so long, but when I see you will tell you)—and so at last I screwed my courage to the sticking place. And now, dear, I have a *great* favour to ask of you—namely that you will if possible see Lissa sometimes, and treat him just as an old friend. Remember *he* is blameless in this. I hope we shall continue the best and most intimate of friends—and to do this nothing will help so much as if you and Longuet continue to see him. You will, I am sure, understand my feeling in this. Ah! it has been a terrible struggle. I sometimes wonder how I have lived through it all. I firmly believe that owing to my long intercourse with cats, I have acquired, like them, nine lives instead of one.

Dear old Di, I wish I could talk it all over with you. I have had so much worry of late. One friend after another I have found false and treacherous—till even Dollie comes here and tells Papa she believes me to be *secretly married* and a lot of other cock and bull stories, that do far more honour to her imagination than to her veracity. But this is over: I mean to try hard by dint of hard work to make something more and better of my life than it has heretofore been. After all *work* is the chief thing. To me at least it is a necessity. That is why I love even my dull Museum drudgery. You see I'm not clever enough to live a purely *intellectual* life, nor am I dull enough to be content to sit down and do nothing. Tomorrow is my birthday—if I keep but half my good resolutions for the coming years I shall do well. But enough of myself. I *hate* to speak of myself—and you too will be, by this, tired of the subject.

The weather in this "genial" place having gone from bad to worse, Mohr has made up his mind to leave here tomorrow (Monday). He had determined not to outstay the three weeks up on Thursday—and as I am going tomorrow it is better he should start at once than wait two days, and have me back again for one. That Mohr is really much better and stronger I see from the fact that he hasn't got worse here. We

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have had days with icy winds, and days with fogs that would not disgrace London—and yet *on the whole* Mohr has stood it well. Then I feel too that he has had in me a most disagreeable and trying companion. I was really ill and, as you may guess, terribly preoccupied with my own thoughts which were none of the pleasantest. I feel heartily ashamed of myself now for having worried him. I *did* try not to let him see—but I succeeded very badly, and then Dollie's advent made further efforts at concealment useless.

We were more than glad to hear you had had news of the box—and we are now waiting anxiously to know whether you have it—I could hardly get over the disappointment were it lost. To begin with there are dear Mama's things which we so much wanted you to have—and then the toys for the children! In my mind's eye I have many a time gone over the scene of their unpacking their box and finding the various things.

News of any other kind I have not to give—for Ventnor is not exactly an exciting place, and the greatest events of each day have been my morning interview with butchers, poulterers, etc., and the various "meals."

Mohr and I have been saying for the last few days that when he feels up to it we shall both come to see you (I for a little while of course as I hope to get to work without loss of time) and also that in the spring or summer you *must* come to us with all the boys. Par will by that time be quite a man (from all I heard he was almost an independent gentleman six months ago) and either Helen or I would go over to help you on the journey.

And now, goodbye, dearest Di. Kiss my dear little boys for their Auntie, who also kisses you.

Your

TUSSY

P.S. Engels wrote about the box. He says you are to let him know the names of the Companies you have applied to and what they said to you.

Eleanor to Laura

The Den, Jews Walk,
Sydenham, London.
8 January 1898

My dear Laura,

It is like your thoughtful kindness to send my birthday present in advance of that not overwelcome anniversary. I got your letter too late yesterday to catch our post (5 o'c). It was very welcome, for, as I hardly need tell you, illness means immense expense in every way. Doctors' visits at 5s. a time, and sometimes twice a day, are no joke. Edward [Aveling] *is* better. Indeed he is working again—though I wish he wouldn't. But I did not exaggerate the danger. The day after I wrote to you the doctor told me Edward might at any moment (his temperature was up to 103 at times) "take a turn for the worse," and that I ought at once to communicate with his relations. Of course I did not, because (except perhaps his sister, now living in Devonshire) there is not a relation he would want to see at any time. I only wished *you* had been a little nearer, and during those anxious hours, I did think Draveil was terribly far from Sydenham. As I have said, Edward is better, but he is still terribly weak and terribly emaciated. He is a very skeleton—mere skin and bones. And so he is not yet out of the wood, and I am still very anxious. The slightest chill would, the doctors say, be absolutely fatal—and Edward is a most unmanageable person—I write freely because he is in bed asleep (thank goodness he *does* sleep well!) and except in letters to *me alone* you must not let him know there is still cause for anxiety. If I can I shall get him off to Hastings away from the awful fogs we are having here.

And now to get away from ourselves. I think

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we have done the best we could for the "children" [of Jenny, who had died in '83; Laura's children all had died in infancy]—although *all* of them (except Mémé) seem dissatisfied. Edward says (please excuse the language) they all want their bottoms smacked. They *are* a trial to one's patience, I must admit. And Paul's shirts. The enclosed will explain why he has not received them. I should have let you know before, but in all the worry I forgot. Meantime the Burnley ass does not say *what* the size is—so I can't order here until the Lord of the Manor will let me know the inches of his lordly neck. It is curious that one should have to get *here* the shirts that are made in the north!

I am sending you today's *Chronicle* where you will find news of the strike.[1] Our great (*entre nous* our only) hope is the re-assembling of Parliament. We can hold out, so Barnes positively assures me, easily till then (and Thorne says so too). Then the game will become even more interesting, e.g., Goschen[2] will have to explain why he does not, especially in view of the Far Eastern crisis, insist upon the carrying out of the naval contracts. The employers *cannot* claim indemnity under the "strike-clause" because the men *have never struck*. They are locked out, and the employers admit that they have no quarrel with the men in all cases except some *two or three in London*. They admit it to be a question of standing by *their class*. Since the great 1853 and 1859 strikes (even including the great Dock Strike of 1889) there has been no such movement in England. Unhappily some of our Socialists don't understand, and say it is no "Socialist" movement! The imbeciles! And *never* has there been a movement in England that was so international. The help coming from abroad is magnificent, and at every meeting the "foreign brethren" are cheered to the echo.

My only fear is that Germany, which has done so grandly, may slacken now that Liebknecht [sentenced to four months' imprisonment under an 1897 anti-Socialist law] is not able to publish his capital articles. The *Vorwärts* is falling more and more under Bernstein's influence, and his wet-blanket articles, that no doubt you see both in the *Vorwärts* and the *Neue Zeit*, are not exactly useful at the present moment. Assuredly the critical attitude is necessary and useful. But there are times when a little enthusiasm—even if "uncritical"—is of greater value. Bernstein's position is a most unfortunate one for the movement, and one that makes *our* position very difficult. It is impossible to defend his attitude, and I am in daily fear that someone will tell Barnes and that Barnes will insist upon answering Bernstein. Barnes would be sure to get me to help him—and then I should be most awkwardly placed. Unhappily there is no one, now we have not the General [Engels], to influence Bernstein, and pull him together. And Bernstein is writing the "Life" of Engels for Fisher Unwin![3] Although he must (I should think) be using the correspondence of Engels and Mohr he has said nothing to me about it. Of course we can't prevent the *use* of the letters, but by the English law not a single letter of Mohr's can be published without *our consent*. The courts have again declared that a letter is the property of the *writer* of the letter and his heirs or executors, *not* of the person to whom the letter is written. Of course I know Bernstein would *never* misuse any letter—but it is as well that we should have the legal control over them. Now dear, goodnight. My thanks to you and a kiss, and a kiss to Paul.

Your

TUSSY

P.S. I was quite shocked yesterday when . . . going to my poulterer I saw *five* guinea-fowls hanging (dead) in a row. I thought of the faithful five,[4] and felt a brute even to buy some fish! Sorry you've had to pay on *Chronicle*. I thought that for France the same rule applied as for England *and Germany*—i.e., that any newspaper (not illustrated papers) were ½d. per paper quite irrespective of weight. It is so for *Germany*.

[1] The Engineers' strike. George Barnes was Secretary of the Union.

[2] Chancellor of the Exchequer.

[3] Bernstein does not seem to have completed this project.

[4] Probably an allusion to the Lafargues' menagerie. □

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Washington Henry

Reds Through Rosy Glasses

Reds, like all soap opera, is a test of one's good will. Does one see the glass half-full, and credit earnestness and energy? Or see the glass half-empty, and allow oneself to feel annoyance at scenes in which the emotional content is hyped and cutesy and cannot be believed?

The test may be most severe for those who regard themselves as radicals, for *Reds* is imbued with good intentions and high hopes failed. In *Reds*, capitalism is nothing but monopoly and imperialism, and there are no kind words for it. Through all the ups and downs, the dreams and disillusionments of John Reed and Louise Bryant, there is an unquestioned belief that World War I was an invention of Western finance, and that the warring powers were united in the desire to keep socialism from breaking out around the world. Regardless of where one treads along the issues that have divided radicals, it is hard not to yearn sentimentally for times when good and evil were seemingly so easy to identify. And it is flattering to the vaguely radical sensibility to find this end product of a $50 million outlay of Hollywood capital pitching itself to the yearnings of leftist idealism. If one believes in the ideals that all leftists vaguely share, then the general values of *Reds'* maker cannot be faulted. It is in his technique—as actor, co-writer, and director—that Warren Beatty falls back on the conventions of de Millian bombast and bourgeois heartbreak.

So the question for the viewer will probably be decided on one's moment-by-moment needs and capacities. Does one long to be on the side of the angels, or does one require what Henry James called "felt life"? Is it the end that matters, or the means? Socialists—as distinct from Communists—have traditionally been concerned with the means, and indeed, the picture itself instructs us to turn sadly from a revolution that rationalizes deceit and oppression. By the standard of means, however, *Reds* falls short, for its moment-by-moment texture is a patchwork of simplisms held together by trickery.

I should pause here for a word about the talking heads, the eighty- and ninety-year-old "witnesses," many of them famous in their own right, whose recollections are spliced into the movie. They are wonderful, and the vitality and spontaneity of what they say makes an amusing contrast with what the movie shows us. But they are brightly lit in closeups against dark backgrounds, to show us, I suppose, the lines and furrows of their magnificent old faces. I would rather have seen them placed in their surroundings, even at the sacrifice of arty cinematography. But this movie is nothing if not a repository of self-conscious visuals. Everything, even the outdoor views, is shown through a vaselined glow—yet little is visually memorable. In three hours and 20 minutes (not counting an intermission), the eye is twitched along from one nervous cut to another, TV-style, as if the film-makers do not trust the content of the film to speak for itself.

The style is due, I think, to the undigested globules of abstract language that are hurled across the screen whenever the principals talk politics. They tend to lecture each other as if they were characters in a John Reed comic book. In fact there is little in the film that would not better suit the comic-book format. It seems that in the glory days of Greenwich Village around World War I, Max Eastman, Emma Goldman, Big Bill Haywood, and Eugene O'Neill all regaled one another with capsules of political wisdom. In too many scenes, a character enters and is introduced, spouts his "position"—and departs. Since little of this is integrated into the film's dramatic substance, it has to be spliced together with movie trickiness.

Take, for instance, the opening sequences where Reed meets Louise Bryant. She interviews him all night long in her Portland studio. It becomes evident that she does not feel obliged to go home to

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her husband, and Beatty's boyish face registers the expectation that she will sleep with him. Then she doesn't—and this is good for a laugh. It's good for another laugh when she encounters him at a dinner party, gets him outside and says she wants to see him with his pants down. There is still another chuckle when Reed asks Louise to come with him to New York and she angrily asks him what he expects her to come "as"? The lady won't come as mistress, paramour, or concubine. It's Thanksgiving, Beatty replies, in a line straight from sitcom, why not come as a turkey? And so Louise does come, and we are on to the next sequence, where in a pastiche imitation of time passing à la *Citizen Kane*, we see Beatty and Keaton bouncing up and down dancing at a series of wild Village parties, as only their costumes change. In this way the movie solves in TV-style the problems of indicating Louise's feminism and getting her from Portland to New York with Reed. But what does Louise feel about leaving her husband—or why was she with her husband in the first place? We see no contact with the husband. Who is Louise, for that matter, other than someone who reacts with monotonous hostility to Reed and to the minor threats to her independence? How does Louise feel about her work, and what is her work like? The movie has little to tell us about her character or any other. It is so worried about taking politics straight on that it takes all its emotions sideways.

In fact it is impossible to believe we are seeing John Reed and Louise Bryant. With a thousand little nudges the camera instructs us to appreciate the endearing portrayals of Warren Beatty and Diane Keaton. Watch Diane now—as she screws her face into cute defiance—and look at Warren, he is going to sit down on the stairs, his face is turning pink, he is about to shed tears! The trouble is, the style of their emotions is as hackneyed as the gimmicky dinner Warren so engagingly burns.

THE MOVIE-STAR QUALITY of the characters is never more apparent than in the triangulation scenes with Eugene O'Neill. Jack Nicholson, in one of his virtuoso impersonations, certainly captures the set of O'Neill's mustache, but there is little about the character we see to suggest a man passionately involved with the theater. Instead we get a glowering, mannered delivery that never allows us to forget we are watching Jack Nicholson. When this is combined with Keaton's mousy twitches and Beatty's ingratiating shamble, we have scenes that convey not love and jealousy but the cleverness of actors acting.

The triangle starts turning when Beatty goes off to report on riots in Chicago and leaves Keaton behind with the Provincetown Players. Sure enough, Nicholson approaches her, with an elaborate business involving her pouring him a drink. O'Neill, you see, drank, and so does Nicholson, gloweringly. "Why aren't you in Chicago with Jack?" he asks, his voice loaded with sexual menace. "He has his things, I have mine," Keaton replies. Next we find Nicholson and Keaton walking through flowing sand dunes arm in arm, and there is a vaseline shot of them standing nude, à la Malibu, in the ocean waves. Then Beatty returns, shambling with flowers, his amiable grin on his face just as we have come to expect it from *Bonnie and Clyde*, *Shampoo*, and *Heaven Can Wait*. The amiable grin relieved by the earnest frown is Beatty's only movie mask. Beatty is the innocent sexy idealist, and unlike John Reed he keeps his infidelities out of sight. Nicholson glowers, but Keaton retires for the night with Beatty. She wants to let him know what's been going on, but "you don't have to tell me anything," he says. "You want to get married?" As for Nicholson, Keaton informs him, in words that would look good in a comic balloon, "Jack and I are perfectly capable of living with our beliefs. But for someone as romantic as you, it would destroy you. And I don't want that to happen—for Jack's sake."

Without further ado, Beatty and Keaton get married, and he gives her a puppy in a gift-wrapped box. The puppy tries to get under the door as they make love. The only trace of Nicholson is a love poem he has sent, which Keaton inserts into a copy of *Leaves of Grass*. Beatty discovers the poem and *then* gets angry, assuming Keaton and Nicholson have been carrying on *after* marriage, and ah, what comic-book irony that he is mistaken! The lady, however, doesn't simply explain or reassure: she packs—and so we have a gimmicky parting of lovers to set up a gimmicky reunion. In a substitute for genuine conflict, our stars shout at one another. If they merely talked, they might discover there is no reason to quarrel. But then the film might only be 90 minutes long, and we would not have the spectacle of Beatty coming to get Keaton on the front lines in France and taking her with him to Russia. She is still angry with him for unclear reasons, still maintaining her substanceless independence, and those who believe in what they see are wondering if she will ever again sleep with him. But the Russian Revolution is so exciting—and the crowd marching in front of the cardboard Winter Palace is so beautifully lit—that of course she does. She is inspired by a comic-bubble speech he makes to the Russian workers.

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With the revolution over, Reed returns to the United States—but the major event of his life, the writing of *Ten Days That Shook The World*, is passed over. Instead the movie plunges into sectarian politics, as Reed's Communist Labor party splits from the Socialist party and then from Louis Fraina's Communists. Reed returns to Russia in a futile bid to gain official recognition for his group, giving rise to another dubious shouting scene between Beatty and Keaton. "You wanna go running all over the world!" whines the lip-quivering Keaton. She says she may not be there when he gets back.

WHILE I DIDN'T WORRY about Keaton's threat, I found the Moscow scenes that followed the most interesting ones in the movie. Blessedly deprived of the querulous Keaton, Beatty in Moscow is initiated into Bolshevik reality via a series of grinding meetings presided over by the bureaucrat Zinoviev, played by the novelist Jerzy Kosinski. Ironically, the non-actor Kosinski creates the film's only character who does not seem to be acting. To Reed's frustration, Zinoviev persists in the futile strategy of trying to infiltrate the American labor movement—and he insists Beatty must stay in Moscow to do propaganda work; he will not let him—thankfully—return to his wife.

Meanwhile Keaton, having suffered a change of heart, is on her way first to Finland—where Reed has been arrested trying to escape—then to Moscow. Since normal travel lanes are closed, Keaton, unlike the real-life Bryant, must undertake the ardors of secret travel. In a sequence reminiscent of the Marx Brothers, we cut repeatedly to Keaton journeying across the tundra, hidden in a peasant cart, stumbling in the snow, sidestepping a herd of caribou—but pressing onward ever onward to join her beloved.

Luckily she takes a while getting there, and while Reed's education is presented mostly through conversation, it is still the most original and convincing segment of the movie. "Our dream is dying," Emma Goldman tells Reed—and though he resists, we see he is getting the point. In a scene on a train, Beatty turns on Zinoviev, shouting that when you don't allow a revolutionary to love his wife, when "you separate a man from what is unique in him . . . you purge dissent . . . you kill the revolution." At that very moment—as chance would have it—the train is attacked by the White Army, and the action degenerates into a melange resembling an American western, with Beatty running earnestly among horses and cannon.

And alas it is not very long—only three hours—before Keaton arrives for the movie's finale, giving her all at last for love as her man lies dying in a Moscow hospital. Beatty dies—like Charles Foster Kane—as a cup falls from Keaton's hands. Just as death brings love, the movie seems to be saying that we can now embrace the political ideals that died with the brutality of the Bolsheviks. For those whose hearts are moved by that sentiment, *Reds* will be a heart-warming experience. □

Bernard Avishai

The Lost Cause of *Napoleon*

If we judge by technical virtuousity then these are the best of times. But if the times make us willing to judge by technical virtuousity then they are the worst of times. Touring the country now, playing with full orchestra to a well-rehearsed chorus of critics, is Abel Gance's film *Napoleon*: in the words of the *Boston Globe*'s Bruce McCabe, "a symphony of visionary cinematic technique, a montage of moods, colors and tones, orchestrated so as to present a vital, vivid and engrossing historical dramatization." This French director's silent film is literally engrossing, demanding four and a-half hours from our sympathetic nerves and lower backs.

But unlike other curios of film literature, *Napoleon*'s vitality and vividness urge a militantly authoritarian ideal of politics, which is not a small fault in a film released in 1927. The critic Leon Moussinac then called it "a Bonaparte for apprentice fascists." The young de Gaulle, whose good opinion of the film is now widely cited, was at that time not a symbol of liberty but of tank-building. In 1937, moreover, Gance would remake *J'accuse*, a bitterly antiwar film that, in the face of the gathering threat posed by Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini,

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implied the folkish defeatism that would soon envelop French politicians and military leaders. So we may justly infer that Gance's art shared, finally, not in the prestige of the Resistance but in Vichy's triumphs of will. It should in all events now be more disturbing to Mr. McCabe.

CONSIDER THE OPENING SCENES of Gance's now rediscovered *Napoleon*, contrived to provide us his dim—and crucial—view of ordinary moral sentiments. Right off we meet our hero shrewdly commanding some other young military cadets in a wild, relentless snowball fight. Though short, the boys are nasty and brutish; most seem pleased to throw slush balls at some weakling's temple or themselves at a bully's feet. Back at the dormitory, they ignore the day's trials and openly resent Napoleon for his enigmatic superiority. The born leader tries to take them all on but at last suffers in defiant, dignified silence; in the glow of blue tint, he plots vindication and is comforted in his lovely loneliness only by a pet eagle whom Gance will routinely dispatch to the grown-up Bonaparte's shoulder during similar *contretemps*.

So much for origins. Returning after adolescence to his mother and native Corsica (both tinted amber), the passionately yet inexplicably Francophile Napoleon attempts to foil the machinations of the island's oligarchs who are trying to cut a deal with the English while France endures the political convulsions of Thermidor. Defeated but not daunted, Napoleon barely escapes his hunters and casts off for his spiritual homeland, the *tricolor* his sail, the eagle perched on his mast. The seas grow stormy and, like Medusa on the raft, our hero is tossed and tested; just as the leaders of the Girondins are pushed about by the Jacobin waves of riot that engulf the Convention and into which, in his only brilliant counterpoint, Gance spliced corresponding scenes of Napoleon at sea. Never has Gance implied, however, that Napoleon had been touched by the egalitarian Jacobin ideals that have brought the Convention to turmoil. Rather, we are impressed by Napoleon's taming of the ocean, and are made to expect that he will also tame the raging eyes of the assembly for the sake of a more cherished fate: France.

After returning him to it, Gance does not disappoint such expectations. To the strains of Carmine Coppola's now martial, now cloying score, our Corsican in Paris emerges from the indignities of "Revolutionary" incarceration to his first military posting and never misses a step. He then rises like a song to the challenge of the Toulon siege and the greater one posed by Josephine's erotic imagination. Finally, he leads a three-screened march into Italy at the head of an army made invincible by his inspiration. So there is not much plot to this epic history. At every turn Gance's Napoleon gains, if not by good luck (as when some buffoon swallowed the document ordering his execution), then by the force of magnetic bearing. Our hero relaxes, all opponents conspire; our hero glares, all cower and swear fealty. D. H. Lawrence called the latter surrendering to the "must" emanating from "men in whom you recognize the Holy Ghost."

So mechanistic a view of heroism may be a serious handicap when trying to do justice to Napoleon's life, or to dramatize any historical event for that matter. In fact, Gance's protagonist is a means to celebrate the wedding of eminence to absolute authority; the film-maker, more than the dictator, has proved to be equivocal about the moral foundations of the civil society that actually issued from Napoleonic order. Napoleon—the real one—despised the Terror because he endorsed and meant to extend the proprietary rights of citizenship, even to the Jew who, like any rational man, would presumably know what to do with them. Though full of himself, Napoleon did not—at least not yet—think dictatorship a political end in itself, and was more given to the scientific details of the old materialism than to the romance of power.

By contrast, Gance's Napoleon seems to agree with Robespierre and Saint-Just (played with panache by Gance himself) that the masses must be sheep or swine; our hero willingly takes the tyrants' ghostly benediction as he sets out for Italy. And as if to discredit the very pertinence of parliamentary disagreement and tolerance to the making of great history, Gance has Danton's ghost bless our hero in turn. So we think: this certificate of fitness is bestowed by the only character in the piece who might have felt at home in the Third Republic. Had Danton's ghost learned a lesson lost on Daladier and Blum?

Gance himself couldn't care less for Danton's actual claims against the *ancien régime*, for the third estate's lawyers and merchants, and seems taken instead with the perfected version of the old aristocracy preferred by Charles Maurras, the chauvinist leader of *Action Française*, which was important enough to have been condemned by the Pope while *Napoleon* was being made. Rather than to dabble in legal matters, Gance wants his Napoleon to force us free from what seem to him manifestations of our dark and dumb instincts to which the Revolution necessarily, but not exclusively, has given occasion. And what an occasion! Gance graphically demonstrates how, come the

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Revolution, liberty slip-slid into dizzy debauchery, equality into the war of all against all, and fraternity into the herd's betrayal of the rare, higher individual. Our hero's true mission, therefore, was to capture the prestige of the Revolution and turn it to saving more nearly human virtues.

This Napoleon accomplishes, inevitably, by exacting the militarist's discipline and faith. Now liberty can be made splendid by the galvanizing excitements of blood and fire, the unleashing of spirit following upon our alienation of will to the leader who embodies the General Will. Correspondingly, Gance has his Napoleon transform equality into the shared risk of armed struggle against the enemies of heroism; the equal chance to die glamorously, as Gance's soldiers regularly do, whispering the name of their commander who has conjured more authentic fraternity out of the passion of Frenchmen for each others' scent. Such is the fraternal unity confirmed by mobilization: the Revolution—the French Revolution—bursting its fetters into Empire.

SO THE STRENGTH of his Napoleon's comportment is not just an instrument of destiny but the unifying force of Gance's film. I suspect it is the nice way Gance seems to bring this off—the plausibility of his hero's "charisma"—that has started our film buffs raving about his technical ability. Gance's Napoleon is unforgettable; a convincing strongman who, like Alexander Nevsky, will have new incarnations in Hollywood. But, on second thought, how much cinematic skill has Gance had to bring to bear to portray this kind of intensity? With just a close-up, Leni Riefenstahl made Rudolf Hess's grinding jaw as indelible as Napoleon's stares, Hess, who had no more strength than Ryan O'Neal. It is rather the wit or quiet courage that redeem tragic vulnerabilities that are so difficult to convey in film: think of how much harder Charlie Chaplin had to work to subvert characters the screen would otherwise amplify, to set up a moment of compassion. So it was not Gance's technical ability—say, his good editing and novel camera mounts—that made *Napoleon* work. We may assume instead that Gance needed no more than competence as a film-maker to produce such a primitive moral vision.

When Gance does attempt something more ambitious than creating tableaus of stiff heroism—some of which derived directly from the paintings of David and Géricault: Marat in the tub, Napoleon on his white steed or posed like a trestle—he fails, and fails more completely to create some necessary evidence of heroic hubris. Napoleon's sentimental love for Josephine is, in Gance's hands, puerile: a perverse, stupid weakness that seems irrelevant to his career. But Gance symbolizes Napoleon's ostensible lust for power by having our hero embrace an earth-globe on which he finds Josephine's lips (somewhere over Austria, I think), a scene so long and false one wishes that Chaplin could break in with his own version of the dictator and the globe. True, there is much to approve in Gance's tinting and climatic triple-screen sequence. But these effects can hardly explain his film's popularity when cinerama and technicolor already seem anachronisms.

In fact, it is Gance's vision—not his image-making per se—that riveted most of the Boston audience with whom I saw the film several weeks ago. These people were cheering on the Holy Ghost, not—or not only—some old director's aesthetic imagination that, particularly in his case, should not be divorced from a corresponding political ideal; and they were obviously the more grateful to be doing so in a huge hall with thousands of others. Their cheers, it turns out, were the last Gance heard (by telephone) before dying, an ending he might have thought to invent.

Still, I am sorry we did not give Gance less credit on that night, and do ourselves more. What are we about in this country, after all, if so many of our audiences and reviewers can fail to notice—or feel too embarrassed to raise—Gance's violations of democratic sentiments? Is the film's fascination with winning personality, sexy power, Manichaean melodrama, and predatory violence at the heart of the matter, at least inasmuch as we casually absorb such cultural signals day after day, on television—on children's television—and in such popular recent films as *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, *Thief*, *Flash Gordon*, and what not? I suppose we are no more inclined to be cavalier about simple freedoms than were the French whom Gance tried to con. But we seem to be no less a bunch of suckers for fascist fantasy, an important conceit of which is, precisely, that society is best viewed as a technocracy of complementary parts that can be made to work more powerfully by leaders who know how to perform; that technical skill, in politics as in art, is our most precious virtue. The reception so many educated people have given to Gance's *Napoleon* suggests, I fear, that it is harder to be thrilled by the gradual emergence of many individuals from scientific and literary culture. □

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Noam Chomsky

"The Denial of the Dead"—A Response to Nadine Fresco

The topic of "denial of the dead" that Nadine Fresco addresses (*Dissent*, Fall 1981) is an important one. Examples abound. Thus Indonesia is now mounting still another military campaign in Timor in the course of aggression that has claimed the lives of over 100,000 people while creating conditions similar to those of Biafra and Cambodia. Timorese males aged 15–50 are being press-ganged into military service, leading church sources to predict that famine will recur with the threat of full-scale genocide. From 1975 on, the U.S. press effectively suppressed the massacre carried out with U.S. diplomatic support, with arms provided in an increasing flow by the Human Rights Administration in the certain knowledge that they would be used for these ends. Similar comments apply to France. Surely this is a striking example, still in process, of "denial of the dead."

There are many others like it. Such "denial of the dead" is systematic and widespread and involves the major ideological institutions of our society, a rather important fact, given our responsibility for death and suffering, which is not small, and our ability to help overcome such horrors, which is considerable—or would be, if it were not for the effectiveness of "the denial of the dead."

The general topic, then, is no doubt important. But Fresco confines herself to only one special case: the attempt by Robert Faurisson to deny the Nazi Holocaust. As she notes, Faurisson has his counterparts in the U.S., for example, Arthur Butz. Why then do we not find a spate of articles in U.S. journals on the 'Butz affair," which one might think would be more important here than the writings of an obscure professor at Lyons? Why do we find articles addressed to "those wishing to understand Faurisson's thought" (Fresco), but not to those wishing to understand Butz's thought? The reason for the lack of such articles seems plain. Who would be interested in understanding Butz's thought? And there is no "Butz affair," because he has not been driven from his position at Northwestern University by violence and brought to trial for "falsification of history."

In short, what makes the Faurisson affair different is not the need for readers of *Dissent* to "understand Faurisson's thought," but rather the civil libertarian issues that arise. But Fresco asserts that "If the Faurisson affair did not become a rights issue in France, it was for the simple reason that it wasn't one." True, Faurisson was "compelled, in May 1979, to request of the secretary of education a transfer to teaching correspondence courses" after being "lightly molested," and "the president of the university chose to suspend his classes," but this raises no issue of academic freedom. True, the French courts were "called upon to pass judgment" on his writings, but "it is important to emphasize that the Faurisson affair is not an issue of legal rights," in fact, there is no "rights issue" whatsoever in this affair.

In the same issue, an insert is headed: "Orwell, Thou Should'st be Living at This Hour."

Fresco adds one qualification: she states, in a footnote, that it was improper to refer the matter to the courts. My recollection is that this qualification did not appear in the French version of her article; it would be interesting to have a record of her public protests in France against the idea of a trial for "falsification of history." But we may put this question aside, and keep to her flat statement in the text that there is no "rights issue" in the Faurisson affair.

Others in France have seen the issue differently.

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The well-known historian Alfred Grosser writes: "I consider it shocking that M. Faurisson is prevented from teaching French literature at the University of Lyons on the pretext that his security cannot be assured. How many Communist professors have been excluded from teaching for having denied the existence of the Gulag? And Faurisson does not injure the survivors as the Communists have done. . . ." But it is true that in Fresco's circles, such attitudes are rare. Thus she cites an article by Jacques Baynac in the socialist *Le Matin*, omitting his critical conclusion: that it is wrong to "defend, in the name of freedom of expression, the right to mock the facts"—"facts" determined, one must assume, by some board of commissars that he will select.

The courts took Baynac's view. The judgment condemned Faurisson for failure of "responsibility" and "prudence" as a historian, and for "allowing others [!] to use his polemics" for nefarious ends. In a display of moral cowardice, the court claimed that it was not restricting the right of free expression, but only punishing Faurisson for availing himself of it. This shameful judgment accords to the state the right to determine official truth (despite the protestations of the court) and to punish those who "irresponsibly" deny it.

FOR FRESCO, none of this raises any question of "legal rights" or any "rights issue" whatsoever. That is what "it is important to emphasize." It is precisely here that we crucially disagree. But Fresco, like others in her circle, does not wish to engage this issue, not surprisingly. The remainder of her comments on my alleged role in this affair is mere bluster, designed to obscure this issue.

Fresco claims that I condemned the French intelligentsia, without qualification, as "totalitarian," and so on. It is common in her circles to interpret a criticism of them as a criticism of "all of the French intelligentsia" (Paul Thibaud). What I wrote, however, in my statement "Some Elementary Comments on the Right of Freedom of Expression," to which Fresco refers, is that my remarks were restricted to "certain segments of the French intelligentsia. . . . Certainly, what I say does not apply to many others, who maintain a firm commitment to intellectual integrity. . . . I would not want these comments to be misunderstood as applying beyond their specific scope."

Fresco complains that I "confuse everything" by reiterating my often-expressed views on the Holocaust, for example, that it was "the most fantastic outburst of collective insanity in human history." One can appreciate her annoyance. This is no doubt "confusing" to those who pretend that defense of Faurisson's rights entails defense of his views, a constant refrain in Fresco's circles.

She complains that I "confuse everything" still further by stating, in a transatlantic phone call that appeared in a somewhat garbled version in *Libération*, that "I don't know enough about his work to determine if what he is claiming is accurate or not." I then elaborated (the omission is indicated in the text by . . .) that I have no interest in Faurisson's work and feel no responsibility to become familiar with it merely because I defend his right to free expression, a trivially obvious point that is considered scandalous in Fresco's circles. I added the equally obvious point that no sane person would comment, say, on Faurisson's treatment of the Kremer diaries without having investigated what he has to say. There is nothing "confusing" in this, nor does it imply that I refuse to express a judgment on his conclusions with regard to the Holocaust, as Fresco insinuates; on the contrary, I have "confused" her by repeatedly expressing such a judgment in such terms as those cited above. All of this has long been in print.

I will not review Fresco's effort to distort my statement that "we don't want people to have religious or dogmatic beliefs about the Holocaust; we want them to know the facts" into some sort of support for Faurisson's theses. I elaborated further: "But it is not by silencing him that you prove that his theses are ill-founded. It is by using all the documents, all the testimony of witnesses now at our disposal—and God knows that they are not lacking—in order to produce an irrefutable denial" (of his theses; *Libération*). Probably a fairly accurate rendition of what I said, and not in the least "confusing," except to those who are trying to conceal their commitment to a form of the Zhdanov doctrine by impugning the motives of those who defend freedom of expression.

Fresco is disturbed by my use of the term "contempt." She refers to my statement that "I have frequently signed petitions—indeed, gone to far greater lengths—on behalf of Russian dissidents whose views are absolutely horrendous. . . . No one has ever raised an objection. Should someone have done so, I would regard this with the same contempt as is deserved by the behavior of those who denounce the petition in support of Faurisson's civil rights, and for exactly the same reason." I presume that Fresco shares this contempt for the commissars while not being too pleased at the fact—and fact it is—that the same principle applies to those

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she praises for condemning the petition in question as "scandalous" because support for the right of free expression was not coupled with a critical analysis of Faurisson's views (Pierre Vidal-Naquet). This principle would effectively undermine the defense of civil rights for people with unpopular or horrendous views, the most serious case. If one must first examine the views of such a person and assess them before supporting his rights, then few will feel qualified to join in such support. One who defends the civil rights of some person incurs no obligation to evaluate his views, or even to be acquainted with them. I elaborated on this point in a letter to *Democracy*, which the journal predictably refused to publish, responding to criticism, some of it mere slander, by Vidal-Naquet and Arno Mayer.

Fresco compares the above quote with a statement in which I noted that one should have contempt for a scientist who disregards the likely consequences of his work, for example, a Nazi scientist, or investigators of race and IQ—who certainly "allow others" (how could they avoid it?) to use their work for nefarious ends, and may therefore be punished by the state under the neo-Stalinist doctrine that Fresco claims raises no "rights issue." Frankly, her point about "contempt" escapes me. Perhaps it is that one should also view Faurisson with contempt. To this I have raised no objection. Rather, I have objected to his suspension from teaching under the threat of violence and to invoking the power of the state to punish those who are "irresponsible" in their treatment of historical fact.

FRESCO OBJECTS to my skepticism about Faurisson's contribution to the revival of anti-Semitism in France—skepticism shared by most if not all serious commentators in France, to my knowledge. My expressed view was that if his influence is as great as Fresco believes, the proper response is not to deny civil rights but to use the ample means available to combat it and "to seek the causes of these vicious developments and work to eliminate them." We can perhaps gain some insight into the factual question by considering the impact of Butz's writings on American society.

The petition that outrages Fresco was submitted to the court that was, in her phrase, "called upon to pass judgment" on Faurisson's writings. When I signed this petition circulated by Serge Thion (whom *Dissent* readers will recognize from his article published here), I assumed that that would be the end of the matter. Every additional statement of mine has been in response to deceit concerning my willingness to defend his right of free expression. In signing the petition I was not, as Fresco claims, an "innocent victim of a quasi-Pavlovian automatism," but rather was following an obvious principle from which I have never departed (contrary to lies in the press that I will not review): namely, that the right of free expression is not to be restricted to views of which we approve, to people who do not in our judgment "mock the facts." As for the repeated efforts to read into the petition some insidious content that is plainly not there, I will simply quote my "Elementary Comments": "I have little doubt that the commissars and apparatchiks have carefully perused these petitions [in support of dissidents], seeking out phrases that could be maliciously misinterpreted, in an effort to discredit these efforts to prevent the suppression of human rights."

I have taken far more controversial stands than this on the same principle, for example, in support of the right of people I regard as war criminals to teach or even to conduct counterinsurgency research, at a time when it was being used to murder and destroy. Since these stands evoked no protest, it follows that the uproar over my defense of Faurisson's rights is an exercise in hypocrisy, pure and simple.

This by no means exhausts the record of Fresco's misrepresentations. If anyone happens to be interested, I will gladly complete the story. Fresco writes that "Hitler would undoubtedly have been overjoyed" at the spectacle of the Paris trials—that is, at the spectacle of the resort to state power to punish the expression of views regarded with near unanimous revulsion, with a deceitful cover to try to obscure the plain facts—note that I have not discussed the scarcely less scandalous "libel" trials. I think she is right, but not for her reasons. To quote myself: "It is a poor service to the memory of the victims of the Holocaust to adopt a central doctrine of their murderers." □

NADINE FRESCO was sent a copy of this communication and felt that she had said all that she wanted to say and all that was necessary in her original article in our Fall 1981 issue. □

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Max Gordon

"Looking into El Salvador" —and Cuba

Irving Howe argues ("Looking into El Salvador," Summer 1981) that democratic socialists have no viable option in the El Salvador struggle since its likely outcome is either victory for oppressive military rule or Communist-led dictatorship.

Howe's premise is that the civilian-guerrilla coalition, headed by a social democrat, will not survive in case of victory and the democratic socialists will be eliminated. A sharply different prospect is offered by Pierre Schori, secretary of the Socialist International's special commission on Nicaragua and El Salvador, who is also the international secretary of the Swedish SDP. Schori writes, in the SI's bulletin *Socialist Affairs* (1/81), that he found both civilian and guerrilla leaders of the revolutionary coalition "unequivocal" in their commitment to the coalition's durability and confident of each other's readiness to honor that commitment. The guerrillas, he reports, were fully aware of the consequences of any coup attempt for postwar consolidation and recovery.

Interestingly, Schori observes that Castro "shares this attitude." The Cuban leader "knows better than anyone" the backlash effects that a coalition disruption would have on Latin American liberation struggles. According to Schori, Castro is arguably "a factor of moderation" in Central America.

Schori's views, of course, are not necessarily persuasive for Howe. But Howe's argument has another facet I'd like to address in some detail. In opposing support for the guerrilla forces, Howe dismisses in a surprisingly offhand manner the claim that left "totalitarian" regimes at least look after their people's material needs. The claim is shaky, he insists, after the 1980 exodus of 125,000 Cubans.

The sources of the exodus have been explored in detail and will be touched on below. Impoverishment was not one of them. But there are more direct ways of determining how well Cubans' material needs are met. Substantial firsthand testimony, including some from Socialist International sources, indicates that as a whole Cubans live far better than people in Latin American repressive societies.

Democratic socialists, I suggest, ought to be interested in how Cuba's non-capitalist society so close to home is working, what is wrong and what is right with it, what political changes it has undergone as a result of institutionalization in the past six years (they have been dramatic), how it differs from the U.S.S.R. (it does so significantly), the damage done by CIA-induced sabotage and the U.S. embargo, the dangers it faces from the Reagan administration, etc.

A relevant question is how democratic socialists perceive human rights. The U.S. establishment defines them solely in political and civil rights terms; it ignores economic and social rights. Democratic socialists, though presumably concerned with the struggle for economic rights, have tended to acquiesce in Washington's disregard of them as an aspect of human rights in Third World countries.

I was in Mexico early in 1977 when President Portillo told an international meeting that for most of humanity, guarantees of political and civil freedom are inadequate for the achievement of human rights. He insisted that the "guarantees of health services, education and work" are basic to human dignity. Portillo's embrace of Castro in defiance of Reagan may be partly due to the fact that Cuba offers its people precisely the guarantees he named.

Cuba is far from a socialist model, politically or economically. The material aid it gets from the Soviet Union limits its freedom of action in international affairs. Its highly centralized power structure, while effective in blocking the persistent CIA-induced subversion efforts to which Cuba has been subjected, has led to substantial abuses of political and civil rights. But a crucial point at issue here is its concern for the welfare of its people, as against the total absence of such concern by the oppressive autocracies that Washington embraces.

An article in *Socialist Affairs* (4/81) by Jean Ziegler, Swiss Social Democratic parliamentarian who visited Cuba recently, pleads for SI relations with Castro, who has invited them. He winds up his article:

> The Cuban revolutionaries have profoundly transformed their country: A wretched exploited people among whom famine, endemic diseases, illiteracy, humiliation and unemployment were rife has, in 22 years, become a proud, active people who are decently fed, housed and educated. Dire poverty has disappeared from Cuba. In that ocean of suffering which constitutes Latin America, Cuba is today an island of light.

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Ziegler warns of the danger of "insane aggression" against Cuba by the Reagan administration. Secretary of State Haig has indicated that the Administration is "studying" what to do about Castro, who is depicted as responsible for instigating all anti-U.S. liberation struggles in Latin America. Veteran *New York Times* correspondent Alan Riding has observed (Jan. 4, '81) that the real problem Cuba presents to Washington is the popularity of its example because of its attention to problems of hunger, illiteracy, and disease.

VARIOUS *TIMES* CORRESPONDENTS have confirmed Ziegler's brief description of current Cuban life. From Havana last year Kenneth Briggs wrote (April 26) that Cuba has become a Third World "showcase" for its "social services to its 10,000,000 citizens." Cubans appear "adequately fed, housed and employed, children receive a solid grounding in the three R's, along with a heavy dose of Marxist ideology." Health care progress is perhaps "the greatest source of pride among Cubans . . . clinics dot the country. Huge strides have been made in the battle to eradicate infectious diseases, infant mortality and deaths from cancer and heart disease." (A 1979 work on world health declares that while Cuba is economically a Lesser Developed Country [LDC], its levels of health care, health, and health systems "correspond to Developed Country standards.") By contrast, the *Times'* Warren Hoge (May 10) described Guatemala as a land with high infant mortality, primitive living conditions for all but the wealthy, and 80 percent illiteracy. Wealth is highly concentrated, and all groups and individuals seeking to ease the poverty are "targeted for elimination."

Conditions in Cuba and in democratic, oil-rich Venezuela showed similar contrasts in *Times* reports a few years ago. On April 20, 1977, Paul Montgomery wrote that Havana was a city ringed with dairy farms under intensive development to guarantee milk for schoolchildren, yogurt, and ice cream. He described food consumption, education, health and dental care in terms similar to those above. He added cheap transportation, housing with furniture that generally included refrigerator and TV set, and full employment.

From Caracas ten days later Juan de Onis wrote that crime and juvenile delinquency affecting the city were attributed by Venezuela's president to the "monstrous inequality" between rich and poor. "A third of the capital's 1.4 million people live in shantytowns on the hillsides that ring the modern concrete city," de Onis reported. He told of the "large number of abandoned children, mothers without child support." A textile worker told him that many found life there a "hell." They "cannot earn a living, so many children turn to crime."

Earlier that year, Alan Riding observed in the *Times* (Jan. 2): "Everywhere in Latin America, except Cuba, millions of rural inhabitants are still excluded from the economic and political lives of their countries." The difference, he noted, was that Cuba alone has carried through the agrarian revolution. The implication that only in Cuba is there wide rural participation in political life is significant, as discussed below.

Numerous statistics confirm the described living conditions in Cuba. Here are a few:

- A recent CIA publication, *The Cuban Economy: A Statistical Review,* compares income distribution in Cuba, the U.S., and eight other Latin American countries. Cuba's was far the most equitable. Income of the top 10 percent was 2½ times that of the bottom 20 percent. The U.S. was second; the gap between the top 10 percent and the bottom 20 percent was six times. The other countries exhibited much more inequality.
- The CIA publication cited life expectancy in Cuba in 1977 at 70 years, as against 73 in the U.S. (By 1980, it was almost 73 in Cuba.) The average for Lesser Developed Countries was 60; for Venezuela, it was 64.
- The same publication gave Cuba's infant mortality rate in 1977 as 25 per 1,000 live births; it was 15 in the U.S. Cuba's was the lowest in Latin America. (By 1980 it was 19.3 for Cuba, as against 19 for New York City and 40 for Harlem.)
- In 1976 the U.S. had one medical doctor for every 660 people; Cuba had one for every 650. The average for LDCs was one for 4470.
- Cuba's education progress is well-known. A startling 2,500,000 graduated in the 1976-80 period from elementary, junior and senior high schools, college, technical and teacher training schools, and the Worker-Farmer Adult Education Program. Of these, 62,700 completed college; 5,000 completed medical and dental schools.
- Some 2,500 Cuban health specialists and 3,500 educators are working as teachers and advisers in 20-odd underdeveloped countries.

IN DISPATCHES FROM HAVANA describing the exodus in 1980, *Times* reporter Jo Thomas wrote (April 27) that 21 years after the revolution Cuba "is a country where children wear shoes, go to school and have milk to drink, a country with good health and a standard of living the poor only dreamed of before." But "housing is crowded and scarce, food

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is rationed, clothing is expensive and difficult to obtain and even sewing needles are prized, and the government has called for more austerity and sacrifice." Cuba is still a Lesser Developed Country and, as in any such country, a section of the citizenry yearns for life in fabled America, especially if passage is available and settlement aid assured. Western diplomats estimated that about 200,000 Cubans wanted to emigrate (2 percent of the population). A week earlier Thomas described a march of "hundreds of thousands" in a demonstration "expressing contempt" for the emigrés. There was "no mistaking the crowd's energy or enthusiasm." According to Thomas, the exodus included many young people who do not remember prerevolutionary Cuba and say they want more of life's goodies. Appetites were stimulated by reports from Cuban-American visitors following the removal of barriers.

There is an added factor. In the past two years Cuba has been hit by blights decimating sugar, coffee, and tobacco crops, while African swine fever has been destroying hog herds—an unprecedented combination of calamities. Charges of sabotage have been muted apparently because hard evidence is lacking. But U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee testimony in 1977 traced to CIA operatives an epidemic of swine fever that destroyed 500,000 pigs in 1971. This poses a political problem. Cuba is surely not the open democratic society envisioned by democratic socialists. Guatemala in 1954, Brazil in 1964, and Chile in 1973 were open democratic societies. With U.S. wealth and power behind it, the CIA had little trouble engineering their overthrow and replacing them with brutal military dictatorships. We now know of the many CIA attempts to assassinate Castro and to penetrate Cuba with thousands of agents for sabotage and subversion. While lack of democratic guarantees has led to substantial power abuse, could Cuba—or any regime trying to prevent or limit U.S. corporate exploitation of its economy—defend itself effectively against U.S.-backed subversion without tight security methods that tend to limit civil liberties?

Cuba's political system, institutionalized during the past seven years, is now based on popular election of Municipal Assemblies. It merits study by democratic socialists, many of whom dismiss it offhand as aping Moscow. The differences, however, are substantial. Single candidacies are barred, for example, and the Communist party is prohibited from interfering in elections. (Whether consciously or not, the electoral system "apes" the Paris Commune of 1871.)

Popular public activities through constitutionally mandated mass organizations are enormous. Herbert Matthews, one-time chief *Times* foreign correspondent and later an editorial board member, wrote in a 1975 study, *Revolution in Cuba* (p. 15), that the 4 million-member Committees for the Defense of the Revolution provided—

> a remarkable mass base for [Cuba's] Revolution. Everyone . . . participates in the Cuban Revolution. Fidel gets a consensus that is not democracy Western-style, but it is surely some kind of democracy. It is a kind, of course, that has nothing to do with civil liberties, but we are talking here of a consensus of the people in the processes of government.

I have dealt with Cuba in such detail not only to demonstrate that democratic socialists do have a basis for choice between El Salvador's revolutionary guerrillas—even if they should follow a Castro-type course—and the military oppressors, and not only to indicate the absurdity of the Reagan-Kirkpatrick thesis that "totalitarian" regimes like Castro's are worse for their people than the "authoritarian" oligarchies. My aim is to encourage democratic socialists to look more closely at the Cuban experience, and its significance for Latin America, as it really is, and not as Washington has sought to depict it. This could be crucial as Cuba continues to give political, moral, and civil support to freedom struggles in oppressive dictatorial regimes, as all revolutionary forces move toward unity in these freedom struggles and as Washington attempts Cuba's destruction. □

JOSEPH CLARK Replies

Of the quest for utopia there is no end. For my friend and former *Daily Worker* colleague Max Gordon, the Soviet and Chinese utopias dissolved, the former with Khrushchev's secret report and the Gulag Archipelago, the latter with the madness and murders of "the great proletarian cultural revolution." Somehow, Cuba survives in Mac's mind with at least some aspects of economic achievement and, more miraculous, democracy. Mac advises us that the Cuban version of democracy "merits study by democratic socialists."

Before presenting the fruits of my study I would suggest to Mac that he reread some of his (and my)

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mercifully forgotten writings about the Soviet Union and China. They are suspiciously similar to his present contentions about Cuba. This is true especially about the "economic rights" the Cubans have won but that are absent in democratic countries. After studying the subject, I came up with a finding quite different from Mac's: without human rights there can be no democracy and no socialism. Surely after the heroic struggles of the Polish workers for the right to organize free trade unions and the suppression of Solidarity, the connection between democracy and human rights should be clear to anyone, democratic socialist or not. The Cuban Communists know this very well. That is why they have supported the Soviet attack upon Solidarity and hailed the suppression of the Polish trade unionists.

When the horrors of the Moscow trials and mass executions of the 1930s in the Soviet Union were reported in the "capitalist" press, Mac (and I) countered with . . . the achievements of the Five-Year Plan. Years passed, came Khrushchev and his revelations that torture had been substituted for judicial procedure in the Soviet Union. But that Soviet leader also disclosed something about Soviet economic "achievements." In 1954 Khrushchev reported that with a population some 30 percent greater than that of Czarish Russia in 1916, there was more livestock—cattle, pigs, sheep—and more food in the Russia of 1916 than in the Soviet Union after the triumph of "socialism." (I place quotes around socialism as it pertains to the Communist countries because the study Mac urged me to undertake led me to conclude that there can be no socialism without democracy.)

MAC IS DISMAYED at Irving Howe for dismissing "in a surprisingly offhand manner the claim that left 'totalitarian' regimes at least look after their people's material needs." Mac rejects Howe's suggestion that this is indicated by the 1980 exodus of 125,000 Cubans. There's a real Freudian slip when Mac puts quotes around the word "totalitarian." Howe had written about left *authoritarian* regimes that didn't provide for the material needs of their people, besides violating human rights. By reading the word as "totalitarian" and gracing it with quotes Mac managed to convey his skepticism about the concept.

Mac argues that in a less-developed country such as Cuba a small section of the citizenry yearns for life in the fabled U.S. and leaves when given the opportunity, as in 1980. (Prior to the exodus of the 125,000, previous flights brought nearly 1 million Cubans to our shores; the total population of Cuba is barely 10 million.) Mac pays scant heed to the Cuban press, which repeated *ad nauseam* that only antisocial elements, "scum of the earth," were leaving. But the Cuban Communists finally admitted that conditions in Cuba were producing the exodus. The May 19, 1980 *Granma*, organ of the Central Committee of the Cuban CP, said publicly for the first time: "The socioeconomic conditions of our country still, disgracefully, engender 'lumpen' and also engender emigration."

Mac quotes *New York Times* correspondent Jo Thomas on some of the advances made in Cuba. She does indeed present a balanced picture of progress as well as failures. What has eluded Mac in his reading of the Thomas dispatches is that she addresses the very matter raised by Howe: that the Cuban exodus was a consequence, among other factors, of the failure of left authoritarian regimes to take care of the material needs of their people. Thomas wrote (*New York Times*, June 8, 1980): "Emigration, as in the past years, is serving as a safety valve. Cuba is exporting its dissidents and its unemployed as well as some of the inhabitants of its jails. In general, youths of military age and Cubans with university degrees may not leave. By exporting people, Cuba is also alleviating consumer demand."

Thomas notes that "when the last refugee boat leaves the port of Mariel, President Castro will still have problems with foreign exchange, shortages and unemployment." Alert to the nuggets of fact among the endless words in a Castro speech, Thomas quotes Castro as declaring that Cuba is adrift not just in a "river of troubles." The Maximum Leader explained, "It would be better to say that we are sailing in a sea of difficulties and the shore is far away." Jo Thomas decribes some of the refugees and their comments: "The people who swarmed to the Peruvian embassy clamoring for a better life compared their lot with that of the exiles returning on tours from Miami. Some pointed out that although Cuba grows citrus, it is difficult to find an orange or a lime in Havana." Others fleeing their country complained that while Cuba was building installations in various foreign countries, there was "a housing shortage at home."

Most of the 1980 refugees were working people; a high percentage was black; there were many young people, others middle-aged and older—all in all a fair cross section of people who grew up in 21 years of the regime. But Castro managed a mean kind of revenge. He prevented many relatives of refugees already in the U.S. from leaving and compelled the boat captains to take common criminals, some sick people, even several suffering from

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leprosy; also a considerable number of homosexuals. (The silence of some defenders of gay rights in our country about gays' persecution in Cuba has been deafening.) The Castro regime sometimes denies that it persecutes homosexuals, but its propaganda about the 1980 exodus belied such claims. Thus the April 20, 1980 *Granma* displays a photo of a 17-year-old as a hero. He had fled from his parents at the Peruvian embassy and *Granma* proudly quotes his revolutionary declaration, "when I found myself with those people, all those homosexuals, bullies and criminals," he realized that he was a revolutionary.

Mac does concede difficulties in the Cuban economy but he attributes some of these to the American embargo, which is real; incredibly, he revives the KGB propaganda of the Korean War that American germ warfare is responsible for Cuba's swine flu and other livestock diseases. Even as to the embargo, Mac might have quoted Raul Castro, the dictator's brother who on November 30, 1979 said that the embargo has been used "as an excuse to hide our deficiencies and inefficiencies." Raul Castro admitted (*Granma*, April 6, 1980) that people lacked the necessities of life because they couldn't afford to buy them abroad, and therefore "our country is facing serious restrictions." Raul called for eradicating "the most important and deforming causes of the manifestations of work and administrative negligence and lack of discipline." Earlier the president of the Cuban central planning board, Humberto Perez, reported (*Granma*, Jan. 6, 1980) that the country was falling behind its plan and there was an "unfavorable economic situation throughout the period." He urged "severe measures against negligence, apathy, indolence and irresponsibility."

THOUGH THERE MIGHT BE some argument as to whether Cuba is authoritarian or totalitarian, the medicine that Raul Castro prescribed for its economic ills (*Granma*, Feb. 10, 1980) is totalitarian: "intransigence against all that implies the slightest departure from revolutionary principles, neglect of duty, and tolerance of deviant attitudes and behavior."

The World Bank, according to an article in the *New Republic* (Dec. 30, 1981), reported that "Cuba's per capita GNP is smaller now than it was under Batista." An even more startling fact is cited by Sovietologist Jiri Valenta: "in 1980, for the first time in its history, Cuba . . . had to import a large quantity of sugar." This happened even though Soviet advisers campaigning for what they called a "division of labor" among the "socialist" countries had persuaded the Cubans to resort to that old colonial vice—monoculture. While racing toward a goal of a 10 million-ton sugar harvest in 1970, the Cuban Communists managed to wreck the rice cultivation that had been increasing to the point where Cuba once was practically self-sufficient in that basic grain. Need one add that sugar cultivation never reached within 2 million tons of its 1970 goal and rarely matched the peaks of sugar production under Batista. (For a detailed account of the economic disasters inflicted on Cuba by Castro, Mac could do worse than refer to my article "Thus Spake Fidel Castro," *Dissent*, Jan.-Feb., 1970).

The Batista dictatorship was a rotten regime, its overthrow an urgent necessity. That should not, however, preclude accurate comparisons of the economy before and after, or even in matters of education and literacy. One of the true achievements of the Cuban regime is the near elimination of illiteracy. But if adherents of Cuban communism abroad are asked what percentage of the Cuban population was illiterate before Castro, you might get some imaginative responses. Maurice Halperin, who lived and taught in Castro's Cuba for years, bothers to make such comparisons. Halperin notes that three-quarters of all Cubans were literate before Castro came to power. His recent book (*The Taming of Fidel Castro*, Berkeley, 1981) points out that Cuba "was not a typically underdeveloped or Third World country, a misconception which Castro later assiduously promoted as a justification for the poor economic performance of his regime." Nearly 60 percent of the population under the old regime was urban.

Halperin tells the dramatic story of the sociologists Oscar and Ruth Lewis in Cuba. Castro gave them his solemn promise that they could conduct a study in Cuba, unhampered and uncensored. That promise was broken, but not before some fascinating data had been amassed. The reason Castro double-crossed the Lewises is evident in their interviews that were later cited by Halperin. Amalia, a slum-dweller, is quoted in Halperin's book: "I won't say that I ate any better before the Revolution, but I didn't eat badly in those days. . . . You could vary your meals. . . . Now I buy whatever food we have in the ration book. . . . The clothes shortage is as much of a problem as the food shortage." Alfredo, another former slum-dweller, is also quoted: "Today the worst problem our country faces is the food shortage. . . . At least now people can get their fair share of whatever there is. Still we don't eat as well now as we did before the Revolution."

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When Irving Howe received Max Gordon's response, he said that his own reply to Mac would be: What good is anything without freedom? Mac cites the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and municipal elections, with multiple candidates, as proof of democracy. A little further study might have enabled Mac to discover that the brutal beatings of people who tried to get into the Peruvian embassy, but failed, was the work of these Committees. He would learn that, as in China and the Soviet Union, the Committees constitute a gigantic network of informers. No Communist regime can exist without systematic informing against neighbors. This type of participatory "democracy" reached its highest form of organization under Stalin. As to municipal or any other kind of elections, I recall a test the late David Spitz suggested for the democratic claims of any regime: ask where the head of the opposition party is, in an office or a jail?

In all the study I've been conducting on the advice of Max Gordon, I've discovered no opposition—that is, no legal opposition. Nor have I discovered an instance in the last 23 years of anyone who publicly criticized Fidel or Raul. There is no record of a single strike, though workers admittedly have grievances. In the earlier years of the Castro regime there were entertaining examples of Castro's criticism of Soviet communism. For example, he attacked the Soviets for removing the nuclear missiles from Cuba. For a time he allowed diplomatic relations with Israel. All that is in the past. No one exceeds Castro in his condemnation of Zionism. There is not a single Soviet diplomatic move that doesn't get a chorus of approval from the entire Cuban press. In a speech to a congress of journalists (March 29, 1980) General of the Army Raul, as he is always referred to, explained the single most important concept of Cuban journalism: *"In the first place, we should underline again that in our country bourgeois so-called freedom of the press has died its death."*

That workers would be deprived of freedom under Castro was soon made clear. After the overthrow of Batista, David Salvador was elected head of the trade union organization. Salvador had been leader of the anti-Batista rebellion in Havana, so when Castro came down from the mountains the city was already liberated. Salvador believed Castro when he promised, before the seizure of power, that there would be democracy, free elections, and freedom. When Castro embarked on the path of Communist dictatorship, Salvador opposed it. For this he was not only removed from trade union leadership but sentenced to a 20-year jail sentence. Salvador was finally released three years ago. Huber Matos, another hero of the revolution against Batista, met a similar fate. Early on when Castro made it clear that dictatorship and not democracy would be his course, Matos made a simple request, that he be allowed to withdraw from politics and return to teaching. That "crime" was punished with a 20-year prison sentence under unspeakable conditions.

BEARING IN MIND the nature of the "crimes" of Salvador and Matos, we read Max Gordon's question: "While lack of democratic guarantees has led to substantial power abuse, could Cuba—or any regime trying to prevent or limit U.S. corporate exploitation of its economy—defend itself effectively against U.S.-backed subversion without tight security methods that tend to limit civil liberties?" They were arrested and tortured by Castro *before* the U.S. break with Cuba and before the embargo!

Finally, Mac's quaint phrase "security methods that tend to limit civil liberties." Among the rather special targets of Castro's concentration camps, prisons, and torturers have been the poets. Reinaldo Arenas's novels and poems won him plaudits in the earlier years of Castro. He was one of 125,000 "antisocial" elements who came to this country in 1980. In an interview for *Encounter* (Jan. 1982) Arenas explains why he was allowed out of confinement: "Because I admitted my 'errors,' . . . the regime considered me a broken reed. It's true I'm no hero. Nothing like a man like Armando Valladares. . . . The poet Armando Valladares has been in jail since December 27, 1960, and he's been treated so brutally that he is now paralyzed in both legs."

The imprisonment of the poet Heberto Padilla became a concern of those intellectuals who had for long argued that Castro's communism was "different." But when Padilla "won" his freedom only with a Stalin-type confession, which included urging his wife to adopt "proper" viewpoints in her writing, friends of the Castro regime the world over began to see the deadly similarities with other Communist societies.

About 11 years ago, for a year's duration I was the accidental recipient of streams of propaganda material from Cuba, including the "Intercontinental" magazine. Mainly this consisted of advice to young peple to pick up the gun, prepare the bombs, and to wage a new kind of revolutionary struggle—urban guerrilla warfare. It was crude, semiliterate pamphleteering. It was incredible that anyone, young or old, could take this advice seriously. But there were a few who did. □

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Maurice Isserman

The Erlich-Alter Case and the Solidarity Movement

Moscow, Sept. 27, 1941

Sweetest Zosia, dearest children! I embrace you warmly—all of you together and each of you separately! Is it possible that I am writing to you again? What is incredible is the sudden and drastic change in my situation—a shift from a death row cell to Metropole Hotel and red-carpet treatment, from a contemptible charge leveled against me and Victor to the current wooing—all this is altogether fantastic, fairy-tale like!

Forty years ago Henryk Erlich, an internationally famous leader of the General Jewish Workers' Bund, the Jewish socialist party in Poland, wrote these words to his family from Moscow. It was his first opportunity to write to them since his arrest in 1939 by the NKVD, the Soviet secret police (Erlich's wife and two sons managed to escape from Nazi- and Soviet-occupied Poland and find refuge in North America in the interim). The letter turned out to be the last he was ever able to send to them. Just over two months later, on December 4, 1941, Henryk Erlich and Victor Alter, his close associate in the Bund's leadership, were rearrested. The Soviet government maintained a grim silence about their fate for the next 14 months, ignoring repeated queries by Western labor and socialist leaders. This silence was finally broken in late February 1943 by Maxim Litvinov, Soviet ambassador to the United States. In response to a letter from William Green, president of the American Federation of Labor, Litvinov announced that Erlich and Alter had been executed the previous December. The two Bund leaders, according to Litvinov, had used their brief period of freedom in 1941 to undermine Soviet resistance to the Nazis by appealing to Red Army soldiers "to stop bloodshed and immediately [make] peace with Germany."

From August 1980 through mid-December 1981, Polish workers waged an open (and for a while, it appeared, successful) struggle to reshape the country's political and economic life, moving away from the authoritarianism of the Soviet-imposed system into a democratic and independent socialism.[1] Part of this struggle was the effort to regain control of the nation's past. When the Gdansk shipyard workers struck in August 1980, one of their central demands was the construction of a monument honoring their comrades slain in the 1970 strike. In August 1981 large crowds turned out to observe the anniversary of the 1944 Warsaw uprising against the Nazis. Solidarity, the independent trade union that was at the center of Poland's recent political ferment, distributed leaflets citing the 1944 uprising as evidence that Poles "do not need anyone to give them lessons in . . . what it means to sacrifice for values more precious than life."

There is no General Jewish Workers' Bund in Poland today, and there are few memories of its existence. The Bund's constituency, the three and a half million Jews who lived in Poland between the two world wars, was annihilated in the Holocaust. Lech Walesa and most of Solidarity's leaders are devout Catholics who draw their inspiration from the Polish Catholic Church's long struggle for survival under Russian domination. Victor Erlich, Henryk Erlich's younger son (who is now a professor of Russian literature at Yale University), told

[1] The word "socialism" has suffered in Polish esteem from its long association with the Soviet model. But, seen from the outside, Solidarity's program of decentralized economic decision-making by workers' councils, and the freer political expression and action bore a striking resemblance to what is known in the West as democratic socialism.

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me in a recent interview that "it is a fair assumption that Walesa has never heard of Erlich and Alter, and has no knowledge of the Bundist tradition." But, he added, there are striking similarities between the vision of an independent democratic socialist Poland sought by the Bund in the 1920s and 1930s, and the goals that the Solidarity movement set out to accomplish. Erlich and Alter, like the 1944 insurgents, and like the members of the now suppressed Solidarity movement, knew what it meant "to sacrifice for values more precious than life."

In 1943 Soviet authorities probably did not expect their grotesque accusation against Erlich and Alter to be believed. But this was a time when Western politicians, military leaders, businessmen, and editorialists vied with one another to see who could offer the most praise of Soviet military valor. Stalin, who undoubtedly had final say on the decision to reveal Erlich's and Alter's deaths, simply assumed that in the aftermath of the battle of Stalingrad the fate of two Jewish socialists would have little effect on Soviet relations with its allies.

Erlich was no stranger to Russian jails. As a leader of the Bund organization in Poland and Russia and as its representative in the Central Committee of the Menshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic party, he had faced constant harassment by the Czar's secret police, and was arrested four times between 1902 and 1911. Alter, a few years younger than Erlich, had also put in a long apprenticeship in the underground struggle, suffering his first arrest at the age of fifteen. When the Czar was overthrown in the revolution of February 1917 Erlich was elected one of the leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. He had opposed the Czarist regime as a socialist, as a Jew, and as a Pole: in the spring of 1917 he brought the first resolution before the Petrograd Soviet calling for the establishment of an independent Polish state. After Lenin's Bolshevik party seized control of the revolution, Erlich left Russia for his native country.

OVER THE NEXT TWO DECADES, Erlich and Alter became well-known political leaders in Poland. Their names were closely linked. Both came from well-to-do backgrounds. Both sacrificed comfortable careers—Erlich had been trained as a lawyer and Alter as an engineer—to devote their lives to the hard-pressed Jewish labor movement. They complemented each other well in leadership. Erlich was the more steady, cautious leader, standing somewhat to the left-of-center in the Bund's internal debates but always valuing the unity of the movement over sharp ideological distinctions. In this respect he played a role in the Bund analogous to the one Eugene Debs played in the pre-World War I American socialist movement. A photograph reprinted in Lucjan Dobroszycki's and Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett's photographic history of Jewish life in Poland, *Image Before My Eyes*, shows Erlich standing erect, distinguished, and conservatively dressed, looking somewhat sadly out over a large crowd gathered at a Bund demonstration in May 1933.

Alter was the more flamboyant leader, more volatile in personal style, and a more restless thinker. In the 1930s he grew increasingly dissatisfied with the economic determinism then dominating Marxist thought. He criticized the fetishism of centralized planning in the Soviet economy, and offered a vision of a transition to socialism in which socialized and private sectors of the economy would coexist for many years. He believed that such policies, coupled with a militant stand against the powers-that-be, could help mobilize the "in-between" classes around the working class in the struggle against capitalism. Both Erlich and Alter took great satisfaction in the Bund's increasing support among almost all sections of the Jewish community: in Poland's last prewar elections, the 1938 city council races, the Bund's candidates won a clear majority of the Jewish vote.

Erlich and Alter were outspoken opponents of the Bolsheviks' suppression of democratic rights in Russia. But they also opposed the allied intervention in Russia in 1918–20. Throughout the 1930s they campaigned for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies in a common defense against fascism. When the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939 and when the Polish government announced that Warsaw would not be defended, they left for eastern Poland to continue the struggle. But Stalin, who sent the Red Army into eastern Poland later that month, had his own plans for the region's political future. Erlich and Alter, along with many other Polish political leaders, were quickly rounded up by the NKVD.

The Bund's leaders spent most of the next two years in the Butyrki prison in Moscow, an NKVD interrogation center. Their jailers wanted them to confess to being Polish spies. Erlich's interrogation was a matter of high priority, and on one occasion he had the dubious privilege of being questioned by Lavrenti Beria, the head of the NKVD. Stalin may have had another show trial in mind, similar to the spectacles of the late 1930s that claimed the lives of so many old Bolsheviks.

Erlich, writing to his family after his release in

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September 1941, told them of this period: "I prepared myself for the worst (I never viewed death as the worst) and tried to gather my forces, to marshal all the strength to resist I could muster . . . I thought that I must leave to you an unsullied name and this bolstered my conviction that I would hold out." Neither Erlich nor Alter would supply the desired confessions: instead of a public show trial, they were sentenced to die in secret hearings before a military tribunal in July 1941.

Then, as Erlich reported to his family, the "fantastic" happened. The Germans attacked the Soviet Union on June 22. The Red Army, caught by surprise, fell back in disorder. Stalin, desperate for military aid from the West, mended as many fences as he could with old adversaries, including the London-based Polish government-in-exile. As a goodwill gesture he arranged a general amnesty for Polish political prisoners in the U.S.S.R.

In mid-September Erlich and Alter suddenly found themselves free men. Not only that, they were now approached by their former jailers and asked to organize an international committee to mobilize Jewish public opinion and financial resources in the West to aid the Soviet war effort. Erlich and Alter agreed that the war against Hitler had to take priority over old disputes, though they entertained no illusions about the sudden generosity of their hosts. "The NKVD representatives dance attendance upon us," Erlich wrote to Bund leaders in New York in September. "This is because they hope to use our connections in America. We, for our part, want to make use of them in order to establish contacts with Poland." In meetings with Soviet officials they drew up plans for a Jewish antifascist committee, with Erlich slated to serve as chairman and Alter as secretary. There was talk of sending Erlich to the United States and Alter to London on goodwill missions. Erlich suggested to his wife that she prepare to leave Montreal. "In the none too distant future," he wrote in September, "I may find myself in North America, in which case my natural residence will be New York."

But Erlich's and Alter's position was growing more precarious daily. In October the Germans were halted before Moscow. In late November the Red Army captured Rostov and prepared to take the offensive on the Moscow front. Stalin, no longer fearing imminent military defeat, once more turned his attention to the question of the future political complexion of the countries on the Soviet Western frontier. Poland was the key to his plans for the postwar settlement. Whatever benefits he could expect to gain in the short run by making use of Erlich's and Alter's prestige would be canceled out in the long run if they were around to challenge his policies in Poland after the war. Stalin took the long view. Erlich and Alter, along with many high Soviet officials, were evacuated from Moscow in mid-October, taking up residence in the temporary Soviet capital of Kuibyshev. There, shortly after midnight on December 4, they were summoned to a meeting with an NKVD official, ostensibly to discuss plans for the antifascist committee. They never returned. News of their disappearance reached the United States a few weeks later, but nothing more could be learned of their fate until Litvinov's announcement.[2]

In the weeks following Litvinov's announcement, the Erlich-Alter case briefly became a *cause célèbre* in the United States—the first time since June 1941 that the Soviet Union came under sustained public criticism from liberals in the West. The *New Republic*, an enthusiastic advocate of Soviet-American cooperation, declared in March: "The announcement of the deaths of Erlich and Alter should take the scales from our eyes." The heroism of the Soviet resistance to nazism was admirable, but had not changed the undemocratic character of Stalin's regime. This left liberals in the West with a difficult task. As the *New Republic* now saw things, they "should neither praise the Soviet Union uncritically nor scream against it," since the former would turn them into apologists for crimes like the Erlich-Alter execution, and the latter would lend ammunition to those who hoped to use anti-Soviet sentiments to push through a reactionary agenda in American foreign and domestic policies.

As Hitler, at the time, was still master of most of Europe, the Soviet Union doing most of the fighting against the Nazis, and the final outcome of the war was as yet still in doubt, it is not surprising that this middle road proved elusive. President Roosevelt and Vice-President Wallace, the supreme arbiters of liberal opinion in 1943, remained silent about the Erlich-Alter executions, unwilling to take a stand that might jeopardize the fragile anti-Hitler coalition. Two weeks after their initial expression of outrage, the editors of the *New Republic* significantly softened their earlier protest, cautioning

[2] Litvinov dated the executions as taking place in December 1942. Several weeks after his announcement the Soviet Embassy in Washington let it be known that a cable from Moscow had been incorrectly decoded, and that the actual date of Erlich's and Alter's deaths was December 1941.

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that the controversy should not be allowed to cast a shadow over future Soviet-American relations. Citing the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti in Massachusetts in 1927, they concluded: "All the chief United Nations have sins on their conscience like the Erlich-Alter case." Despite protest meetings organized by some prominent union leaders in the United States, within a few weeks the Erlich-Alter affair dropped out of the headlines.

IN POSTWAR POLAND, the new Communist government saw to it that memories of the earlier democratic socialist tradition, as represented by the Bund and the Polish Socialist party, were suppressed. Erlich and Alter became non-persons (although there was one article published in Poland, shortly after Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization" speech to the Soviet Communist party's 20th Congress in 1956, calling for the posthumous rehabilitation of the Bund's leaders). Victor Erlich argues that Stalin, "for all his cynicism, did not discount the power of ideas." Erlich and Alter had to be killed because they were spokesmen and symbols for an alternative vision of what a socialist Poland could look like. The emergence of Solidarity, Victor Erlich believes, cheated Stalin of his victory. "It would be misleading to claim that Henryk Erlich's and Victor Alter's legacy, in a direct sense, goes marching on in Poland today. What does march on are some of the larger concerns, democracy and independence, with which they were associated. Stalin was not able to kill off these ideas by killing Erlich and Alter."

Poland is once again ruled by the bayonet. The movement for workers' rights has been dispersed. But if the events of 1956, 1970, and 1980–81 are any indication, the country's present rulers should beware of overconfidence. Someday, in a democratic and socialist Poland, the names of Solidarity's leaders—and perhaps of Erlich and Alter—will be honored long after those of Gomulka, Gierek, and Jaruzelski have been forgotten. □

We are pleased to announce that

PETER STEINFELS

editor of *Commonweal* and author of
The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing American Politics

has joined our Editorial Board.

Walter L. Adamson

Italian Communists and the Gramscian Traditions

> These [Social Democratic] parties have lost power in Britain and risk losing it in Germany; indeed, they have lost ground more or less everywhere and, in several countries . . . suffer from internal divisions and cleavages. This shows that in and by themselves, the Social Democratic parties are not even capable of providing an effective dike against conservative and reactionary comebacks, let alone of building solutions that move in the direction of socialism. . . . And yet here in Italy, we have . . . people . . . who continue undaunted to urge us to become a Social Democratic party. . . .

So remarked Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the Italian Communist party (Partito Comunista Italiano—PCI), in a recent report to its Central Committee. Yet the casual reader of the rest of his report might be forgiven for not having divined this antipathy. For while one reads, for example, about the importance of Italian participation in the European Economic Community, about the "major moments" in recent "parliamentary life," "the youth question," and "welfare and pension policy," nowhere does one find any discussion of such traditional Communist policies as the nationalization of industry, centralized economic planning, or a "dictatorship of the proletariat." Even the critique of social democracy is voiced in terms of its political weaknesses and recent strategic defeats rather than for its intrinsic undesirability. And those references we find to a more than social democratic politics tend neither to be very thoroughgoing nor very precise. We read only that Communists struggle for "far-reaching" reforms and that they hold fast to "the goals of transformation."

Despite this evidence, and much more that could be cited, I wish to suggest that Berlinguer's claim to be leading something other than a social democratic party makes sense in terms of his party's unique historical tradition. Born in 1921, after three years of the most intense revolutionary activity Italy (and Europe) experienced in this century, the PCI had to switch almost immediately to a defensive struggle against fascism. This two-sided experience made a deep and lasting impact on its collective outlook.

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NOWHERE IS THIS more evident than in the theory of revolution developed by Antonio Gramsci, the PCI's major theoretician and its leader from 1924 until his arrest and imprisonment by Mussolini in October 1926.

Gramsci, who spent most of 1922 and all of 1923 in Russia as the PCI's representative to the Communist International, began to outline his theory by early 1924. The failure of Western revolutions after the war, he argued, was connected to their tendency to ape the Bolshevik model. This model had worked in Russia, which was politically underdeveloped, but it would not work in Central and Western Europe, where the much more complex and massive "political superstructures created by the greater development of capitalism . . . make the action of the masses slower and more prudent and therefore require . . . a strategy and tactics altogether more complex and long-term." A proper strategy here would necessarily be predicated on a slow wearing-down of those superstructures. Such a strategy would mean building socialist institutions in the present (like the workers' councils of Turin in 1919–20), and it would also have to incorporate a cautious, realist dimension of class alliance and compromise, of political accommodation and restraint. Gramsci saw the latter dimension as dominant in the short term; the other would emerge as significant only very much later, after a long period of cultural and political incubation.

Whatever the differences between the Italy and the PCI of the early Fascist and of our own era—and they are obviously substantial—this Gramscian image of "Western revolution" remains the central ideological element of Italian communism. The image is, of course, subject to different interpretations by the various PCI factions, but more than anything else it is also what holds them together.

WITHIN THIS BROAD, tension-filled, and temporally vague perspective, we may distinguish two major tendencies. I would designate as "Gramscians of the right" those, like the late Giorgio Amendola, who insist on broad-based electoral and ruling coalitions as the major avenue open for the formation of alliances among all sectors of the popular masses, and who stress the need for the social and economic stabilization of Italy prior to "reforms" of any sort. The contemporary "Gramscians of the left," on the other hand, are those like Pietro Ingrao and Bruno Trentin, as well as the leaders of parties to the left of the PCI, like Lucio Magri, whose politics remain significantly informed by the 1919–20 experience. Like the Gramsci of those years, they insist in principle on a strong counterhegemonic thrust through institutions—workers' councils, cooperatives, cultural associations—in which new political and cultural modes can be actively spawned and nurtured. Though even the most radical among them lowered their sights in the 1970s, they all agree that to ignore base-building entirely, in favor of establishing broad-based electoral coalitions, would be to incorporate the left into the existing hegemony and to impair perception of what is distinctive about a socialist alternative.

For a long time after Gramsci's arrest and imprisonment no such left/right division was apparent. During the first three decades of Palmiro Togliatti's tenure as chairman, the need for a defensive strategy was so readily evident that questions about the PCI's program seldom required hard answers. And since Togliatti did not share Gramsci's doubts about the course of Soviet internal and foreign policy after 1928, when the question of "what socialism really means" did arise, it could be answered with a nod in the direction of the Soviet Union. All this changed with Togliatti's denunciation of the Soviet party after its Twentieth Congress in 1956. Deprived of all the easy answers that a pro-Soviet policy allowed, the party split along left/right lines.

The two paths were not equally easy to defend. Questioned as to what they meant, the Gramscians of the left could always fall back on the politics of the Turin workers' councils of 1919–20. The Gramscians of the right, however, could no longer refer to a concrete historical model. Their situation, obviously, was no longer that of defense against an aggressive fascism. For them the politics of accommodation and class compromise would now necessarily mean the politics of parliamentary electioneering. While leftist charges of "selling out to social democracy" could be answered by noting that the late Gramsci himself had recognized the utopianism of a return to 1919, it was obvious that a fuller defense of the PCI's electoral strategy was required.

Gradually, over the past two decades, the Gramscians of the right have developed such a defense by means of two fundamental and, I think, quite surprising innovations, in view of what communism has generally meant in this century.

- The first was to turn necessity into a virtue by arguing that parliamentary democracy and the multiparty system it presupposes are not merely "bourgeois" contrivances, or cloaks for bourgeois domination, but integral aspects of all democracies, socialist as well as capitalist. To imagine

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democracy solely as a network of workers' councils is, for them, utopian; to imagine it on any of the Eastern-bloc models is, for them, a sham. We are left, they say, with the institutions we have, and we must make them serve socialist ends, even if today they do not.

• The second innovation is perhaps even more surprising. Socialism, for the Gramscians of the right, and above all for their leading economic spokesman Giorgio Napolitano, does not mean nationalization of all the major industries and centralized planning on the Eastern model. Socialism, argues Napolitano, may well mean extensive use of market mechanisms, roughly in the manner, one gathers, of the social democratic regimes that post-World War II Europe has already witnessed.

• Should we conclude, then, as many have, that the PCI, except for its most ardent left Gramscians, has become a party of social democrats?

The answer, I think, depends on making a basic distinction within this admittedly very crude category I have been using: the Gramscians of the right. One faction among them, led once by Amendola and now by Luciano Lama and rooted in the trade union movement, is centrally concerned with the economic fate of the workers: how to help them keep pace with inflation, how to humanize the workplace so as to overcome the conflicts that increasingly plague it, and so forth. Amendola and Lama have disagreed on how this ought to be done. In the last years before his death in June 1980, Amendola argued that current union policies of pushing for index-linked wages that fuel inflation and of failing to stop increasing violence in the workplace could lead to the bankruptcy of Italy and force the PCI to fall back on a pro-Soviet and ultimately totalitarian position. Lama, who proposed a policy of union self-restraint in 1976, now argues that Amendola underestimated the difficulty of getting millions of workers to accept "sacrifices." But both focus all their attention on bread-and-butter politics. Neither claims Swedish or German social democracy as a model, but both offer nothing, even by way of hints, as to the difference between their outlooks and social democrats elsewhere.

WITH BERLINGUER'S now dominant faction we have, I think, a more complicated story. Berlinguer's embrace of Napolitano's ideas about market socialism and his rejection of extensive nationalization and centralized planning are hardly suggestive of anything more left-leaning than social democracy. Yet as his replies to Amendola's call for working-class belt-tightening and "sacrifices" make clear, a Communist party without some sort of larger ideological vision is bound to lose popular support. Amendola's approach, he declares, "can only produce bewilderment and disheartenment." Thus he is driven to affirm, at least with passing references and vague hints, some of what the left Gramscians have always advocated.

Berlinguer's politics, then, are an uneasy oscillation between pragmatic accommodation to difficult economic circumstances and visions of long-run "goals of transformation," which, while vague, seem to be genuinely held. His politics, I am suggesting, are bound up in the same contradictory movement that Gramsci's were, however great the differences in their respective historic milieus. Whether his vision of transformation will someday be enacted as the final act of Gramsci's glacially paced drama of "Western revolution" is, of course, far from clear. I would also suggest that Berlinguer's dilemma is like the one that confronts all sensible elements of the Western left today.

Given the bankruptcy of East European "socialism," to take anything other than some form of social democracy as a starting point would indicate not only a false sense of the possible but also of the desirable. Yet it is equally obvious that social democracy not only represents a significant compromise of traditional aims of the left, such as equality, political self-governance, and a nonalienating culture—but that it may not even be viable except in periods when capitalism is experiencing relative prosperity and growth. In the present, post–1973 period, its problems are acute and its viability is deeply in question. No doubt, Berlinguer has many problems not shared by the left elsewhere in the West, but this, his most fundamental one, appears to be embedded in the present historical situation. □

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Nicolaus Mills

The Portable Generation

"What are they like?" Because I teach and because the college at which I teach, Sarah Lawrence, has a reputation for being experimental, I am constantly asked this question about my students. Most of the time I resist answering. I am suspicious of any generalization I am likely to make, and I sense that the people who raise that question secretly look on me not as a teacher but as a human zoo keeper—an authority on an exotic species I am empowered to keep under control from September to June.

Lately, however, I find that what lies behind this question, particularly when posed by friends who, like me, grew up in the '60s, is not curiosity so much as fear—fear that the people who are emerging from our colleges in the 1980s are hip conservatives. The student my friends picture getting a diploma these days is a combination jogger, vegetarian, Reaganite, future condo dweller: someone who sees the country's current state of disarray but won't do anything to change it; the kind of sophisticate who knows what the gentrification of cities is doing to the poor but has too much invested in an apartment to want the gentrification to end.

This stereotype both worries and puzzles me. I cannot figure out whether it is a dare or a write-off. In either case, though, I think it needs an answer. For behind it lives an arrogance that menaces us all. What it says to the current generation of college students is, "You're impoverished. You have no Mississippi to go to. No Vietnam War to protest. No John and Robert Kennedy to mourn. No Martin Luther King to heroize. No SDS to join. No Washington moratoriums to gather at. No wonder you're the way you are! No wonder the best you can do is take our style minus its content!"

A half-decade ago, when Jimmy Carter and Jerry Ford were our political heavyweights, such a statement would have fallen on deaf ears. Now it has the capacity to hurt. Whatever their faults, this crop of college students shows little affinity for playing ostrich. They are not Tom Wolfe's "me" generation, nor Christopher Lasch's cultural narcissists, nor the crazies of Joan Didion's *The White Album*. They are aware, as no college generation in recent memory, of being in for a long haul, and they have begun to prepare themselves accordingly.

AS A RESULT, they have become a portable generation. A generation whose most ubiquitous possession is the nylon backpack and whose life style is reflected in a readiness to change addresses or schools with little notice, begin or end relationships with a minimum of trauma, keep free of controlling beliefs. Why this should be so is, I find, much harder to say, but at this point five factors seem to me especialy worth noting:

• *Post-Liberation Blues* • Like any number of college generations, this one has the sense of coming of age at a dull moment in history. But far more decisive, particularly among women, is the feeling that the great liberation battles have already been won. The current abortion controversy and the Equal Rights Amendment struggle are, of course, grim reminders that soon the country could easily move backward rather than forward. But were the worst to happen, what it would mean to the current generation of college students is a renewed war in which a previous generation has all the heroes. For the Class of '82 and those their age, the upshot is a dilemma that won't go away. They must, they know, be loyal to a past that has liberated them in profound ways, but the more loyal they are, the more difficult it becomes from their point of view to find a voice or a cause recognizably their own.

• *The Visual Bind* • It is commonly assumed that television has turned this generation into lousy readers with 30-minute attention spans, and their lowered College Board scores suggest that they have gone downhill in the way they test. But there is something more here than a slippage in reading scores or how much time the Class of '82 spends watching TV: at issue is the fact that this generation of students is geared to the visual. More at ease in front of a screen than a book. More willing to go to a museum than a library. More anxious to make a movie or work for a film company than at a publishing house. The result is that for any number of them there is an extraordinary gap separating the language of the visual that is natural to them from the bookish language of the schools in which they have spent most of their time. It is not a gap like the one that affects so many Spanish-speaking children in the public schools, but it is a gap, and its effects cannot be underestimated. It breeds resentment and, above all, it puts twenty-year-olds in a situation in which they must operate in a medium that is not the one in which they make their subtlest, and most perceptive, distinctions.

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• *Fear of Divorce* • By now even government statistics are telling us that everyone is getting married later, living alone longer, having fewer children. But for the Class of '82 and those their age, something more is going on. What they are really fighting is not marriage or monogamy or parenthood. What they are fighting is the prospect of divorce. They have an almost fatalistic belief that two people cannot remain together over a lifetime, and what they are seeking to do in their various postponing strategies is to put off divorce. The problem is the self-fulfililng nature of their fear of divorce. It makes sense, of course, for women to have careers that will let them be self-supporting, and it is practicable for couples to live together before settling into marriage. But when all these precautions are taken with the fear of divorce in mind, it means finally that in the name of safety something is withheld. One is prepared to forgive, prepared to move out, prepared to end up "just friends"—all without the irrational commitment that might make such adjustments unnecessary.

• *Downward Mobility* • It is not only the housing market that has closed down. Dozens of other careers now seem out of reach or hopelessly overcrowded. For the Class of '82 this means a realization that they may end up less well off than their parents. For some, the immediate reaction is to become professional with a vengeance. Their eyes are on the prestigious medical, law, and business schools; they work hard to get the grades these schools want. But there is also a less predictable, more interesting phenomenon: preparation for jobs that are not careers so much as a means to an end. One goes to a law school (preferably an untraditional one) not in order to practice law but to work for welfare rights. One stays at home baking bread to sell to local stores in order to pursue unprofitable work such as writing or painting. To be sure, the exceptions are still the ones who are taking such risks; but they are setting a new tone, and as the economy worsens, their choices seem increasingly prophetic.

• *Contamination Politics* • To call this an apolitical generation is to imagine that they were sleeping while the catastrophe at Three Mile Island was occurring or to fail to realize that Pentagon talk about winnable nuclear wars strikes them as dialogue from *Dr. Strangelove.* If anything unites the veggies, the joggers, the ecologists of this generation, it is a fear of contamination, and nothing embodies that contamination more profoundly than the Pentagon and the nuclear industry. For them, the hard part is going beyond this perception. This generation finds something contaminating about workaday politics. They are not at home in a union hall or a city ward, and they are not about to make the kinds of alliances that would draw them into partnership with poor blacks or striking farm workers. The result is that for the Class of '82 direct political involvement has, with some notable exceptions, been an isolating experience. It has thrown them back upon themselves instead of freeing them, and it has done so almost in direct ratio to the purity of their commitment.

SO PORTABILITY BECOMES an answer or symbol for those coming of age in the '80s. One holds back on words because one doesn't have a clear voice, because in the end only the visual seems authentic. One is wary about passion (not sex) because what can be relied on are friendships, not marriage. One finds that a job rather than a profession makes sense when it comes to work, and one practices a politics in which avoiding impurity is more crucial than winning. And yet in the end there is more to portability than just knowing how to withhold gracefully. When I teach, I do not find stereotypes filling my class. I find instead enormously complex students whose willingness to travel light and start over reminds me how profoundly my '60s generation failed to understand that politics is a marathon, not a sprint. □

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Rose Laub Coser

Portrait of a Bolshevik Feminist

BOLSHEVIK FEMINIST: THE LIFE OF ALEKSANDRA KOLLONTAI, by Barbara Evans Clements. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 352 pp. $15.00

ALEKSANDRA KOLLONTAI: SOCIALISM, FEMINISM, AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, by Beatrice Farnsworth. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 432 pp. $28.50.

Aleksandra Kollontai, the first woman to be a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party at the start of the Revolution, was one of the few Bolshevik leaders who survived the purges of the '30s. In earlier years she had been independent in her actions and ideas on politics and women, fighting the party bureaucracy at every step. Yet in the end she capitulated completely, agreeing to make changes in her previous writings that would indict former colleagues, and acquiescing to everything demanded of her. She spent her last 8 years in Moscow, after more than 25 years in the diplomatic service abroad.

Both Farnsworth and Clements have written excellent biographies, giving us not only details of Kollontai's political life and her feminist views but also a refresher course in the Russian Revolution. One gains the impression from both authors—though neither seems to be aware of it—that Kollontai was a woman of extremes: remarkably courageous yet a coward at the end; highly intelligent yet incomprehensibly naive; autonomous and independent yet romantic and sentimental. Perhaps the authors fail to recognize these traits in her because philosophically Kollontai was consistent. As Clements writes,

> Her socialism was based on three elements—community, revolutionary purity, and female emancipation. . . . The emancipation of women and the emancipation of all people would proceed from the creation of a harmonious society, built by the working class and by a party of revolutionaries who refused to compromise their principles. It was a fine vision, unsullied by realism. Factories, electrification, uneducated workers, military power, foreign policy, nuts and bolts—none of these concerned Kollontai. She demanded communes, revolutionary purity, and the emancipation of women.

Kollontai was born in 1872, the child of Russian aristocrats, of the second marriage of a mother who already at that time had mustered the courage to divorce her first husband. Like her mother, Aleksandra was to be strong-willed. From her father she learned the meaning of liberal values and a love of writing. She married an engineer, to the displeasure of her parents who thought the young man inferior to Aleksandra in intelligence. But she soon broke with him, being bored with her married life, and left her one-year-old son with her parents in order to go to Switzerland to study Marxism. By 1905 she was a Social Democrat. Soon thereafter she turned her attention to women's issues. She took heart from the development of the women's movement in the German Social Democratic party, under the guidance of Clara Zetkin, and actively backed Zetkin's demands for a women's bureau in every section of the Second International.

Kollontai ran into trouble because of her feminist views. Mensheviks and Bolsheviks alike were suspicious of the women's movement, ready to label attempts to foster women's interests as "bourgeois feminism." Socialists and Communists held that working-class women were supposed to realize that their interests were totally the same as those of working-class men.

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Kollontai joined the Bolsheviks in 1915, drawn into their circle by Lenin, who was impressed by her determined antiwar position. Shortly before October 1917 she was elected to the Bolshevik Central Committee, and immediately after the Revolution Lenin appointed her the new government's first Commissar of Social Welfare. "The party regarded Kollontai not only as one of its most talented orators," writes Farnsworth, "she was accorded the further honor, rare for a woman, of at least temporary acceptance as a theorist."

Despite lack of money and staff, and the hostility of the agency's staff that had been taken over from the previous government, Kollontai accomplished much as Commissar of Social Welfare. She ordered the establishment of social services in the style we know today in Western society. In the area of family policy, she abolished classification of children as legitimate or illegitimate, created the Department for the Protection of Mothers and Children, and laid the legal foundation for full state-funding of maternity and infant care. She was determined to show that motherhood was not to be a private responsibility but a social contribution.

Yet while she knew how to deal democratically with her own staff, having everybody, from party functionary to janitor, participate in her meetings, she had less understanding of how to win over outsiders who obstructed her plans. There was, for example, her attempt to take over the Alexander Nevski Monastery in order to convert it into a home for homeless returning veterans who were roaming the streets of Petrograd. Unconcerned that this was one of the Russian Orthodoxy's holiest shrines, and without consulting the political leadership, she ordered the seizure of the monastery. Obviously, as Clements notes, "the demands of the veterans rang more loudly in her ears than the ancient bells of priestly power." All hell broke loose. The monks rang the bells, a crowd gathered, and sailors were called in to disperse the people and occupy the monastery. It ended with one monk dead and the monastery unoccupied. Clements relates that Lenin was furious with Kollontai for having acted on her own, forcing his hand to decree the separation of church and state, which he believed then to be premature.

Kollontai's personal life did not endear her to her comrades. While still working with Shliapnikov, a Bolshevik union leader who had been her lover, she fell in love with Dybenko, a sailor seven years her junior, and soon married him. This provoked plenty of gossip among her comrades whose sexist prejudices had remained intact. Lenin told Clara Zetkin, as Farnsworth reports, that he "wouldn't bet on the reliability of those women who confuse their personal romances with politics."

Kolontai opposed the separate peace with Germany. Soon thereafter, coincidentally, she was sent abroad on some mission, and then dropped from the Central Committee during the Seventh Party Congress in 1918. Her final clash with Lenin occurred in 1921 at the Tenth Party Congress concerning the Workers' Opposition, then under the leadership of Shliapnikov. She had become the theoretical spokesperson for that movement. Her pamphlet *The Workers' Opposition* showed analytical depth. The government office refused to print it, and she had it printed at her own expense. In this pamphlet, which she presented at the Party Congress, she wrote that the party's present problem lay deeper than the issues raised by the Workers Opposition: at stake was democracy in the party, and the power of the workers. She accused the party of abandoning the program with which it had come to power.

How she combined theoretical astuteness with political naiveté—a fact the biographers fail to point out—is revealed in her treatment of her opponents. These were not all of one mind, and she could have tried to find allies among them. Instead, she cleverly pointed out something they had in common: they all distrusted the workers! In this way she united her adversaries against herself and alienated the leader of the Revolution by telling him that he did not know his communism. She tried to take on everybody with the sheer force and sparkle of her intellect, and failed. Kollontai's pamphlet made little impact upon the Congress, at which she was treated with sarcasm by Lenin and Bukharin, who included in their polemics personal invectives to discredit her.

Afterward, she was finished off completely when she proceeded to carry her protest against Bolshevik policies to the Congress of the Comintern. Although her performance must have been courageous and brilliant, to believe some witnesses, she had obviously set herself up to lose. Lenin was outraged by her behavior. Although, as Farnsworth points out, the harshness of the polemics showed that the party leaders dealt with her as they would have with any man, sexism was rampant during the Comintern's proceedings. Farnsworth notes that "Trotsky . . . bantered with Radek to the amusement of the audience over whether Kollontai should be called an Amazon or a Valkyrie."

ALL THIS TIME Kollontai continued her activities on behalf of women. From 1920 to 1922 she was the director of the Zhenotdel, the Women's Bureau,

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for whose establishment she had already fought before the Revolution. Clara Zetkin, in Germany, had been more successful; for Social Democrats were more flexible than Communists, allowing the expression of different interests within their party. But both Social Democrats and Communists were always ambivalent about fighting for the equality of women. Although Engels's work on the family and Bebel's book on women were widely read among them, most felt that the women's problem would be dealt with by the liberation of the working class. Most of them feared that work on behalf of women was "separatist," divisive and distracting from the mission of the proletariat. The whole Bolshevik leadership, men and women, held this view, with the exception of Kollontai. After the Revolution, Kollontai managed to persuade Lenin that it is imperative that working women, and the wives of workers and peasants, be mobilized for Bolshevism, lest they succumb to the propaganda of "bourgeois feminists." It was for reasons of expediency that Lenin agreed to establish the Women's Bureau—so that women would not be attracted to femimism, which was said to favor the rights merely of individuals and not to recognize the class nature of the struggle.

Working women would hardly have been recruited for the party if it had not been for the Women's Bureau. Yet Communists regarded it as an isolated effort, cut off from the general party work. The leadership never felt at ease with Kollontai. According to Angelica Balabanoff, as quoted by Farnsworth, Kollontai was

> [a] frequent source of both personal and political annoyance . . . More than once [writes Farnsworth] the Central Committee asked Balabanoff to substitute for Kollontai in the leadership of the women's movement. . . . . Balabanoff understood what she called the "intrigue," and refused these offers.

At the Eleventh Congress in 1922, an investigation committee of which Clara Zetkin, her old friend, was a part, threatened Kollontai with expulsion from the party. At this Congress, although requests were made by women and some men to give government and party support to the work of the Women's Bureau, its mission was further restricted. In 1930, the Bureau was finally abolished altogether. Kollontai was not expelled from the party, but was sent abroad, in the diplomatic service. After a brief return from Norway in 1927, she fought one more battle on behalf of the new Family Code that was in preparation. She was protesting the conservative tendencies to stabilize the individual family. This coincided, of course, with the stabilization of the Stalin regime itself. The concrete issue at stake was that the party wanted husbands, members of both registered and nonregistered unions, to be responsible for alimony and child support; Kollontai believed that such support was the responsibility of the state. She also proposed a marriage contract that would safeguard the interests of wives by having couples conclude agreements on their economic rights and obligations to each other and their children. The party leadership objected to her proposals on the grounds that the peasants would consider state support of illegitimate children a public licensing of prostitution.

The leadership could point to "the backwardness of the people" in rejecting Kollontai's vision. But, writes Clements, what about their own "enlightenment"? Why did they not heed Kollontai's demand that the party promote women into positions of authority throughout the Soviet system?

This raises the larger question: why have Bolsheviks and Mensheviks as well as socialists of all shades in Western countries distrusted the women's movement? Why have they all objected to a change in the status of women in society beyond merely writing about the position of women or the establishment of some "women's bureaus" or the sanctioning of women's journals?

There was, first, it will be remembered, a fear of "separatism" of interests even in a pluralist movement such as social democracy and, related to this, the view that feminism was individualistic, that it ignored class interests as the crucial factor in the fight for a free society. But I believe that there is more at stake here than these political issues. Socialists and Communists alike have never questioned the basic stereotypes, Bebel's statements in *Die Frau* notwithstanding. It is noteworthy that Marx once filled out a "confession," a "questionnaire" for his daughter Laura revealing that the virtue he admired most in men was "strength," and in women, "weakness." And Lenin's stereotypical view of women is surely exemplified in his statement, cited by Farnsworth, that contact between women and youth is "natural" because it is a continuation of motherhood.

KOLLONTAI WAS MUCH IN ADVANCE of her time, and this makes her biographies of more than historical interest. She may have been wanting in political efficacy, but she was a sharp analyst of social situations. To Lenin's notion that contact between women and youth was "natural," she countered that there was ground for an alliance between women and youth because both were in the position

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of being potential rebels. She also disagreed with Lenin on the definition of bureaucracy. Lenin was critical of bureaucracy, but he used the term as a synonym for "red tape." For Kollontai, bureaucracy was a special arrangement of social relationships, in which "some third person decides your fate."

Kollontai's views on sexual liberation caused consternation among socialists and Communists alike. Although she traced women's psychological subordination to economic dependency, she was aware of the problem of internalization. As Clements quotes her, "The contemporary heroines have to fight a battle on two fronts: with the outside world and with the inclination of their forebears, which is deep within them." I personally remember that she was accused by both socialists and Communists in Western Europe of encouraging free love, and that the mention of her name provoked sarcastic remarks concerning her so-called water-glass theory. That alleged theory apparently derived from the following statement, cited by Clements, about "the new woman":

> When the wave of passion sweeps over her, she does not renounce the brilliant smile of life, she does not hypocritically wrap herself up in a faded cloak of female virtue. No, she holds out her hand to her chosen one and goes away for several weeks to drink from the cup of love's joy, however deep it is, and to satisfy herself. When the cup is empty, she throws it away without regret and bitterness. And again to work.

Today we would not find this statement so objectionable. It could be argued that Kollontai's notion of free love is similarly sexist as that of those men who hold that one should "screw 'em and leave 'em." I could agree if it were not for the fact that this is a misunderstanding of Kollontai's view. She saw free love as a temporary phenomenon due to the conditions of capitalist society, where

> the new woman was constantly leaving men because she made demands on them which they could not meet. . . . She demanded that they allow her to be free, and they tried to reduce her to the old dependence. . . . The new woman searched from one to another, not realizing that she would find her ideal only in the future, when human beings had learned to love.

More important than the actual merit of her view about free love is the fact that it was seized upon for political and especially sexist reasons. Not only did she challenge the leader of the Revolution, but her ideas about the liberation of women went beyond economic demands and threatened the very nature of the whole patriarchal system. Most women in the movement—Ruth Fischer and Angelica Balabanoff come readily to mind—were thought to be silly whether they symbolized through their behavior the wish for sexual liberation, or the wish for purity as in the case of Balabanoff. Rosa Luxemburg—not a feminist in any sense—escaped this fate although I well remember that she also was accused by political adversaries of being a "romantic"—an adjective often used as synonymous with "silly."

KOLLONTAI WAS A CLEAR THINKER and an amazing orator who could sway crowds. Lenin knew this. He did not want her expelled from the party, and he was reluctant to attack her in public. At both the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses, and at the Congress of the Comintern, she conducted herself with great dignity and strength, ignoring humiliating invectives, going straight to her main point: the Communist party had gone wrong. With hindsight we must recognize, however—and the biographers fail to do this—that much of her courage was based on a rationalistic fallacy. Of course, the suffering of the veterans rang louder than the bells of the monks because it was eminently reasonable to assign empty space to starving and mutilated soldiers. Of course, she was right in her assessment of where the Communist regime was heading: the dream of the Revolution was no more, and Lenin's politics were spelling doom. But never did it occur to her that one needs more than being right to win one's case.

Clements and Farnsworth could have been a bit more critical of Kollontai. But I appreciate the fact that they don't let us forget that she was one of the few people who as early as 1921 and 1922 stood up at official Communist party and Comintern meetings, to declare her opposition on the basis of socialist principles—and that her insights about the place of women surpassed by far those of other socialist feminists, across the left spectrum.

Two questions remain: Why did she capitulate to Stalin? And how come she survived? Like many Bolsheviks who were purged, Kollontai signed false statements indicting former comrades. Along with other Bolsheviks, she could not face being cast out of the society she had helped create. In the 1930s and '40s, as in the '20s after her defeat at the Eleventh Congress, she decided, as Clements cites, that "obedience was preferable to isolation."

Why did Stalin let her live? Farnsworth speculates about the part played in this by Stalin's sexual sadism and his contempt for women. Indeed, he must have gloated over Kollontai's compromises in

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those last years. But Stalin killed more women among the old Bolsheviks than he let live —and why Kollontai was to live, we simply don't know.

Kollontai was called back to Moscow from her diplomatic mission in 1944. She assumed she was going to her death, to judge by her last letters. But she continued to live. She died of a heart attack in 1952, at the age of 80. *Pravda* did not even print a notice. □

David Bensman

Do Socialists Have Any Fresh Ideas?

THE TRANSITION FROM CAPITALISM TO SOCIALISM, by John D. Stephens. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press. 231 pp. $25.00 cloth, $13.00 paper.

During the 1970s, European socialists grew dissatisfied with the welfare state they had built, despite the prosperity and security it brought to European society. In the Swedish Social Democratic party of Olaf Palme, the French Socialist party of François Mitterrand, the German Social Democratic party of Willy Brandt, even in the staid Dutch Labor party of Joop den Uyl, there arose a critique of the welfare state on the grounds that it was bureaucratic; stifled popular participation; followed corporate priorities in economic development; perpetuated civil inequality; institutionalized inhumane conditions in the workplace; and, finally, rested on a worldwide maldistribution of wealth.

In the early 1980s, the socialist desire to go "beyond the welfare state" has grown urgent. As prices of energy and raw materials have increased and interest rates soared, the economic precondition for the welfare state—rapid economic growth —came to an end. Without growth, many European socialists believed it was impossible to provide security and improve living standards for the masses without disturbing the cooperative relationships between business, labor, and government that had prevailed for at least a quarter-century.

However neat the slogan "going beyond the welfare state" may be, it will take more than fine words to bring about industrial democracy and promote economic prosperity when effective demand for goods and services is stagnating worldwide.

JOHN STEPHENS'S BRILLIANT BOOK *The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism* helps outline how such a desirable outcome may be achieved. Stephens also clarifies the problems and obstacles that stand in the way. He begins with an examination of Marxist social theory in order to elucidate the concepts of "reform" and "revolution." Drawing on the works of such neo-Marxists and neo-Weberians as Nikos Poulantzas, Erik Wright, G. Carcherdi, and Anthony Giddens, Stephens revises Marx in two ways:

(1) He sees property rights as consisting of the right to make a variety of decisions about how property may be used, and he argues that socialization of the right to control the use of property is what socialists are after, rather than simply the socialization of ownership

(2) He conceptualizes class relations so that he can distinguish between class interests in consumption and class interests in production. On the basis of these formulations, Stephens is able to argue that a socialist program of structural reforms, aimed at socializing the control of capital, has the potential to attract the support of white-collar as well as blue-collar workers.

In order to determine how socialists might get past the current impasse, Stephens analyzes why some of the European welfare states are more complete than others. Stephens concludes that countries in which the welfare state is most complete are characterized by two things: high proportions of their work forces belong to labor unions;

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and labor/socialist parties have frequently been in government. Stephens points out that in Sweden, where the labor movement means the Social Democratic party and blue-collar workers are highly organized in unions affiliated with the party, Social Democratic governments helped the unions organize white-collar workers into the TCO. With both blue- and white-collar workers highly organized, the balance of power in Sweden and Norway favors labor.

In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, industrialization started earlier; as a result, the labor movement developed on strong craft lines and remained less centralized than in Sweden. The decentralization and disunity of the British union movement prevented the Labour party from ruling as long as its Swedish counterpart did and this, in turn, meant it was harder to organize white-collar workers after the Second World War.

In the meantime, in the United States and Italy, where labor/socialist parties have not been able to govern, levels of union organization are much lower, and the balance of power favors capital.

Swedish labor's success enabled the Social Democratic governments to begin moving a little "beyond the welfare state." That move became politically urgent, for as white-collar workers came into the labor movement, they exerted considerable pressure on the Social Democratic party to shift emphasis from income equalization and high marginal taxation, and toward programs expanding employee control in the enterprise, that is, industrial democracy.

The Swedish Social Democrats' strategy for industrial democracy included many parts. First in 1971, the Law on Improvement of the Working Environment increased the power of union safety officers, and gave them access to information about their companies. Next, the Aman Laws strengthened the power of shop stewards and Labor Market Boards, and placed worker representatives on corporate boards. Third, in 1976, the government revised the country's labor law and made employers liable to negotiate on any issue the trade unions demanded.

THE MEIDNER PLAN is the centerpiece of Swedish socialists' program for industrial democracy. In order to "socialize" the economy in the long run, the Plan would require companies with more than 100 employees to transfer a portion of their profits in the form of newly issued shares of stock to "wage-earner" or "employee-investment" funds administered by the local and national unions. Over a period of 20–30 years, profitable firms would come under the control of their employees. In 50 or 60 years, the majority of equity capital would come under collective control. Thus, when Sweden's Social Democratic party returns to power, the prospects for increased worker decision-making in the workplace and for increasing social control of investment decisions are excellent.

In a concluding chapter, Stephens argues that the smaller welfare states, such as Norway, Denmark, Holland, Austria, and New Zealand, as well as large Australia, could follow a similar path to industrial democracy. But in the larger democracies where business centralization has been limited, and where unions are weaker, progress will be much more difficult. The key, Stephens argues, will be labor organizing, particularly among white-collar workers.

Some readers may react to Stephens's book by questioning its relevance at a time when Reagan is dismantling the welfare state. That is a serious objection; yet Stephens's approach not only can meet it, it may be the only one that can do so. For the idea that movement toward economic democracy can only be brought about in times of prosperity depends on Keynesian assumptions about the economic "growth dividend" that can be invested in socially desirable purposes.

But what if there is no "growth dividend"? Keynesianism has no good answer to that question; the Rohatyn plan calls for government to expropriate covertly the wages and property of working people to generate funds for new investment. Stephens's approach, on the other hand, suggests that accumulated social capital, in the form of pension funds, can pick up the slack in job-creating economic activities, such as mass transit equipment, housing, and solar energy. Thus it might be possible to preserve workers' living standards even in an economy that is growing slowly.

Stephens offers no easy solutions or cheap comfort. But by combining study of the classical social theorists with a command of recent empirical studies, Stephens shows that the program of Sweden's Social Democratic party is relevant not only to socialists seeking to break out of the impasse of the welfare state but also to those who have not yet been able to build one. His book deserves widespread attention. □

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Saul Hillel Benjamin

Is a Rational Defense Policy Possible?

NATIONAL DEFENSE, by James Fallows. New York: Random House. 204 pp. $12.95.

Fifty-three American fighter planes were lost in the effort before the Thanh Hoa Bridge in Vietnam was finally destroyed by a guided missile. Complex-weapon enthusiasts readily cite such episodes when pressing Congress and the public for sophisticated hardware. "What they rarely add," writes James Fallows, "is that this technical achievement could not be converted into a strategic success because there was a ford just up the river."

Such oversights are emblematic of much that is wrong-headed about our plans for and public arguments about defense. Chief among Fallows's preoccupations in this richly anecdotal and sharply argued study is the burden of subjecting public discussion to the claims of reason. When it comes to arguing about arms, that is no simple matter.

Obstacles to improved public understanding of defense questions are varied, but there are "three realities against which all our military plans should be tested." According to Fallows, we must first acknowledge inherited constraints that dominate our nation's economy. Of the present federal budget pie, 49.5 percent (60 percent when one includes interest payments) belong to "entitlements, or the uncontrollables." Some 26 percent reach the Pentagon (Reagan's target over the next four years is to lift that figure to about 32 percent of the annual slice-up). The remaining 15 percent is left to quarrel about. (Welfare programs form part of the "entitlement" category, but amount to a puny 6 percent of the federal annual expenditures.) If defense is to get more, it is important to understand how little margin there really is in the federal arena with which to do that.

Disputes about defense policy are not exhausted by skirmishes over the size of the Pentagon purse. Enter two further "realities." We must recognize that future events may distort or even cancel the merits of any plans to wage a war, or to defend ourselves from possible attack. And finally, throughout we must be mindful of "the special nature of combat." Too easily defense talk "drifts up into the thin air of grand abstractions." Tactics are read from textbooks, emphasis is put on "magic weapons" rather than on men and the harsh, unpredictable life, and death, which is battle.

Fallows quotes with effect the Prussian military theorist and field officer Karl von Clausewitz: "Everything in War is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. These difficulties accumulate and produce a *friction* which no man can imagine who has not seen War." If we are to think clearly about defense, Fallows believes, we must resist the temptation to conceive the world in tidy, predictable terms. Friction is the difference between war as it is imagined and war as it actually occurs. "Friction is the only certainty in war."

The rational response would be "to develop forces and strategies that give us the greatest possible capacity to adapt to whatever the future brings," and Fallows does believe that there is "a rational list of what the nation needs for defense." But the list seems an elusive grail.

DRIVEN BY A GRIM LOGIC, the modern American defense establishment has invested enormous energy and resources in pursuit of ever more technically complex aircraft and weapons. A baneful marriage of high-tech impresarios and economic analysts has spawned equipment, like the M–16 rifle, which "even our enemies would not remove from dead American soldiers." Vietnam annals are stocked with complaints about the ineffectiveness of a rifle that repeatedly jammed in action. Ineffective equipment, however, is one thing: Fallows's indictment strikes more deeply into the administrative machinery that produces devices seemingly immune to reliability or success. Badly pirated from the earlier, highly praised AR–15, the plight of the M–16 is typical: weapons development has fallen into the hands of a military "corrupted by the mentality of magic weapons," and often sabotaged by the "culture of procurement." In 30 years of peacetime operation, Fallows claims, "the central function of the military has been perverted." Weapons production has been severed from its purpose.

There has been "a substitution of procurement for defense." Quoting one veteran of 19 years at the Naval Weapons Center at China Lake, California, Fallows seems to sum up his case: "There is no competition and incentive to produce. The goal of every good bureaucrat is to get an exclusive franchise on what he is doing." Such thinking has become standard operating procedure among Pen-

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tagon officials and their extended professional family. Defense contractors depend upon procurement officers to award them research and manufacturing grants, and procurement officers soon learn that their postmilitary retirement income can be happily supplied (and significantly enhanced) by employment for the contractors whom they previously judged. Too often, Fallows concludes, weapons are built not because they meet a demonstrated need but "to conform to paper projections of how a weapon should work." The business of the defense business is to do business.

There are other features of contemporary military life that suffer a comparable divorce between purpose and practice. Chief among these is the composition of our nation's armed forces. In a democracy, Fallows reminds us, "a military must represent its society." However one may object to actual and potential abuses of our military strength, if decisions about its use are to be democratically made, we require a citizenry that "feels it has a direct stake in its performance."

Arguments can—and should—be waged over the use of military force. And Fallows offers sound advice, particularly for those on the left: the draft is a political tool, whatever else its more immediate functions. Accordingly, "a draft should not be enacted because it would make foreign intervention either easier or harder." Fallows seeks to situate debate about how we select—and retain—those in military service within the larger context of the relation between society and the resources (and reasons) that society might bring to the task of defending itself. He views reluctance to reassess policies about military conscription as a failure to acknowledge important practical implications of liberal/left theory. Apprehensions about—and resistance to—a burgeoning defense establishment remain legitimate; but they should not blind us. More truly representative armed services may have a progressive influence upon the fashioning of defense policy. If the consequences of a military or defense policy are not "borne by the same public that must give its assent" to those policies, then the direction of both policies and their practices is less likely to earn accountability. "Ultimately," Fallows argues, "a nation must pay a price for using troops in war, and it will be more attentive to the price from the start if all its members think they must pay."

At present, of course, the volunteer army has tended to formalize what, during the Vietnam shame, was the merely implicit record: "a service that exempts the rich or the otherwise fortunate is not a representative service." During the Vietnam war, exemptions went not simply to the demonstrably disabled, but to the clever and the resourceful. Those who fought and those who died were disproportionately from the social and economic classes whose parents or relatives had little to say about the policies that sent their sons to war. Middle-class America's rage against the war ran parallel to the rising price it began to pay directly. In 1980, however, of the 100,860 men who enlisted for their first term of active military duty, an extraordinarily invisible portion had any educational or social experience of college. In fact, among that number a mere 25 (numbers, not a percentage) "possessed degrees from any college, of any quality, anywhere in the United States." Fallows puts this in political context as he quotes a Marine staff colonel: "I wonder about the morality of a nation that lets the disadvantaged do the fighting. I feel like we're setting up a kind of class warfare."

While the principle of an all-volunteer army remains attractive (chiefly because its contrary has the philosophic demerit of being coercive, discriminatory, and, in a sense, "always unfair"), Fallows urges a new draft. Its features should address just these traits; but however imperfect, it should seek to incorporate the notion of "a generalized system of national service." Such a service would offer options under a mandatory umbrella. (Not everyone would have to enter the fighting ranks, though Fallows seems to suggest there may be some virtue to requiring young people to share something of the more traditionally disciplined experience of "the ranks".) At the heart of any such new draft would be the argument, inherently democratic, that privileges presuppose service.

WHY THEN THE PERSISTENCE with which the defense establishment rejects arguments that might reorient its mission and practices? Time and again, Fallows records examples where the object at hand is the quest for certainty. Simplistic judgments about the "efficiency" of various weapons and strategies have their source in modernity's pervasive obsession with uncertainty. Nowhere is this more evident, or more dangerous, than in the prospect of nuclear war.

About conventional conflicts, however intractable to prior reasoning, at least there are facts about which to argue. But here there are no facts. Fallows's topic is nuclear conflict, *exchange* between unimaginably ferocious weaponry. Here defense planning has no evidence. At best, we build our missiles and speculate about their consequences: we have constructed "nuclear theologies." Arguments about strategic arms are not disputes about

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facts but of faiths. Talk about "first-strike capacity," "protecting the Triad" (bombers, submarines, land-based missiles), or the frenzied notion of a "winnable nuclear event": these discussions breathe the rarified air of hypothesis and conjecture. Analysts may second-guess each other's likely reactions to imagined conflict scenarios, but neither side has any basis for knowledge. "The most important questions about how the weapons *actually work* cannot be conclusively answered until they are fired." And fired under conditions that duplicate conditions of warfare, not the controlled experiments on which both superpowers have amassed considerable data. But this data, Fallows points out, is largely compromised.

Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union *has ever* fired an ICBM on the north-south route that each side's offensive missiles would have to take in an actual nuclear attack. Nor does either side have reliable knowledge about the impact an exchange of nuclear arms would have upon the actual delivery of nuclear-powered weaponry. Such weapons "change the atmosphere and induce incalculable winds which would affect subsequent missiles." Fallows suggests that there is some comfort to be taken. Where the costs of miscalculation are so high, no "rational leader, Soviet or American, would risk unleashing their arsenals."

Since only realistic, repeatable missile-entry tests could provide, in principle, the kind of evidence upon which sound strategic decisions might be taken, Fallows offers a practical suggestion for containing the arms race. Stop (or at least significantly limit) the testing of entry vehicles that can carry nuclear devices. Such a mutual ban would fundamentally undercut the acquisition of the kind of information that might serve to encourage either side to risk an exchange of nuclear arms. Wherever possible, we should restrict our ability to improve or acquire data that would serve the game of strategic predictions. Even after many tests, "prudent men" should doubt that all the relevant uncertainties have been removed. To believe in our survivability, Fallows claims, is to tempt disaster.

But on Fallows's own account, defense thinkers have never scored high on either prudence or the capacity to allow uncertainty to protect us. Indeed, *National Defense* offers compelling evidence that those for whom defense questions are matters of professional life are characteristically driven to exceed the cautions of reason. Wherever uncertainty looms its unseemly head, the mad rush is on again to design "the next brilliant item." The various plans to deploy the extravagantly expensive MX missile system, for example, are but the latest offspring of the magician's cleverness. The motor of that cleverness is the fear of uncertainty, the modern incapacity to sustain self-confidence in the face of the humbling unknown.

Fallows clearly grasps our dilemma. What is needed to ensure "the invulnerability of the deterrent" is that the other side must believe we are invulnerable. At the same time, our knowing that we may not be invulnerable has historically driven us forward to yet more sophisticated and even more uncertain mechanisms and consequences. "In nuclear weapons, both sides have a stake in keeping either side from starting to believe it really knows how the weapons would actually perform." Our mutual safety, therefore, lies in our shared ignorance of what might happen should either side push the button.

Perhaps this dilemma will sober and keep us. Yet if we remain the creatures we are, puzzled by uncertainty, ill at ease with our imperfections, we are likely to continue to seek to know what it is best we should only believe. □

Lewis Coser

Jonestown Revisited

OUR FATHER WHO ART IN HELL: THE LIFE AND DEATH OF JIM JONES, by James Reston, Jr. New York: Times Books. 331 pp. $14.95.

JOURNEY TO NOWHERE: A NEW WORLD TRAGEDY, by Shiva Naipaul. New York: Simon & Schuster. 336 pp. $13.95.

When Rose Laub Coser and I wrote about the Jonestown tragedy (in *Dissent*, Spring 1979), the sources of our interpretation were limited to journalistic accounts. I was therefore eager to turn to these two books hoping that, with the distance of some two years, they would provide a more searching account of these horrifying happenings. I am sorry to have to say I was disappointed.

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James Reston's book is worth reading largely because, owing to a suit based on the Freedom of Information Act, he was able to gain access to FBI documents containing transcripts of Jones's nightly sessions with his followers. His book is largely based on these tapes and not on the stories of the survivors on which the early journalists had to rely. Yet what emerges here is not much different from the story we already knew.

There is some value in having a chance to get the authentic flavor of Jones's ravings. Consider this specimen:

> You who are stupid piss-ants and reptiles, who are lower than the primates, you can make whoopee if you want but your whoopee makes me sick . . . peace, peace. . . . You make your whoopee, while I do something that is far more significant, because I know exactly what's going to take place. I've made some *big* plans, honey, both here and there and everywhere. Lots of plans. . . . You gonna commit treason? You better know whom you are dealing with. . . . You fuckers, I like to look at you now, because you don't know how clever I am. . . . I know I couldn't trust nothing, only Communism, and the principle that is in me. . . . I have made long, long plans to take care of these enemies. I'm a Man of Steel, though I feel every ache and pain. . . . This is part of the historical procedure, part of historical change.

And so on. Here it all is—Messianic visions, contempt for and disgust with his followers, complaints over his sufferings while he sacrifices all for the very followers he despises. Here we get the brew of slimy wordage that poured almost daily from Jones's unconscious in the Guyana jungle. By then Jones was surely already a madman. But the real question, and this is what Mr. Reston does not deal with, is not the sickness of Jones's soul. It is why the great majority of his followers, despite or because of his ravings, stuck with him to the end and never lost their belief in him. He attacked them viciously, ridiculed them and attempted to destroy their least bit of self-respect; but they continued to believe in him.

To understand how such madness can have such horrendous social consequences one must ask how it contributed to create a social structure from which individuals could not extricate themselves.

It is the kind of madness that creates the structural conditions for the surrender of individual wills to the (alleged) collective superpower. Having already severed his followers from any contacts they individually had possessed, having deprived them of any means of individual survival such as property, passports, etc., having broken down each individual's ego by rearranging friendships, courtships, and marriages—having, in a word, broken down each individual's orientations to people or things, Jones deprived his followers of any capacity for informed judgment, action, even a dim awareness of self.

Reston attempts an explanation through some fancy theology about Jones as the incarnation of the devil. It won't wash. The mystery of Jones's ascendancy over his congregation does not yield to psychological or theological ruminations. It lies, I am convinced, in the *structure* of his perverse utopian community. Jones's private madness, while real, does not sufficiently explain the public suicide of 913 of his followers. To explain it, Dostoevskian intuition or a great deal of sociological imagination is indispensable. Alas, Mr. Reston has neither.

The author provides some other hitherto unavailable information. We learn, for example, about that scavenger, Mark Lane, who, after having exploited the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy as well as of Martin Luther King, saw another opportunity in Jonestown to exploit a tragedy. He not only fed Jones's paranoia about the FBI and CIA plots to destroy the community, but even attempted to sell the story of Jonestown to a Hollywood movie company.

Reston also provides a mildly amusing account of the relations between Jones and the Soviet embassy in Guyana. The Soviet diplomats clearly were attracted by Jones's plans to remove his flock to the Soviet Union. Think of the chance to counter all the stories of Soviet defectors with the news that nearly a thousand Americans had decided to come to the workers' fatherland. But, then again, what would the Soviets do with these thousand deluded followers of a madman? In the end, the embassy people, good bureaucrats that they were, kept away from too much involvement with Jonestown.

AS SHIVA NAIPAUL SHOWS in some detail in his book, the Guyana government lacked the Soviets' caution. The corrupt regime of Comrade Leader Forbes Burnham profited in diverse ways from Jones's shrewd political support. Some of his ministers and officials took Jones's money, others slept with the (mostly white) girls that Jones provided for them, and the regime as a whole relished the political reinforcement that Jones provided in the form of mass rally supporters and enthusiastic press releases.

Burnham had originally been put into power by the CIA and the British secret service in 1964 to counter the pro-Soviet regime of his predecessor Cheddi Jagan. But in 1970 Burnham suddenly discovered his deep ideological commitment to

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Soviet- or Cuban-style politics and instituted a "Cooperative Socialist Republic." He now runs the country with the help of so-called people's militias, people's self-defense corps, and people's police. He has ruined it economically while amassing a gigantic personal fortune, rigs all elections so that the blacks who are his basis of power invariably prevail over the Indian laborers who are Jagan's mainstay. Guyanese bauxite and sugar are nationalized, the multinational companies have been expropriated, but the Comrade Leader now presides over a country where everything shows signs of advancing decay. Burnham's corrupt dictatorship and Jones's corrupt utopia seem to have been made for each other.

Shiva Naipaul's account of the politics of Guyana are vivid. But they are also somewhat overwrought. When he is approached by a man who offers to buy his foreign currency at black-market rates, a commonplace occurrence in many countries both East and West, he speaks about the man's "degeneracy." "He was an exhalation of the moral decay I could sense all around me. The society had robbed him of his humanity. It allowed virtually no one to be fully human." Well, Guyana is surely not a pleasant place to live in, but such strident outbursts hardly help clarify the issues.

Yet Shiva Naipaul's portrait of the sad state of Guyana is the best part of the book. He was only allowed a short visit to the destroyed remnants of what had once been Jones's empire, and he only talked to a few survivors in Guyana and the United States. As a result, he tells us little we did not already know. He tries to fill the gap with an account of the excesses of San Francisco's counterculture that may be news to his British audience but is old hat to American readers. His general observations about the West Coast are offensively condescending.

There are, to be sure, some worthwhile insights here, as, for example, Naipaul's realization that,

> [Jones's] corruption was not something which developed with time—as Jones became more power-mad, paranoid, or whatever—but was contained in the very premises on which the Temple was founded: the cult of the superman equipped with paranormal powers; the idea of a preacher who did not believe in God and a church that was not really a church but a secret society; the abasement of the self in the name of the Cause—all this was already in place when Jones left Indianapolis.

But, when all is said and done, Naipaul's book is, deep down, a shallow contribution. □

Mark Oromaner

Definitions of a New Class

THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUALS AND THE RISE OF THE NEW CLASS, by Alvin W. Gouldner. New York: Seabury Press. 121 pp. $8.95.

Alvin Gouldner's interests transcended the boundaries of academic sociology. Throughout his career he was interested in developing a critique of social theory as well as an understanding of the place of scholars and intellectuals in society. These concerns are brilliantly presented in *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*, the middle volume of his trilogy "The Dark Side of the Dialectic." The final volume was published in 1980, the year of his death.

The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class takes the form of 16 theses. The virtue of a thesis, Gouldner informs us, is its contribution to "organizing discussion in an intellectual community by its pointed implications for certain intellectual traditions." Gouldner situates his own work in a left neo-Hegelian sociology. His work is left Hegelian in that it holds that knowledge is important in influencing social outcomes, but this knowledge also is viewed as the ideology of special social classes. Knowledge systems are historically shaped. A left Hegelian sociology also accepts dissonance as part of reality. If other intellectual systems attempt to normalize the world and see a correlation between the good and the powerful and the bad and the weak, the left Hegelian does not assume that the powerful are good or the weak bad. If Marxists see a future in which a powerful and good proletariat will dominate, the left Hegelians accept "the possibility that those who are becoming stronger—such as the New Class—and to whom the future *may* belong, are not always the better and may, indeed, be morally ambiguous."

Gouldner argues that a new class system is arising in the Third World, in the "socialist" nations of the Second World, and in the late-capitalist

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nations of the First World. A "New Class" of intellectuals and technical intelligentsia is entering into competition with the "Old Class" of businessmen or party leaders who now control the various nations' economies. This New Class, like all classes, contains contradictory elements, and one of its major contradictions lies in the tensions between the scientific and technologically oriented intelligentsia and the humanistically oriented intellectuals.

With all its contradictions, the New Class has played a revolutionary role vis-à-vis the Old Class. Successful 20th-century revolutions, which have involved a transfer of private property to the state apparatus, have been led by revolutionary elites containing large numbers of intellectuals. Examples are the Cuban, Russian, Chinese, Vietnamese, and Cambodian revolutions. At the same time, members of the New Class in advanced industrial societies are acquiring an increasing amount of control over the machinery of production and administration. Members of the Old Class are becoming increasingly dependent upon members of the New Class for technical knowledge. Gouldner is not naive enough to argue that the capitalist class has lost its power; he maintains that there is a trend away from ownership control by the Old Class toward management control by the New Class. The increasing dependence of the Old Class upon the New Class in the West is paralleled in the East by the increasing dependence of the political elite upon the New Class.

THE ROLE OF THE NEW CLASS in Gouldner's analysis is similar to the role of the proletariat in Marx's theoretical analysis. Gouldner, however, argues that the New Class is a self-interested and flawed class and that, in the West, "the New Class's rise will more likely be like that of the bourgeoisie than like revolutions made in the name of the working class." While it may take centuries of development for the New Class to assume political authority, when this happens it will do so in its own name. One should not be surprised by Gouldner's argument that the moneyed class will be succeeded by another relatively privileged group, for while the history of all hitherto existing societies may have been the history of class struggles, *"The lowliest class never came to power.* Nor does it seem likely to now."

Gouldner dismisses the anticipated criticism of those who will be "dismayed (and even enraged)" by his use of the term class. He argues that since Marx did little to define the term, used the term class in defining a relationship to the means of production, and applied it to such historically diverse groupings as slaves, serfs, journeymen, or bourgeoisie, "then surely intellectuals and intelligentsia can constitute a new 'class.'" While Gouldner has the right to "feel free not to make a scholastic issue of the matter," I believe that a term such as the "New Elite" or the "New Knowledge Elite" would have been more appropriate. He could then have analyzed the conflict between the "New Knowledge Elite" and the "Old Moneyed Class" in the West and the "New Knowledge Elite" and the "Old Political Elite" in the East. It was, in part, in order to avoid a position identified with economic determinism that C. Wright Mills preferred the term "power elite" to the term "ruling class." For Gouldner money and culture are forms of capital. If the capital of the Old Class takes the form of money, the capital of the New Class takes the form of culture. Therefore:

> What is needed for the systematic analysis of the Old and New class is a *general theory of capital* in which moneyed capital is seen as part of the whole, as a special case of capital. Conversely, what is required for the understanding of culture as capital is nothing less than a political economy of culture.

This ambition to develop a general theory creates some difficulty in following Gouldner's otherwise clear and historically based analysis and critique. His critique is not limited to Marx and Marxists. It ranges from the analyses of Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils to those of Noam Chomsky and Herbert Marcuse. Each of these analysts has failed to examine and see both the liberating and repressive potentialities in the New Class. Gouldner's left Hegelian acceptance of dissonance illuminates the contradictory nature of the New Class. Thus Bell and Galbraith are criticized for having presented a view of the members of the New Class as benign technocrats whose elite status is "more or less inevitable and trustworthy."

The New Class is distinguished quantitatively in its possession of a relatively greater stock of cultural capital than other classes and in the fact that a relatively larger part of its income derives from this capital. It is distinguished qualitatively because it is also a community of language. This linguistic characteristic is the culture of careful and critical discourse (CCD). This CCD requires that the validity of claims be justified without reference to the speaker's person, authority, or status in society. There are obvious potentialities in the CCD for the undermining of all existing authority structures.

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The public education system is the necessary institution for the mass production of the New Class and the dissemination of the CCD. It is here that students are socialized by teachers who represent the broader collectivity and the CCD rather than in such intermediate institutions as the family, community, and church. The legitimacy of each of these is made problematic by the critical nature of the CCD. Gouldner cites research that suggests a negative correlation between education and religiosity, authoritarianism, dogmatism, and ethnocentrism, and a positive correlation between education and autonomy, complexity and reflexivity.

The actual role of education in undermining the status quo varies according to sector (elementary, secondary, and post-secondary), according to type of institution (teaching vs. research) and program (vocational vs. arts and sciences). However, perceptions about social phenomena are frequently as important as the realities themselves.

W. I. Thomas emphasized the importance of the "definition of the situation" in any analysis of social situations. That is, "If men define situations as real, they will have real consequences." A combination of the ideas of Gouldner and Thomas helps one to understand the present attack on the public school system.

The attack on the educational system and on other cultural institutions associated with the New Class may itself contribute to its further alienation from the Old Class—an example of what Gouldner's mentor, Robert K. Merton, called the "self-fulfilling prophecy." Gouldner maintains that the alienation of the New Class from the Old Class and the internal unity of the New Class, at the present stage, are much intensified by the barred opportunities that confront it, because of an oversupply of educated manpower.

Members of the New Class "want power commensurate with what they think to be their own value, and intellectuals have a very high opinion of their value." In order to lessen the dissonance between their power and their perceived goodness, many intellectuals have been willing to join vanguard parties that, upon achieving power, have limited the exercise of the CCD. The members of the New Class face the dilemma of perhaps having to support the extension of the state's control in order to remove barriers to their ascendance, while exposing themselves to the censorship of that very state apparatus. Gouldner sees Eurocommunism as an effort to resolve this dilemma. While committed to control of the economy, it also espouses a pluralistic democracy that limits the threat of censorship.

THE SPIRIT OF MAX WEBER is present in this work. In the dark pessimistic Weberian tradition, Gouldner concludes with the observation that, although the New Class is the most progressive force in modern society,

> The New Class sets itself above others, holding that its speech is better than theirs; that the examined life (*their* examination) is better than the unexamined life which, it says, is sleep and no better than death. Even as it subverts old inequities, the New Class silently inaugurates a new hierarchy of the knowing, the knowledgeable, the reflexive and insightful. Those who talk well, it is held, excel those who talk poorly or not at all. It is now no longer enough simply to be good. Now, one has to explain it.

But it was never "enough simply to be good." Gouldner suggests that knowledge be added to Weber's charismatic, traditional, and rational-legal authority basis. The unique aspect of this authority basis is that it is critical of all authority, including itself. Its very culture, therefore, contains the seeds of its own destruction.

In Gouldner's eyes the path to class succession is not an easy one. The influence of the New Class depends partly on its functional significance; its education; its relative autonomy; its political skills; its numbers and those of its allies; its will to power; and, very critically, the condition of the other classes. Recent events in the United States indicate that the Old Class and its political representatives are far from dead.

My forecast is, unfortunately, that while this book deserves better, its acceptance will be limited—because of Gouldner's insistence that all social phenomena are complex and therefore require a dialectical analysis. This will make many uncomfortable with his work. Besides, and contrary to Gouldner's assumptions, self-criticism is not a practice of all sectors of the New Class. □

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LETTERS

How Critical Is Our Condition? Some Matters of Foreign Policy

Editors:

In "How Critical Is Our Condition?" (*Dissent*, Fall 1981), Dennis Wrong inaccurately equates opposition to the Vietnam War with isolationism when he writes that McGovern's 1972 candidacy represented "an essentially isolationist rejection of American involvement in world politics." McGovern sensibly called for immediate withdrawal from Vietnam, but he was (and is) hardly an isolationist. In '72 he supported greatly expanded and improved U.S. development assistance programs; lower tariff barriers on imports of manufactured goods and raw materials from the poorer countries; and closer consultation with NATO members on all aspects of U.S. foreign policy. In these respects McGovern was more of an internationalist than Nixon.

In the same section of his essay, Wrong accuses the *Nation* of "denying the reality of increasing Soviet military power and . . . automatically denouncing any American efforts to contain it." While I am not in total agreement with the *Nation*'s views on East-West relations, I think Wrong's charge is patently hyperbolic. I also feel it's a bit one-sided to criticize the *Nation* on this score without mentioning the slide into cold warriorism of the *New Republic*, which has recently published the likes of Arnaud de Borchgrave, Constantine Menges, and Michael Ledeen, not to mention Jeane Kirkpatrick. Surely the *New Republic*'s neoconservative rhetoric on East-West relations is no less deplorable than what Wrong sees as the *Nation*'s insufficient concern with the Soviet threat. Why, then, should the former be exempt from criticism?

Louis F. Cooper
Washington, D.C.

Dennis Wrong Replies

I was not referring to McGovern's voting record in the Senate but to his 1972 "America, Come Home!" campaign slogan and all the talk at the time about the need to "reorder our priorities." Does Mr. Cooper really think that those who took this line had in mind only ending the Vietnam War?

My reference to the *Nation* was to an advertisement, presumably a better reflection of editorial opinion than any randomly picked article, suggesting that Reagan's doubting whether the "cold war" had ended was fraught with menace to the nation and the world. There have been occasional articles in the journal supporting NATO and American resistance to Soviet pressures, but there have been many, many more denying, questioning, and even justifying the Soviet military buildup. A few of them have actually been written by elderly Communists, e.g., Victor Perlo. I was not so "hyperbolic" as to accuse the journal of a pro-Soviet bias, although Mr. Cooper on no stronger evidence is quite ready to charge the *New Republic* with "neoconservatism"despite its frequent editorials and articles critical of that tendency (such as Michael Walzer's, reprinted in the very same issue of *Dissent* that contains my article to which Mr. Cooper takes exception).

Anyway, I was assessing foreign policy as an election issue, not handing out ideological demerits to liberal journals. Is the *Nation* so inextricably bound to the *New Republic* that a critical reference to one *must* be balanced by a similar reference to the other? Rather, as some people (who write frequently for the *Nation* but much less often for the *New Republic*) think that any negative judgment of the Soviet Union requires an equating black mark for the United States, e.g., one mustn't deplore events in Poland without bringing up El Salvador? That is not my view either of the journals or of the great powers. □

The Many Trials of Jacobo Timerman

Editors:

Leon Wieseltier read a memoir of mine about my days as Israeli ambassador in Paraguay and tried to deduce from it my "political character." He quotes [in his article "The Many Trials of Jacobo Timerman," Dissent, Fall 1981] my five-line thumbnail sketch of President Stroessner, who once admired Hitler and now is solidly in the American camp, and concludes: "Varon apparently can forgive a lot." I suppose he expected me to interject into my listing of facts a comment as f.i. "that scoundrel!" Wieseltier is blissfully unaware of an ambassador's duties. They certainly don't include the education of presidents, nor the arrogance of forgiving or not forgiving sympathies they may have held in the past.

Mr. Wieseltier's tour de force does not make me a part of an alleged neoconservative conspiracy against

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Timerman. He credits me with having started the "campaign against Timerman" and finds it "disgraceful" that this campaign "was begun by Jews." The truth is that I am in this campaign, if one can speak of such, precisely and exclusively because I am a Jew. I play no part in American politics.

Mr. Wieseltier mentions that I have "many friends in Latin America." Among them are some leaders of Argentina's Jewry whom Timerman cavalierly has dubbed *Judenrat*. Wieseltier is decent enough to call this comparison "really cruel." My friends are devoted and courageous men and if they can be reproached of something, it is that *they* are not hysterical. After all, they have no book to promote. It was this heartless and arrogant slander that gave me the first impulse to set the Timerman record straight.

Mr. Wieseltier takes exception to my assertion that "Timerman was not arrested for being Jewish; quite the contrary, he was freed for it." Yet two paragraphs later he asserts that "Timerman never said he was detained because he was a Jew," which would seem to coincide with my statement. He then corrects me by saying Timerman was freed because he was a "famous" Jew. I can live with this correction. Yet may I point out that a substantial number of other, not famous, Argentinian prisoners were released on condition that they depart for Israel, because they were Jews. No non-Jewish *desaparecido* had similar luck.

It is also as an Israeli that I am against the canonization of Jacobo Timerman. (See my article in *Midstream*, August-September 1981.) Wieseltier says in a footnote:

> Timerman's critics like to cite his description of Israel as "fascist." He is said to have made this repulsive remark in conversation; to my knowledge all that he has said in print is that there are tendencies in Israeli politics that produce in him a fear of fascism. . . . Timerman's commitment to Israel cannot be impugned; see for example his moving essay "Coming Home" . . . .

Timerman's "repulsive remark" was quoted by several columnists and never challenged by their author. More recently he compared Israel to Argentina and claimed that Israel is going to totalitarianism. This is not just frivolous. What is Israel's claim to fame in the U.S.? That it is a "sister-democracy," "the only democracy in the Middle East." Remove this image, and you pull the rug from under Israel's postulate for special treatment by the U.S.

Yes, Timerman wrote in 1979 a moving essay on "Coming Home" to Israel. In summer 1982 he made some other statements in Israeli newspapers: "I like Israel. I don't like the Israelis. I never will be an Israeli and I don't want to be one. [He travels on an Israeli passport.] Life in Israel is unbearable. It's inferior to any Western country." He also is in favor of a Palestinian state.

And this commitment to Israel cannot be impugned?

Benno Weiser Varon
Brookline, Mass.

Leon Wieseltier Replies

It is not arrogant not to forgive a man for having thrown in with Hitler. It is a duty.

And what is so terrible about comparing Israel to Argentina? Argentina, if Varon is to be believed, is rather an admirable place.

Timerman has some doubts about Israel in Tel Aviv. Varon has no doubts about Israel in Brookline, Mass. Let us say it is a draw. □

Do Reading Tests Test Reading?

Editors:

Deborah Meier (Fall 1981), one of our most thoughtful and articulate educational leaders, argues the case against reading tests with a fury that is understandable in light of the undue influence these imperfect instruments have had and the devastating effects of their misuse. However, before we outlaw tests or relegate them to the trash can, we need to examine more fully why tests fail and how they might be useful despite their fallibility.

Let us for a moment review what testing is about. A test is a standard stimulus situation that purports to measure the magnitude (usually relative, not absolute) of a defined trait. The construction of a test presupposes that (1) an adequate definition of the trait that is to be measured exists, i.e., the trait is well understood and its meaning is widely accepted, and (2) the trait is capable of being translated into item content for the purposes of quantitative assessment. With regard to the latter premise, the task of adapting the substantive content of a complicated trait to fit a test format, not unlike that of representing a three-dimensional structure in two-dimensional space, is formidable but often can be achieved without excessive distortion. It is probable that the shoddy examples of item construction cited by Ms. Meier could be avoided by instituting superior quality control. Further, isolated instances of absurd or inappropriate test items are inconsequential unless it can be shown that all items of a given test, or a number sufficiently large to affect the outcome, suffer from such deficiencies.

A crucial element in test construction is finding and using an adequate definition of the trait in question. Some test-makers deliberately choose simplistic definitions because they can be easily accommodated to the test format. But in most cases, the deficiencies of the test-maker's definition are intrinsic to the problem; they reflect the fact that the trait is not yet well understood. Professionals in the field resent tests that

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are not constructed on solid definitional ground, not only because their measurement will be invalid, but also because such tests obscure the lack of resolution of a given problem area. The very existence of a test gives the false impression that a terrain has been fully mapped when considerable ambiguity regarding its definition still remains.

On the other hand, new tests may be viewed as presenting a stimulus to critical thinking, as providing intellectual ferment in an area where progress has been stymied. The process of constructing a test, the data that it ultimately generates, and the wave of criticism that it arouses are major occasions for reassessing and reformulating the trait in question. One of the most productive ways to think about the meaning of a construct is to set about measuring it. If, indeed, the construction and use of tests constitute a vehicle for clarifying major issues, then we cannot afford to stifle such explorations. We need to guard against inappropriate use of tests without interfering with the dialectical process that they make possible.

When tests are used to deal with the problem of accountability by providing a periodic external measure of achievement, their deficiencies and limitations need to be borne in mind. Unfortunately, the simple summary statement of a test score is much easier to communicate and disseminate than other forms of pupil evaluation, and its quantitative form of expression tends to make such data seem more definitive than they really are. Obviously, tests should not be used to supersede the assessments of teachers who know the children in much greater depth. Nevertheless, they constitute a valuable tool; they provide another voice, an external framework, and a more objective (but not necessarily more valid) index of what is being learned. If we are not satisfied with the way tests work, we need to learn to make them better. But advances in testing will not be forthcoming unless the flow of test data continues.

Herbert Zimiles
Bank Street College
New York City

Deborah Meier Replies

The passion of quantification in the social sciences afflicts workers in the field of cognitive psychology where it is, perhaps, even more misguided than elsewhere. In this area, it has had two supremely unfortunate results.

The first is the ranking and sorting of people, most especially, in latter days, children. Though based on a set of a priori assumptions about a single "correct" response to a given question (stimulus?), and the same kind of assumptions about what constitutes a meaningful question, the norm-referenced reading test tends to relegate people to their permanent "place" in society. It bestows upon all those who have decision-making power over the testees' lives a fixed and preordained way of judging them and often a large role in determining their future. This, in turn, creates the unfortunate by-product of convincing the victims to see themselves as their judges see them, often contributing a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The second misfortune is the wasted time and talent of so many researchers. They "construct" instruments and gather interminable and trivial data that fail to clarify the truly important and interesting things we want to understand: (1) how children learn to read; (2) useful ways to judge how well or ill they do in fact read; (3) how to help them learn to read well; (4) how to develop the love and taste for reading that will make them inveterate readers.

The sad fact is that after decades of norm-referenced tests of both the widely discredited IQ variety and their suspiciously similar though renamed counterparts, the reading tests, no light has been shed on the above-mentioned:

> Gradually, even slyly, our own minds become infected with . . . the fallacy of misplaced concreteness . . . We come to believe that these theoretical terms (mind, intelligence) are ultimately interpretable as observations, that in the "visible future" we will have the ingenious instruments capable of measuring the "object" to which these terms refer. There is, however, no such thing as mind; there are only individual minds, each belonging not to "man" but to individual human beings.

This citation from Joseph Weizenbaum's *Computer Power and Human Reason* is, I think, a pertinent response to Mr. Zimiles's misguided reliance on the magic of numbers. For the rest, I refer him back to my article and its fundamental argument with which he simply did not deal. □

Tawney, Howe, and Socialist Morals

Editors:

I was much heartened to see the inclusion of some of R. H. Tawney's writings in your journal (Fall 1981), not to mention the essay by Irving Howe "On the Moral Basis of Socialism." Moral philosophy is a neglected area among socialists. This is unfortunate because, I think, the cutting edge of socialism is its moral outrage at the injustices of capitalism. We have overplayed the importance of Marxist "science" and its historical determinism. This is not to say that Marxism has not contributed valuable tools to our critique of capitalism, but that is a far cry from using it as a "scientific" dogma.

Now, with the social meanness that permeates our

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political climate, it is time to reassess our socialist critique and vision. There is much to learn or relearn from R. H. Tawney. However, although he was one of the most important socialist moralists, there are others that should be "rehabilitated." William Norris is one who, although considered even by himself a Marxist, was expressing a vision based on socialist morals. There are also Martin Buber, Erich Fromm, and others in the tradition of religious (Christian, Jewish, humanist) socialists. This tradition, in the words of Tawney, "appeals to principles."

As he wrote,

> An appeal to principles is the condition of any considerable reconstruction of society, because social institutions are the visible expression of the scale of moral values that rules the minds of individuals, and it is impossible to alter institutions without altering that moral valuation.

Can we afford not to heed such an appeal any longer?

DANIEL DEL VALLE
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